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ABSTRACT
On Verbs and Time

February 1985
B.A., Tel Aviv University

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Barbara Partee

This work is intended to contribute to the study of

aspect.

It is claimed that,

just as change and causation

can be viewed conceptually as either instantaneous or

continuous, inchoatives and process verbs, whose meaning

involve such notions, appear in natural language as either
event or process type verbs.
We adopts Dowty's hypothesis that the difference

between classes of aspectual verbs may be captured by the
presence of abstract operator such as Become, CAUSE and DO
in the logical structure of verbs, where these notions from

generative semantics are formalized in

a

Montague Grammar.

We argue that the presence of the abstract operators does

not always yield the classification of aspectual verbs

predicted by Dowty, due to the interaction of the meaning of
these operators with other factors.

While achievement and

accomplishment verbs, which are analyzed as including Become
and CAUSE respectively in their meaning, are event type

verbs for Dowty, inchoative and causative verbs which are

process verbs may be found in natural language.

Their

semantic analysis involves notions such as comparison, scope
vii

.

relations, conditions on the relationship between the time
at which the two sentences underlying a causative sentence

are true and the time adverbial modifying it, as well as

other relatied topics concerning the interaction of the

properties of partitivity and additivity and process
causative verbs, and the gap problem in the case of process
verbs vs.

that in the case of process inchoative verbs.

It is shown that Hebrew verb morphology system called

"binyanim" reflects some of the subtler distinctions among

verbs involving change and causation.

The relations between

the aspectual property of being an inchoative and change and

that between being an accomplishment and causation is

examined via the Hebrew binyanim, which are traditionally
claimed to carry the semantic features of inchoation and

causation
Several issues concerning the semantics of the English

progressive, which is an overt aspectual marker, are
discussed.

Following Dowty and Kratzer

a

proposal is given

analyzing it as an expression of necessity whose meaning
contains a free variable over sets of worlds, which is fixed
by the context of utterance.

viii
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VERBS, CHANGE AND TIME

1

1.1.

.

Introduction

The Classification of Aspectual Verbs
In English and in many other languages it is the verb

which carries the tense system discriminations of past,
present and future.

The role of what is called in grammar

"tense" is to relate the time of the situation described in

the sentence to the time of speaking.

A situation described

in the past tense is located prior to the moment of speaking

and a situation described in the present tense is located

temporally as simultaneous with the moment of speaking.

It

was observed long ago that verbs carry other discriminations

involving the notion of time, for example, whether the event
referred to by the verb begins, ends or is still occurring,

whether it is complete or incomplete, single or iterative,
protracted or momentaneous

.

Temporal discriminations of

this kind are known in the literature as aspectual ones and
the phenomenon is called "aspect".

Aristotle is often referred to as the first to mention
in his writing certain aspectual differences among group of

1

2

verbs, although he did not employ the term "aspect". He

discussed the subject within the framework of his

metaphysical system, which we will not discuss here.^ The
philosophers Ryle (1947), Kenny (1963) and Vendler (1967)
were the first to discuss at length the different properties
of classes of verbs.

Ryle described as "achievement verbs"

resultative verbs which express the success or failure of
the activity denoted by them

(

win

,

prove

,

find

and

)

distinguished them from irresultative activities

(

run

swim

,

)

making further refined distinctions within the class of
achievements.

Kenny provided strict grammatical and logical

criteria to sort different classes of verbs and Vendler

extended those criteria ("time schemata" in his terminology)
to yield four different categories of verbs: states,

activities, accomplishments and achievements.

2

Vendler

's

verb classification and the tests which determine it were

widely adopted by linguists and philosophers interested in
the theory of aspect.
The major criteria considered for the classification of

aspectual verbs may be divided into three categories:
(a)

tenses.

(b)

logical entailments.

(c)

time adverbials.

We will give one example to illustrate the way each of the

3

three categories interacts with inherent properties of verbs
and how it affects their classification.

A complete table

of classifying criteria accompanied by examples is given in

the end of this section.

Stative verbs

(

love

,

know

,

live in Northampton

)

may be

used in the simple present tense to report certain
situations.

Consider:

(1)

John loves Mary.

(2)

Alison lives in Northampton.

Activities, accomplishments and achievements in the simple

present tense can not be used as reportive and have only the
habitual reading:

(3)

John runs.

(4)

Mary plays the piano.

(5)

John catches butterflies.

Sentences (3)-(5) can be used to report a happening only in

restricted contexts, as when uttered by an actor on a stage
or a radio announcer.

The occurence in the simple present

tense with a non-habitual reading distinguishes stative
verbs from other kind of verbs.

This is an example where

the use of tenses interacts with the inherent temporal

features of verbs to yield different readings.

4

A second kind of test suggested for classifying verbs
is that of logical entailments

.

Kenny noticed that

entailments from the progressive to the non~progressive

distinguish activities from accomplishments.

If

is an

activity verb, then x is (now) ^-ing entails that x has
if ^ is an accomplishment verb,

then x is now

j^-ed

()2l^-ing)

entails that x has not (yet) ^-ed. The following example

illustrates this principle (where

—>

stands for the

entailment relation):
(6)

John is running

(7)

John is drawing a circle

^

John has run.
^ John has not

drawn that circle.
The third test is that of time adverbials which occur with

certain kinds of verbs but not with others.

Accomplishments

take in-phrase time adverbs (and in marginal cases take
for -phrases

adverbials.

)

and activity verbs allow only for - phrases time

Consider 3

:

(8)

?John wrote this poem for an hour.

(9)

John wrote this poem in an hour.

(10) John ran for an hour.
(11)

*John ran in an hour.

Other classifying criteria have been suggested in the

literature in addition to tenses, logical entailments and
time adverbials.

It has been observed that some verbs but

5

not others may appear as complements of certain verbs, that
some adverbs can not occur with all verbs and that certain

verbs can not take the progressive.
The classifying criteria set up by philosophers and

linguists were not picked up arbitrarily- all of them
involve certain assumptions or entailments about temporal

properties which verbs in natural languages maintain or
lack.

Since the criteria chosen were meant to reveal the

inherent temporal properties of kind of verbs, and assuming
some claims about language universals are true, we expect

some criteria to be similar in different languages.

When

two languages react differently toward the classifying

criteria, their verb classification must be affected by it.

Certain criteria used to detect aspectual features of
English verbs may be absent in other languages, i.e the
grammar may fail to express them (Hebrew, for example, lacks
the progressive, which in English can not occur with stative

verbs and serves to distinguish them from activities and

accomplishments), but we expect grammars of all languages to
exhibit some criteria (not necessarily the same for all
languages) in common.
The number of chosen criteria and the importance

assigned to some of them but not to others will affect the
refinement of the classification.

Categories others than

these suggested by Vendler can be found in the literature.

)

;

.

6

L.

Carlson (1981), for instance, adds two additional

categories to these suggested by Vendler- that of

momentaneous verbs and that of dynamic verbs.

He

distinguishes between achievements which take the

progressive and those which do not, and calls the latter

momentaneous verbs.

The verbs hit

momentaneous while win
achievements.

attack

,

,

,

notice

,

and blink are

and take off are

Dynamic verbs are placed between Vendler

's

class of stative and that of activities and they share

properties with both.

The difference between activity and

dynamic verbs is that the latter take momentaneous adverbs

while the former do not.

Carlson gives the following

example of a dynamic verb with a momentaneous time
adverbials

(12)

At seven o'clock the caravan was standing in
its old place.

Bach's (1983) verb classification also differs slightly from
that of Vendler

's.

He distinguishes between states,

processes (non-states) and events, where the latter are
sub-divided into momentaneous and protracted events
(accomplishments in Vendler
states into dynamic

drunk

)

notice

(

He sub-divides

terminology).

's

sit , stand

)

and static

(

love x

and momentaneous events into happenings

and culminations

(

die reach the top
,

)

(

,

be

recognize

,

7

Other verb classifications have been suggested in the

literature, all of them more or less based on that of

Vendler and differing only in the degree of refinement of
the chosen criteria which determines how subtle the

classification will be.
Vendler

's

In this work we will adopt

classical classification and, like him,

distinguish among statives, process, achievement and
accomplishment verbs.
his.

Our terminology differs slightly from

We will replace the term "activity verb" with "process

verb", since the former denotes actions in general instead
of temporal properties, which are relevant for the

classification of this class of verbs.
Linguists have observed (Dowty 1979;

L. Carlson 1981)

that the choice of subject and certain other NP-complements

affects the aspect of the verb.

Consider;

(13)

John ate the bag of popcorn in an hour.

(14)

*John ate popcorn in an hour.

(15)

John ate a chicken.

(16)

John ate chickens.

(17)

All guests arrived.

(18)

Guests arrived.

The verb eat is an accomplishment but when it takes the

indefinite plural direct object (as in (16)) or a mass noun
(as in

(14))

it turns into a process verb.

Eating chickens

.

8

denotes a process while eat a chicken denotes an
event.
Sentence (14) is ungrammatical since eat popcorn is a

process verb and as such can not take the in - phrase time
adverb.

Sentence (18) has an accomplishment verb arrive but

when its subject is an indefinite plural it turns into a
process
Process verbs describing movement which occur with a

specified destination or with an indefinite NP behave like

accomplishments.

Consider;

(19)

John walked to the park.

(20)

John ran a mile.

Dowty (1979) observed that almost all process verbs can have
an accomplishment sense when a proper context is provided;
if we know that John is in the habit of swimming a mile

every day we can say that in the previous day John swam in
an hour or that he finished swimming.

All those facts raise a serious difficulty for

Vendler's classification which applies to surface verbs
only.

The example given suggests that VP's and whole

sentences are involved in determining the aspectual

properties of verbs.
David Dowty (1979) adopted Vendler's verb

classification in his attempt to show that the difference
among Vendler's aspectual classes can be explained, to a

9

remarkable degree, by the appearance of abstract operators
like Become, CAUSE in the logical structure, of verbs of

each class.

All verbs which belong to one aspectual class

share the same logical structure, which differs from that of

verbs of other classes.

Dowty presents a lexical

decomposition analysis of classes of verbs in English which
is based on word meaning analysis in generative semantics.

His decomposition analysis is treated as fragment of a

"natural logic", for which an explicit model theoretic

interpretation is given.

The detail of this theory will be

discussed at length in the following chapters.
Dowty

'

s

main idea is that different aspectual

properties of verbs can be explained by introducing

a class

of predicates which he calls stative predicates in addition
to a few sentential operators and connectives.

The

aspectual operators and connectives are treated as logical
constants and the stative predicates as non-logical
constants.

Statives, which Dowty assumes to be understood

clearly, hold or do not hold of an individual by reference
to a state of the world in a single moment.

Dowty refers to

events and processes in his exposition, but these plays no
formal role in his theory.

The only notion his theory

employs is that of truth with respect to an interval of time
(see the discussion of this in chapter III). The notion of

an interval is taken as basic in his semantics.

10

Truth-conditions of accomplishment, process and achievement
sentences are derived from the semantics of the aspectual

operators and the stative predicates.
Bach and Kamp take an opposite approach.

Bach (1977;

1980; 1981) has introduced the generic term "eventualities"

which stands for events, process and states.

Unlike Dowty,

he does not take the notion of interval or that of moments
of time as primitive, but goes in the other direction and

analyzes the notion of time in terms of eventualities and
the relation of precedence and overlap between them.

Processes, events and states are analyzed as primitive in
the model and unlike in Dowty 's analysis, they have a role
in the formal theory.

Dowty does not adress the status of

events, processes and states in the world, but only provides

truth conditions for event sentences, process sentences,
etc.

Bach introduces the notion of a possible history which

consists of a set of individuals
and their relations.

,

a set of eventualities

He uses the English words before and

while as technical terms which refer to the relations of
strict precedence and overlapping, and he defines other

relations between eventualities- as, for example, that of
simultaneity.

4

Meaning postulates guarantee that different

verbs receive their appropriate aspectual meaning.

5

Kamp (1981b) has also argued for taking eventualities

rather than moments of time as basic and has shown how

11

moments and intervals can be constructed from them by a

technique that traces back to Russell and Wiener. Various
linguists and philosophers dealing with aspect have adopted
the framework that takes eventualities as basic (Parsons
1983; Hinrichs 1981; Partee 1984). We would like to keep in

mind the difference between Dowty

'

s

and Bach's approaches.

There follows the classifying table of aspectual verbs

taken from Dowty. The application of each of the criteria is

demonstrated by an example given below.
-

The notation + and

indicate that the class of verbs satisfies or fails to

satisfy the given criterion.

The notation

0

indicates that

the criterion does not apply to verbs of this class.

The

words "o.k" and "bad" specify correspondingly whether the
sentence is grammatical and semantically normal, or not.

:

.
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Table

1.

Criteria for Verbs Classification

Criterion

states

processes accompli - achieshments
vements

1.

Meets non-stative
tests

-

+

+

P?6

2.

Reportive reading
in the simple
present tense.

+

-

-

-

3.

X is ^-ing entails
X has ^-ed.

0

+

-

0

4.

X ^ for an hour
entails x at all
times in the hour.

+

+

0

0

5

X ^^-ed in an hour
entails x was 0-ing

0

0

+

—

o.k

o.k

bad

bad

bad

bad

o.k

o.k

complement of stop

o.k

o k
.

o.k

bad

complement of
finish

bad

bad

o.k

bad

bad

o.k

o.k

bad

.

during that hour.
6.
7

.

8

.

9

.

^ for an hour
in an hour

10. occurs with

studiously,
carefully, etc
11. ambiguity with

+

almost

The following examples demonstrate the application of each

criterion to different classes of verbs and the results they
yield

s

13

cr‘it 0 irion coinbinss diffsirsnt

tests.

non~stativ©

Stative can not occur in the progressive (example

21), in pseudo-cleft constructions

(example 23), they can

the imperative (example 22), they can not appear

with adverbs such as deliberately or carefully (example 24).
They also can not occur as complements of force and persuade
(example 25). These restrictions do not hold in the case of

other aspectual verbs.

The sentences below show that

statives fail to occur in these constructions:
(21)

a.
b.

*John is loving Mary.
John is running.

(22)

a.
b.

*Love Mary!
Draw a circle!

(23)

a.
b.

*What John did was live in Boston.
What John did was win the race.

(24)

a.
b.

*John deliberately loved Mary.
John deliberately built a cabin.

(25)

a.
b.

*John forced Bill to know French.
John forced Bill to learn French.

The criteria listed above differ from Dowty's only in the

results of the i for an hour test (criterion 6). In Dowty
table accomplishments take for adverbials.

'

However, in

chapter II of his book he provides contradictory judgements

with respect to this point.

At one point (pg. 56) he

maintains that accomplishments only very marginally take
for-phrases, while at another point (pg. 58) accomplishments
are said to allow both for-phrases and in-phrases

.

English
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native speakers have informed me that accomplishments with
for adverbs are generally bad.

Given their judgements, in

addition to Dowty's contradictory judgements on that point,
I

have changed the results of criterion

(6)

in Dowty's table

so that accomplishments do not take for adverbials, and as a

consequence criterion

accomplishment verbs.

(4)

is no longer applicable to

Only process and stative verbs now

satisfy criterion (4). If
^ is a process verb like walk then
John walked for an hour entails that at any time during that
hour John walked is true.
We have already given examples of the application of

the second and third criteria.

The fifth criterion

distinguishes accomplishments from achievements: if John
wrote a sonata in a month it is true that he wrote the
sonata during that month but if he discovered a treasure in
a week it is not true that he discovered the treasure

throughout a period one week in length.
Criteria (8) and

accomplishments.

(9)

distinguish achievements from

Unlike accomplishments, achievements are

unacceptable as complements of finish

,

and also unlike

accomplishments and processes, they can not occur as
complements of stop

.

Consider:

(26)

*John finished discovering the treasure.

(27)

John finished building the cabin.

(28)

*John stopped reaching the top of the mountain.

:

.
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(29)

John stopped building a house.

(30)

John stopped running.

The tenth criterion was observed by Ryle (1947), who

suggested that certain adverbs are anomalous with

achievements

(31)

?John

carefully recognized his mother.
attentively reached the top of the hill.
conscientiously discovered the treasure,
etc

Others adverbs which belong to this class are studiously

vigilantly and obediently

,

.

The last criterion which Dowty gives is that of the

effect of the adverb almost on different verbs.
(32)

John almost drew a circle.

(33)

John almost ran.

Consider:

Sentences (33) entails that John did not run while (32) has
two "readings”: that in which John intended to draw a circle

but did not do so and that in which John began to draw a

Process verbs lack the second

circle but did not finish it.

reading when used with almost

.

Later in the book Dowty revised his verb classification
and made further distinctions relevant to the various topics
he discussed: as, for instance, interval semantics,

subinterval predicates, agentivity etc.

We will stick to

.
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Dowty's "classical" verb classification described in
table

1

and will discuss later in our work some of the issues
he

raised which may lead to a subtler aspectual verb

classification

1

•

2

.

Analogies between Temporal and Nominal Reference
In various places in the literature

(Taylor 1977;

Mourelatos 1978; L. Carlson 1981; Bach (to appear)) claims
have been made about certain correlations and analogies

between reference in the object and temporal domains.

L.

Carlson (1981) mentions the property of partitivity
(discussed by Quine and the Swedish grammarian Adolf Noreen)

which in nominal reference constitutes the semantic

distinction corresponding to the syntactic distinction of
countability.

Informally, partitivity is a notion connected

with divisibility.

A portion of some substance like gold

can be further divided into parts each of which is also
gold.

(This condition is too strong since there are parts

of gold too small to count as gold.

)

The inverse property

of partitivity, i.e additivity, seems to hold

unconditionally of mass terms- the sum of a number of
portions of gold is always gold.

Additivity and

a

weaker

version of partitivity do not hold in case of count terms.
An individual in the extension of a count term such as
"chair" is not divisible into further members in the

.
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extension of "chair". Reference in the temporal domain is
similar.

Additivity and

a

weaker partitivity hold of

process verbs like push a cart

run and walk

,

.

This has led

to their characterization as subinterval verbs; if a

sentence with a process verb is true of some interval of
time

I,

then the sentence is true of every subinterval of

I

including every moment of time in I.^ Event type verbs
(accomplishments and achievements) like recognize and build
a cabin don't exhibit this property.

One of the contrasts between count and non-count nouns
is in their quantifying systems.

quantifiers, words like a, each

,

Numerals, singular

every come only with count

nouns while only mass nouns and plurals come with measure

phrases

Mourelatos (1978) observed that there is a

nominalization equivalent to an event predication in which
the original verb appears as a gerund or deverbal noun with

suffixes like -ion

,

-ment

,

-al

,

-ure

.

The nominalization

appears with numerals, indefinite articles and other count
features as in the following example; there were three

eruptions of Vesuvius

.

The nominalization equivalent to a

process predication never appears with an indefinite article
or cardinal numbers.

Taylor (1977) made a distinction between process verbs
(E-verbs in his terminology) and event verbs (K-verbs) which

.
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can be either instantaneous or protracted, and drew

analogies with spatial dimensions.

He observed that E-verbs

are homogeneous while K-verbs are heterogeneous.

Fall is an

example of an homogeneous E-verb since every period within a

period of falling is itself a period of falling.

Stab is a

heterogeneous verb since no period within a period of
stabbing is itself such a period.
spatial dimensions

:

He draws analogies with

every three-dimensional area within a

homogeneous stuff, like a lump of gold, is occupied by a
lump of gold but no space within a table (which is

heterogeneous) is occupied by a table.

chapter

I

Later on in this

will return to the observations made by Taylor and

Mourelatos
Bach (to appear), following Carlson, dealt with the

aspectual shift of verbs from one class to another.

He

adopted Link's analysis (1983) of nominals and extended it
to the temporal domain.

His treatment reflects a similar

asymmetry in the relation between count and non-count

meaning that runs in the same direction in the nominal and
temporal domain.

Link has adopted models with a richer

structure than those found in Montague by giving more
structure to the domain of individuals.

In Link's semantics

there are plural individuals like the children and John and

Mary and also quantities of 'stuff' or matter that
correspond to individuals of both kinds.

There is stuff
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that makes up the plural individual John
and Mary and the
that makes up the plural individual children.
One starts with a set of individuals

and extends

this domain by a join operation to define a superset

(AiO Ei where every i-join of individuals exists).
P^^tial ordering is then defined on the members of
that

oL

.

is "less than or equal to"

i-join of

and

<7<.

y?

A^ there is a subset

is

oC

itself.

E.

A

such

E.
1

just in case the

Among the elements of

which forms a special subsystem.

Each of its members is the "stuff" which makes up some

individual.
ordering.

This subsystem has its own join and partial

What are the relationships between the system

and the rest of the domain?

There is a mapping h^ from

individuals (atomic or plural) to the stuff which composes
them.

The ordering among individuals is preserved in the

ordering among the quantities in the mapping (h^ is an
homomorphism)

.

The same quantity of stuff may correspond to

many different individuals.

The same individual may be both

in the extension of man and the extension of cells since the

value of

hj^

,

given the two arguments, is identical.

Bach shows how one may extend the structure of the

model just described to the domain of events and processes,
which are new kinds of elements.

The analogies are between

events and singular/plural individuals, on the one hand, and
bits of process or portions of matter which compose events
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and individuals on the other hand.

As before, one starts

with a set of events A^ and extends
this domain to
means of join-operation and partial ordering.
subset of

by
is a

and its elements are bits of process of which

the events are composed.

and partial ordering.

This subsystem has its own join

The homomorphism h delivers the

bounded bits of process corresponding to instances
of each
of these event types.

Bach claims that any count term can be used as a mass

term and vice versa.

As an example he gives the sentence

there was dog splattered all over the road and the

expressions portions of ice cream and kinds of mud
same phenomenon occurs in the domain of verbs.

.

The

Process

verbs can be used as events and events as processes.

mentions Dowty

'

s

example

I

Bach

finished looking for a book

,

uttered in the context of a library with a well defined
search procedure.
Bach noticed an asymmetry in the relation

count/non-count in the nominal and temporal domain.

When

one starts with a count meaning and derives the non-count

meaning, a particular meaning seems to be involved.

The

mass noun apple seems to mean the stuff such that there is
at least one apple that is constituted from that stuff.

(He

argues later that a more indirect relation between the

denotation of a mass predicative term and the corresponding

.
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count predicate is in need).

But in the other direction, it

IS not clear how the meaning of
a count noun is to be

constituted from that of a mass noun.
serving of beer or a kind of beer.
in the verbal domain.

A beer may be a

The same asymmetry holds

When we use a process expression in

the count meaning in a certain context we
must come up with
some kind of corresponding event, but it is
not determined

what event it is- the beginning of the process
in question,
some bounded portion of it or its end.

Bach argues that

this asymmetry is predicted by the many to one
function from
the count elements to the non-count ones (as illustrated

before with the NP
same stuff

1

•

'

s

cells and man which correspond to the

)

Von Wright's Logic of Change and Inchoatives

3

Achievement verbs like cool

,

change from one state to another.

reach and die denote a
This observation may be

found in various places in the literature.

Von Wright

(1963) developed a formal calculus to represent change.

An

event is a change of state where one state is the negation
of the other.

His calculus of change of state consists of

classic propositional logic plus an operator T ("And Next")
by which four basic types of formulas can be represented:

~pTp
pT

rv

-

p-

the state p comes about.

the state p ends.

.

.
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pTp

-

the state p remains

'^pT'^p-

the state

p remains.

Generative semanticists suggested that an operator
such as
Become is involved in the underlying representation
of

sentences like John died.

Various proposals were made about

the stages of lexical insertion and the
syntactic nodes

which govern different constituents.

I

will ignore these

questions here and represent John died by the general tree;

(34)

S

John

become not alive

Dowty (1979) analyzed sentences involving the operator
Become in terms of Von Wright's logic of change.

His

analysis can represent the beginning and the ending of
states and activities as in John got drunk and John stopped

running

.

He suggested that one regard Become as a sentence

operator, and define its truth condition with respect to a

model
Dowty

'

s

claim that all achievements have a logical

structure consisting of Become plus an embedded clause leads
him to distinguish between three types of achievement verbs

which he represents by different formulas.

He uses a

.
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convention whereby oL

stands for arbitrary predicates and

for arbitrary formulas either atomic or
complex.
The first type are simple achievements represented
by
^ X Become
(

[

o<l

'(

X )])

.

Simple achievements are sub-categorized

into several groups: locatives like reach

,

leave which are

transitive, and also two place predicate like arrive at

absolute changes of physical state like freeze

melt

,

;

die

,

which are intransitive, and one-place predicates like
become-ad;]-er

;

aspectual complement verbs like begin

verbs of possession change like lose
verbs like notice , see

;

,

acquire

;

start,

,

cognitive

and change of state of consciousness

like awaken .
The second type of verbs of change are those which

indicate inchoation of activity.

Sentences embedded under

Become do not always contain a stative predicate, and may

instead contain an activity.

The only English lexical

example Dowty provided is germinate (Become plus grow

)

Complex sentences like John begin to walk also fall under
this category.
follows, where
‘V

Dowty represents inchoation of activity as
oC

stands for arbitrary individuals terms,

for n-place stative predicates and DO is a semantic

operator which changes statives into activities;
(35)

Become [D0(o4j^[

(

oL

The third type of verb is that of an inchoation of
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accomplishment.
Become

Where

j/

is an accomplishment sentence.

j represents this group.

The linguistic tests which single out
achievements were

discussed in 1.1. Achievements are event type verbs.
There
are many cases in which they represent an
absolute change of
state.

Consider:

(36)

The cube of ice melted at midnight.

(37)

The puddle of water froze at three o'clock.

(38)

John reached the top of the mountain at one
O'clock in the afternoon.

There are physical states which determine the time at which
the subject entered the absolute states implied by sentences
(36)- (38). While the adjectives frozen

,

melted desribe these

absolute states there is no English adjective which
describes the absolute state of being on the top of the

mountain or being a winner of a race.

Since stative

predicates underlying VP's like win the race and reach the
top of the mountain do not exist in English, Dowty suggests

giving these VP's a more complex representation.
Inchoative verbs form a sub-class of achievements and

usually denote a change of physical state, melt
die , for example.

,

freeze

,

In English there are inchoatives

morphologically related to adjectives which denote the state
which undergoes the transformation described by the verb.
Cool ^ is morphologically related to cool

^^ ^

as redden ^, is

;

)
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related to red^^_ English has a quite productive
lexical
rule for deriving inchoatives by adding the
suffix en to the

corresponding adjective.

In Chapter IV we will discuss

lexical rules in general and the deriviation of inchoatives
in Hebrew, which is more productive than in English.

Dowty offers the following syntactic and semantic
lexical rule for deriving inchoatives;
S^;

If

then

^

^

^^ere

^

ends in a non-nasal obstruent,

otherwise.

translates into;

"^l*

^ x [ Become

^ '( x

]

The clay hardened is represented in the intensional logic as
(I

ignore the past tense in the representation and represent

clay

by c

'

)

(39)

a.
b.

(c)

Become hard'

(c)

by

^ -conversion

The above translation rule seems to capture our intuition

about absolute change of states.

Let us call inchoatives

which denote an absolute change of states simple
inchoatives

.

It seems that the above rule involves an

instantaneous change usually associated with event type
verbs.

Any discussion of the kind of change involved here

is directly related to the semantics proposed for the Become

:

:
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operator introduced in the translation rule.
will be postponed to a later section.

2.

2

•

1

•

This issue

Comparison Classes and Change

On Ad;]ectives and Comparatives

One class of verbs occurs with durative adverbs and

usually does not allow the punctual time adverbial at

t.

Consider
(40)

The soup warmed for three hours.

(41)

The tree grew for three years.

(42)

The face reddened for two minutes.

The verbs in (40)- (42), which denote change, share some

properties with process verbs.

Like run

,

they extend

through a period of time and possess the sub-interval

property characteristic of process verbs- when the soup
warms for three hours it warms at each sub-interval within
the three hours.

Unlike run , which denotes a process, the

verbs in (40)-(42) contain a sense of completion which

processes lack.
an hour or

They may occur with time adverbials like in

It took x y time , which process verbs can not

take

(43)

The soup warmed in two hours.

(44)

It took the soup two hours to warm.
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(45)

The tree grew in three years.

(46)
(48)
(47)

It took the tree three years to grow.

His face reddened in two minutes.
It took his face two minutes to redden.

Inchoatives like cool

,

redden and warm are related to

adjectives whose extension is hard to determine since it is
relative to a comparison scale, or context.

Linguists and

philosophers have pointed out that vague adjectives can form
the comparative with no semantic anomaly.
coo^, warm

,

Adjectives like

red can be used for comparison as follows:

Adjectives like dead related to verbs like die which involve
instantaneous change can not be used for comparison:
(50)

*John is

deader than Bill.

Kamp (1975) and Klein (1980) have made suggestions regarding
the interaction of positives and comparatives.

Hoepelmann's

(1982) theory of comparison and change is an extension of

these works- his semantics for verbs of change is related to

Klein's and Aqvist's.
they have taken.

I

will discuss briefly the approaches

Kamp deals with the problem of vagueness

and contextual disambiguation.

He treats positive

adjectives as one place predicates and claims that
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comparative forms which are two place relations
are derived
semantically as well as morphologically from the
positives.
To show the primacy of positives over
comparative adjectives
he evaluates predicates in a multi-valued
model theory.
in

a two valued logic a predicate can
be identified with a

characteristic function which is
the set

0,1

.

a

function from a set onto

The extension of the predicate man is defined

as the set of elements in the universe which give the
truth

value
them.

1

when the characteristic function is applied to
Tall is a vague predicate since its extension varies

from context to context.

For any group of men some of them

are definitely tall, some definitely not tall and for some
of them it is not determined whether they are tall or not.

Before proceeding with our exposition we will mention
some distinctions made by Kamp (1975) and others to single

out different dimensions involved in determining the

extension of an adjective.

Some adjectives are vague but

linear, i.e there is a single relevant scale which

determines their extension when the context is given.
old

,

wide

,

long

,

belong to this category.

Tall

,

These adjectives

are also partial functions, i.e they are not defined for all
the individuals in the universe of the model.

Another group

of adjectives are those which are vague and nonlinear

(Klein's terminology for these adjectives), i.e there is

more than one relevant "dimension" or "scale" which

29

determines their extension.

^

is a non linear vague

adjective whose relevant extension can either be
its volume,
height, surface area etc. A can be bigger
than B in a
certain context where the scale is A's and B's
heights, and
B can be bigger than A in a different
context where
the

scale is their volumes.

An adjective like prime

other hand, is not vague but a partial function.
i_s

—prime

,

on the

The tomato

is nothing but a case of sortal incorrectness-

prime is not defined for tomatoes.
Kamp argued that to deal with the vagueness of tall one
can let the characteristic function

be a partial

function on the set of men rather than a total one.
some men the function will give the value

and for some it will be undefined.

1,

For

for others

0,

John is tall and John is

not tall may lack truth values, as may tautologies and

contradictions of classical logic.

The positive extension

of a predicate in a context c is a set of things of which it
is definitely true,

its negative extension is the set of

things of which it is definitely false, and individuals who
fail to belong either to the positive or negative extension

are said to belong to an extension gap.

Kamp introduced a

set of new valuations which close up the extension gap in a

consistent way.

This is done by a completion of the partial

model determined by partial characteristic functions.

Each

complete characteristic function that extends the first one
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in a consistent way assigns the truth
value

and

0

to contradictions.

1

to tautologies

Given a context c and a predicate

A we can define the set of consistent c+
(set of new
contexts) which include a consistent total
extension of the
meaning of A in c, i.e the set of all c+ such that
Ac^Ac+
and Act is total.

Fraassen (1969)

.

This is the supervaluation idea of Van

Suppose we have a partial model where some

tautologies are undefined.

We can make them true by

introducing supervaluations: something is true if it is true
in all the total extensions.

Kamp

'

s

analysis allows the comparative to be defined in

terms of the positives- if A is in the positive extension
and B is in the extension gap, then A is taller than B is

true if there is a completion

function

of the original

such that F'tall^^^"^

^'tall^^^"°*

the case where both are in the extension gap,

supervaluations are not enough.
B are both in the

The reason is that if A and

extension gap, there will be some

consistent total extensions in which A is tall, and some

consistent total extensions in which B is tall and A not
tall.

Klein introduced the notion of a comparison class.

A

comparison class is a subset of the universe of discourse
which is established by a context of use.

When Mary and

John are both in the positive extension of tall relative to

.
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a universe, a subset of it may
serve as a new comparison

class on which a new partial or total
function can be

defined.

Klein introduced the following example.

One

starts with a set X and partitions it by means
of the

function F^(c[x]) where x is the comparison class for
the

predicate A in the context

Y is the extension gap which

c.

remains, i.e Y is X- dom[F^(c[x]

)

]

Y is a new comparison

class which is partitioned again by means of the function
F^(c[Y]). Then again, one takes the remaining extension gap,
and partitions it.

Klein provides the following figure to

illustrate this;

(

51

)

X

The comparative is derived from the positive in a similar
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way to that offered by Kamp. Both Kamp and
Klein treat
adjectives as one place predicates and Klein
treats
prenominal adjectives as a special case and introduces
an
ad-hoc device to take care of them.
Hoepelman (1982) presents a semantics for adjectives,
comparatives and change in which he treats adjectives as
common noun modifiers.

His theory is influenced by Aqvist

(1981) who tried to account for the relationships between

adjectives in order to preserve the validity of arguments in

which they occur.

For example. Bill is a good violinist.

Bill is a violinist and Bill is good is an invalid

argument; Aquist would like this to follow from his theory
since traditional propositional and predicate logic can not

handle such cases.

Hoepelmann claims that an advantage of his theory over
Klein's is that it handles all adjectives in a uniform way
and is simultaneously able to account for relationships

between comparatives and superlatives.

He also deals with

opposite pairs of degree adjectives like tall - short
big - small

,

,

etc.

The area of the really not tall man will be the area of

the short man and the area of the really not short man the

area of the tall man.

He gives the following diagram:
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(

52

)

undefined

Pt3ll(U)=0

If Mary is in the undefined area, Mary is
tall does not have
a truth value and neither does Mary is short

.

Mary is short

and tall and Mary is neither short nor tall are
^*^^tradictions in classical logic, but do not have a truth

value here.

However, he claims, we can answer questions

like: How tall is Mary? by Mary is neither tall nor short,

she is something in between

This is not a contradiction

.

unlike Mary is tall and short

.

His semantics is intended to

reflect this fact.

Hoepelmann presents a theory of polar adjectives by
means of comparison classes.
as adjectives

He treats common nouns as well

(except for such adjectives as fourlegged) as

a special case.

The set of men, for example, is carved up

into the set of tall men and the set of short men.

Between

these two sets there is the set of men which are neither
tall nor short.
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(
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)

I

VlllWIWi/i//7Wh

F

tall (U)=l

)

F

tall (U)=0

W////////////m,/

\j

The same carving up can be done on this set.

The idea is

the same as in Klein except that adjectives are
common-noun

modifiers and contexts are no longer parts of the model.
The traditional view of adjectives as function from CN to CN
of which Kamp and Montague are representative, is kept here,

since degree adjectives like tall are functions taking as

arguments subsets of the universe and giving as values
subsets of the universe.

Hoepelman suggests CN's should be

treated in the same way, which may account for their

intensionality

i.e with respect to the universe the set of

,

philosophers may be the same as the set of logicians, but
the function corresponding to both may be different since
F

logicians F logicians u
(

(

(

(

Fpj^^

u

)

)

)

)

F

T philosophers
Thus when N is an arbitrary CN and A an

.

arbitrary adjective.

9

9
(?(N)

F(N)

€

(P(N)

(P (N)

and

F(A) e

(P(N)

(N)

(N)

;
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i.e, adjectives are total or partial
functions

f rom

denotations of CN's to possible denotation
on of CN's.
CN

possible
I

will

not enter into the details of Hoepelman's
semantics or the
conditions on the interpretation of adjectives he
offers.

2*2.

A Certain Case of Ambiguity

Consider the following sentences:
(54)

The sky darkened.

(55)

The soup warmed.

(56)

Bill's face reddened.

In sentences

(54)- (56) the meaning of the verbs darken,

waxm, redden depends on the context and in that sense these

verbs are considered to be vague.

The vagueness of these

inchoatives derives from the vagueness of the adjectives
from which they are formed.

I

assume that the meaning of a

vague adjective like cool contains a context parameter
(which

I

write as a subscript).

c

The lexical rule T^ will

derive the following meaning for the verb cool
(57)

The absolute simple inchoatives can be regarded as a special
case; since their meaning does not depend on context, we can

suppress the context parameter in their representations.
There is some evidence which suggests that inchoative
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verbs are ambiguous between a "become adj"
and "become
3dj er reading.
Consider the following examples:
(58)

(59)

I

a.

The Atlantic ocean is wide and is widening.

b.

*The Atlantic ocean is wide and becoming wide.

c.

The Atlantic ocean is wide and becoming wider.

a.

John is tall and is growing.

b.

*John is tall and becoming tall.

c.

John is tall and becoming taller.

used the progressive tense in examples (58) and (59) since

widen

,

grow can not appear in the simple present tense.

switch of tenses should not affect my argument.

I

The

used the

verb grow in example (59), which morphologically is not
related to tall, although semantically it is analyzed in
terms of the vague inchoative tall

.

Sentences (58b) and

(59b) sound odd since when the Atlantic ocean and John are

wide

and tall _ relative to some fixed context c, they can

not become wide_ and tall_ again.
are perfect.

Sentences (58c) and (59c)

The Atlantic ocean can be wide^ and still

become wider since in the semantic analysis of the
comparative, its width is evaluated with respect to contexts
(i.e. comparison classes) distinct from c.
c,

In the context

wide oceans are distinguished from non-wide oceans.

In

the evaluation of the comparative, the comparison class may
be much smaller (for instance, temporal stages of the

:
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Atlantic ocean).

One can compare two wide objects which are

in the positive extension of a predicate,
i.e you can say "a
is a wide skirt" and ”b is a wide skirt" and
"a is wider

than b".

This suggests that widening in (58a) and (59a)

means "becoming wider" and not "becoming wide".
(54)
a

Sentences

(56) appear to involve an ambiguity between a vague and

comparative reading.

Sentence (54) may imply either that

the sky became dark _ or that it became darker.

Partee has suggested (personal communication) the

interesting fact that some degree modifiers that
comparatives allow are the same as those that go with
inchoatives
(60)

Adjectives

Comparatives

Inchoatives

very cool
quite cool
so cool
pretty cool
rather cool
*a lot cool
*quite a bit
cool
*ten degrees
cool

*very cooler
*quite cooler
*so cooler
pretty cooler
rather cooler
a lot cooler
quite a bit
cooler
ten degrees
cooler

has very cooled
has cooled quite
has so cooled
has pretty cooled
has rather cooled
has cooled a lot
has cooled quite a bit
has cooled ten degrees

On the other hand, absolute modifiers like completely

absolutely (which imply some "absolute" top on

,

a scale)

go

with adjectives and inchoatives but never with comparatives;

(
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(

61

)

Adjectives

Comparatives

Inchoatives

completely
cool

completely
cooler

has cooled

absolutely

*absolutely
cooler

has cooled

completely

absolutely

This reinforces the suspicion that the verb
cool is

ambiguous.

(62)

Partee has also noticed that we can say;
the weather has finally cooled.

where finally implies an end state cool
(63)

and also,

The weather has cooled considerably.

where considerably implies a degree or comparative reading.
How should the reading of inchoatives paraphrased by "become

cooler" be represented?

In Kamp,

x is cooler than y is true

iff fo^ ^11 ways of resolving the vagueness of cool by

separating the cool from the non-cool, if y counts as cool,
then X counts also, but not in the other direction.

In line

with Kamp, we can say that inchoatives with the "become
adj-er" reading, which

will call "comparative

I

inchoatives", are also derived from the positives.

To do

this we introduce into our lexical rule T^ an existential

quantifier which binds the free variable over contexts;
T„;
M

^ x[

3 c

)

Become cool
[

'

o

](x)]

Argumentation for introducing an existential quantifier into

39

our "comparative inchoative" rule will
be given in the next
section.
Inchoatives derived by T^, which is a closed

expression, are no longer vague, a fact which
explains why
sentences (58a) and (59a) are fine.

2*3.

Inchoat ives in Sentences with Durative Time Adverbials

Dowty has given examples of verbs which would seem to
be achievements on some semantic and syntactic grounds,
but

which nevertheless allow durative adverbs which only occur
with process verbs.

These verbs express a change of state

and do not imply that the same change of state occurred over
and over.

He says that these inchoatives which occur with

durative time adverbials are vague.
(64)

The soup cooled for three hours.

(65)

The sky darkened for half an hour.

(66)

The Atlantic ocean widened for three years.

Dowty asserts that (64) should be analyzed as saying that
for each time t within the interval of three hours there is

some resolution of vagueness of cool by which the the soup
is cool is true at t, and false at t-1.

One wants different

resolutions of vagueness to be used for each time covered by
the durative adverb.

This is the reason why in the semantic

definition one should give "a resolution of vagueness"
narrower scope than that of times.

a

Dowty puts it this way:

.

:

'
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(Dowty 1979, pg.

90); "A sentence Become

should be true at

t iff there is some resolution of
vague predicates that

makes

f

true at t but false at t-1; then (\/x: x

e

an hour)

fi

must be true iff for all times t' within the
interval an

ho^^ there is some resolution of vague predicates that
makes
^ true at t

'

”

How should we represent a sentence like (64) in a way

which captures Dowty 's suggestion?
To say that the soup cooled for three hours

example (64), means that there is some interval
three hours, such that for any time t in

,

as in

I

of length

there is a

I,

^o^text such that the soup becomes cool (simplifying

assumption- the soup
(67)

(

3

I)

equals

s

^duration of

I

(\/t(tel)

—

^

)

is three hours

(3 c) [Become cool
'

^

&

(

s

)

(

t

)

]

)j

We have here an existential quantifier over contexts with a

narrower scope than that of the durative time adverbial.
Dowty (1972; 1979) has provided examples of achievement
verbs with indefinite plurals or mass nouns as subject or

object which occur with durative adverbs as in (68):
(68)

John discovered fleas on his dog for six weeks.

and noticed that these sentences involve an existential

quantifier with

a

narrower scope than that introduced by the

:

:

;
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adverb, but it was Gregory Carlson (1977;
1977a) who

accounted for the presence of an existential
quantifier in
sentences involving bare plurals.

Carlson has given

examples of sentences with indefinite plurals like
dogs

,

rabbits in constructions of various kinds: VP quantifiers,
negation, anaphoric constructions, frame adverbials and

aspectual verbs like continue

.

He has shown that in each

case the only possible reading of these sentences is that in
'^'^hich

the existential quantifier underlying the indefinite

plurals has a narrower scope than the other anaphor

.

For

example
(69)

Harry continued to kill rabbits.

(70)

Dogs were everywhere.

Indefinite plurals also seem to have a universal or generic

quantifier
(71)

Dogs bark.

(72)

Smokers are rude.

Indefinite plurals, referred to by Carlson as bare plurals,
are never ambiguous between an existential and generic

reading; they are in complementary distribution.

Furthermore, anaphoric constructions with bare plurals fail
to show the difference between existential and generic NP

'

s

in (73) the NP is generic and since it contains a universal

;

42

quantifier, the pronoun they can not be
bound, nor deictic
or an E-type pronoun.® Similarly, in
(74)

the NP is

existential, so again the pronoun can't be
bound, deictic or
E-Type

(73)

Mary hates raccoons because they stole
generic
existential pronoun
her sweet-corn.

^74)

Raccoons stole Mary's sweet-corn, so now
existential
she hates them

.

generic
The behaviour of the pronouns in (73) and (74) is

inconsistent with the assumption that (73) contains
universal quantifier and (74) an existential one.

a

This led

Carlson to look for a semantic analysis of bare plurals.

He

claimed that bare plurals do not contain a quantifier in
their NP. The difference between the generic and existential

interpretation of indefinite plurals lies in the meaning of
the verb they interact with.

The indefinite plurals and

their pronouns in (73) and (74) share the same meaning, and
it is the different verbs hate and steal which determine the

interpretations of (73) and (74). Carlson claimed that bare
plurals are names of kinds, like chairs, cats and flowers.
He introduced a relation R which realizes the kind with an

individual.

R(a,b) asserts that a thing a realizes the kind

or an individual b.

Similarly, he distinguished between an

:

.
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individual and its stages.

R(c,d) asserts that the stage c

realizes the individual d at a certain time.

Certain verbs

and adjectives predicate things of individuals
and kinds,
and others of stages of individuals or kinds
at a certain
time

Carlson mentions Milsark (1974) and Siegel
(1976) who
divided English adjectives into two classes: those
which
select the indefinite plural existential reading,
and those

which select the generic reading.

f^,

Property adjectives like

clever, tall are more permanent than adjectives which

denote states, such as drunk and happy
(75)

Dentists were drunk.

(76)

Dentists were tall.

.

Compare;

Sentence (75) has the existential reading where the subject
is an indefinite plural, and (76) has the generic reading.

States are predicates of stages of individuals and

properties are predicates of individuals.
Hate is a primitive relation between individuals while

kick and eat are relations between stages of individuals.

derived translation of eat is a relation between

individuals/kinds
(77)

^xy3x'3y'[R(x',x)

The part of (78)

&

R(y',y)

&

eat(x',y')]

A

;
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(78)

Raccoons were eating sweet— corn.

which IS interior to the progressive
operator is translated
into

(79)

3x' 3y'[R(x',r)

&

R(y',s)

&

eat(x',y')]

Dowty incorporated Carlson's theory into his
Become analysis
of achievement, and in this way (68) can be
represented in a

way similar to (64);
(80)

(Vt;t€six

weeks) At(t, Become [John know that

(3x[R(x,f)& X is on his dog])])
The existential quantifier in our representation of (64)

ranges over contexts and there is no context involved in

Carlson's theory.

My treatment of comparative inchoatives

is an elaboration of a suggestion by Dowty which was

influenced by Carlson's treatment of bare plurals.

The rule

of deriving comparative inchoatives introduces an

existential quantifier like that which is implicit in the

verb in Carlson's theory of bare plurals.
We will provide an example which illustrates the

difference between the two inchoative translation rules T^
and T

2

repeated below:

1
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(81)

Absolut© and vagu© inchoativ©s:

^x[B©com© [o<.'^(x)]]
(82)

Comparativ© inchoativ©;
'^

'

(

2

3 c)B©com©

[«^'^(x)]]

L©t's assum© that th© two cont©xts of us© ar©
Alaska and
Egypt. In Alaska anything und©r 0° c©ntigrad© is
cool and

anything which is abov© 0^ c©ntigrad© is not cool.

anything und©r 30
is not cool.

c©ntigrad© is cool and anything abov© it

Suppos© a particular glass of l©monad© w©nt

down from 31^ to 29^ c©ntigrad©.
(83)

In Egypt

In this cas©

(83)

Th© glass of l©monad© cool©d.

wh©n translat©d by

and

(

s©© (84) and (85) b©low) hav©

diff©r©nt truth valu©s with r©sp©ct to th© cont©xt of us©
Alaska and Egypt (wh©r©
(84)

B©com©

[

stands for th© glass of l©monad©):

1

cool ^

(

1

)

'

(85)

(84)

(3c)[B©com© cool'^(l)]

is fals© with r©sp©ct to th© cont©xt Alaska and tru©

with r©sp©ct to th© cont©xt Egypt. On th© oth©r hand (85) is
tru© with r©sp©ct to ©ith©r cont©xt, b©caus© in ©ach cas©

th©r© ©xists a cont©xt, i.© Egypt, wh©r© th© glass of

l©monad© cool©d.

.
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3.

Inchoative Process Verbs

^he Gap Problem and the Process Meaning of
Inchoatives
As we saw in the previous section, a sub-class
of the
inchoatives take durative time adverbials which usually
go

with process verbs.

Aspectually, these verbs seem to behave

like such process verbs as run and push a cart

although

,

morphologically they are derived by the inchoative lexical
rule (see chapter IV section 2.1.) and their meaning

involves changes of states.

We will refer to inchoatives

which take durative time adverbials as "inchoative process
verbs"
In discussing inchoative process verbs we will deal

with two issues:
1.

The gap problem which deals with the way of

representing the quantifier over times in (67), and the
relationship between the length of the intervals at which
the activity took place and the gaps in the case of

inchoative process and inchoative process verbs.
2.

The two possible event and process readings of

inchoative process verbs.
In the representation of

(67)

(

3

I)

[duration of

\/t[(te

I)

(64)

I

repeated below:

is three hours

~^(3c)[ Become cool
'

^

(

&

s

)

(

t

)

]

]

]
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the context is expected to change
for every moment within
the interval I of duration three
hours such that the soup is
not cool at a previous moment and cool
at the next one.
However, it seems that the universal quantifier
in (67)
forces us to accept undesired consequences
which could be

avoided if a weaker quantifier were present.

In

(86^) there

is no context (resolution of vagueness) with
respect to

which the soup become cool at moment

a,

yet, in intuition,

sentence (64) repeated below;
The soup cooled for three hours,

(64)

is true in the following situation;

In all the situations described in

duration

3

(86)-(92)

I

is of

hours and "am4M" represents not running.

.
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The problem of the representation
of the durative time
adverbials arises not only when they occur
with inchoative
process verbs but also when they occur with
primitive

process verbs.
(87)

For

John ran for three hours.

to be true, John does not have to be occupied
in the

activity of running at every moment throughout the
duration
of three hours- he can rest for ten minutes or stop
every

half an hour for a moment.

This situation is described in

(86ii) where we have drawn the running and the gaps on a

single line.

So sentence (64) and (87) are both true in the

situation described in (86)

Sentence (64) can not be true

in the case where for most of the time there was a steady

warming rather than a cooling of the soup (see (88i) below)
even though by the end of the three hours the soup is

definitely more cool than at the first moment.

Likewise for

primitive process verbs like run in sentence (87). If the
running occupies only a small subinterval of the interval of
three hours,

(87)

is not verified.

So in case

sentences (64) and (87) are both false.

(88),
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(

88

)

Some important differences between the length of the

intervals at which the activity took place and the gaps show
up in the case of process and inchoative process verbs.

This seems to follow from the fact that the latter but not
the former involve change of states.

Consider the situation described in (89i). The soup is
not actually growing cooler for most of the time but at the
end of the three hours it is cooler than at the beginning.

Sentence (64) is true in this case.

On the other hand,

(87)

is false where the situation is as described in (89ii)

although the periods of acting and rest are the same as in
(89i). So, inchoative process verbs seem to behave

differently from process verbs in case (89).

50

(

89

)

Furthermore/ consider the case where the soup cools

most of the time but by the end of the three hours its
temperature is the same as before, as diagrammed below;

(ii)
0

time

^AAAAli

3

'

>

'
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Where the circumstances are as described
in (90) we would
not say that the soup cooled for three
hours, but under the
same condition the sentence John ran for
three hours is
true.

This sentence is true whether John ran for
three

hours circling a building and ended at the starting
point,
or he ran back and forth along a line, finishing
at the

point where he started.

In running there is no notion of

making progress.
The truth of

for n hours depends on the truth of
p at

^^^i^tervals of the verifying interval whose duration is n
hours, and some condition on their length must be

stipulated.
The idea is that in evaluating the truth of ^ for n

hours we should ignore intervals shorter than some minimum

duration

In the case we have been looking at, and where

z.

the sentences were true, the duration of the "gaps" were
less than z.

This condition is stated more formally in (91)

given below.

j/

subintervals

I'

is true at

I

iff it is true at all

whose length is bigger than

z

which is an

interval whose length is determined by the context (sentence
(64)

When ^ is true at all I'>z, then ^ is true

is vague).

at I.

(91)

[[^ for n]]=l iff
(

\/

I
)

[

I

^

I

&

(9

I)

duration

[duration
I
(

')>

z

(

—

I

)=n

&

[[)^]]j,=l]]

.

,
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Sentence (64) is true in case (89i). Since
k is not a large
enough interval, the temperature increases
at k.

duration

^

decreases at

I

'

.

I
(

')>

But for

then the temperature

z

This accounts for the truth of (64) in case

(89i). But consider case (92);

Sentence (64) is false in case (92i). No matter what
as long as

I

itself has a duration longer than

intervals longer than

z

z,

z

is,

there are

where the temperature increases.

itself is such an interval).

(I

This again illustrates the

unique feature of inchoative process verbs- it is the degree
of cooling which is significant, not just the set of moments

where cooling is taking place.
case (92ii) since for all
true

I'

Sentence (87) is true in

bigger than

z

John ran is
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What about the cases described in (88i)
and (90i)? with
regard to (88i), the soup warmed rather
than cooled for
quite long subintervals of I. Assuming that
any reasonable
value for z is less than, say, half the
duration of I, this

explains why sentences (64) and (87) are false.
to (90i), note that Become cool
(

the interval

I

(

s

)

)

With regard

is false with respect to

itself; recall that we required that a

reasonable value for

z

be less than the duration of I.

Let us turn to the second issue, that of a possible

aspectual ambiguity of verbs like warm

,

redden

,

widen. These

may take a punctual or a durative time adverbial;
(93)

The soup warmed at three o'clock.

(94)

The soup warmed for three hours.

(95)

His face reddened at three o'clock.

(96)

His face reddened for three seconds.

Mourelatos has offered offered tests to distinguish event
type verbs from process ones as we mentioned in 1.1. He

claimed that an event predication has an equivalent

nominalization in which the original verb appears as
gerund or deverbal noun.

a

Event predications take cardinal

numbers, the existential quantifier and determiners like

many

,

few, while process predications never appear with the

indefinite article or cardinal numbers.

The corresponding

nominalization seems to have the same features:
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(97)

There were three eruptions of Vesuvius.

(98)

For three hours there was pushing of
the
cart by John.

Verbs like warm, re dden

,

widen seem to have an event as well

as a process predication:

(99)

a.

The earthquake was preceded by a
~
warming of the sea.

b.

How much warmina will this
tolerate?

(100)

^ widening of the road would facilitate
traffic flow.

b.

How much wideninq is aopropriate for
this expressway?

(101) a.

A reddening of the skin is a symptom
of measles.

b.

How much reddeninq of the skin will this
drug cause?

The progressive tense does not entail the present perfect

tense as is the case with event type verbs:
(102)

The soup is warming

(103)

The sky is darkening

—

the soup has warmed.

-y-9

the sky has darkened.

but notice the following entailments:
(104)

The soup is warming

(105)

The sky is darkening

—

^

The soup has
warmed somewhat.
The sky has
darkened somewhat.
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This relates to Kamp
and imparfait.

•

s

(1979) work on French passe simple

Just as we seem to be able to look at
change

as either gradual or abrupt, we seem
to be able to look at

time as either continuous or discrete.

Kamp discussed the

difference between French passe simple and imparfait
where
the first conveys that the action, event or
state reported
with its help has come to an end and the second
conveys no
such termination.
The imparfait is used to provide
the

background to a certain event or sequence of events, whereas
the succession of events which unfold against this

background is reported by the passe simple.

The use of the

imparfait places the hearer inside the action and the passe
simple keeps him outside it.

No one of these observations,

Kamp points out, can be captured by truth conditional
semantics.
(106)

He provides the following sentences:
II y a deux ans la Compagnie acheta un navire
de 100,000 tonnes.

"Two years ago the company bought a ship
of 100,000 tons”.
(107)

II y a deux ans la Compagnie achetait un navire
de 100,000 tonnes.

"Two years ago the company had bought a ship
of 100,000 tons".
It is not so much features of the event,

i.e the time it

took to conclude the deal, that determine the use of the

appropriate tense but rather the angle from which it is

.
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viewed.

According to Kamp, the truth of a piece
of
discourse should not be equated simply
with the truth of its
component sentences. Truth conditions can
be assigned only
to a discourse as a whole and the
differences between the
imparfait and passe simple can be explicated
in terms of
their distinctive contribution to the truth
conditions of
the discourse.
The particular order that the discourse
conveys depends on where the passe simple is used
and where
the imparfait.

The difference between the two is in how to

represent events used to report, or how to represent the

information in the discourse.

The passe simple, for

instance, pushes the action forward since a sentence in the

passe simple is understood as reporting an event subsequent
to the last event.

An imparfait sentence, on the other

hand, following a passe simple sentence is understood as

stating conditions which obtain at the time of the event e

which the passe simple sentence reports.

It is not

specified whether the state introduced by the imparfait
sentence outlasts the event with which it is represented as

simultaneous or not.

Kamp's theory of discourse

representation accounts for such temporal orders.

However,

what we have attempted to point out here is the analogy

between viewing time and change as either punctual or
durative
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Let us discuss the process reading
of inchoatives,

cool^ is a vague inchoative which
denotes a change from
cool^ to cool^ and the presence of
the durative time

adverbial suggests a reading with repeated
changes from not
cool to cool as described below;

(108)

0

'^cool^

1

cool
/V cool

2

3

4

5

6

cool
/^cool

cool
'^cool

cool
^cool
cool

The fact that for every two moments in the three hours the

soup turns from ^ cool^ to cool

^

i.e it becomes more and more

cool/ determines the gradual reading of sentence (64). No

comparative component is directly involved in the derivation
of inchoatives/ but given some facts about the meaning of

cool/ it can be proved that "become cooler" and

Become cool'^(x)) are the same thing.

^x((9c)

The repeated reading

of cool^ is not different from the iterative reading

involved in sentence (109):
(109)

John pinched Bill for three minutes.

where pinch is a regular event type verb.

This brings up a

difficult issue; should sentences (64) and (109) be analyzed

;
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as process sentences or as event
type sentences with an

iterative aspect; and is there a real
distinction in the
world between repeated events and
processes?
If an iterative event verb is
a kind of process verb

then perhaps the aspectual ambiguity
in verbs such as cool
and re^dden may be accounted for by the
presence of an
iterative operator which changes an event
type verb into a
process one.
in this case, (64) should be represented
as

follows

ii®^^tive operator seems to be involved in the morphology
of Hebrew where aspectual properties interact with its

binyanim system.

(The Hebrew binyanim system and its

interaction with aspect will be discussed in chapter IV).
Some event type verbs in Pa'al, the base form, have an

iterative reading when formed in Pi 'el. The iterative Pi 'el

construction (which carries as well other aspectual
properties

)

is more productive in Biblical than in Modern

Hebrew. Consider:

,

.

'

'
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Pa al

Pi 'el

kaf ac

kipec

rakad

riked

caxak

cixek

'

'

jumped

'danced
'

laughed

In Hebrew, the verb pattern
formed in Pa'al can be used to
denote a single event as in kafacti
pa 'am arat ("i jumped
y^l^ndti rikud exad
c axakti cxok boded

(“I danced a single dance") or

("I laughed a single laugh"),

when conjugated in Pi 'el: *kipacti oa'am axat
rikud exad and *cixkakti cxok boded

.

but not

*rikadti

.

Comrie (1976) provides further examples from
Slavic

languages which reflect iteration morphologically.

In these

languages habitual forms are often referred to by
the term
iterative": pivat

counterpart of pit

'

'

znavat

*

in Russian are the habitual

("drink") and znat

'

("know").

Habituality is connected to iterative aspect since any
situation that can be iterated a sufficient number of times
over a long enough period can be expressed as a habitual.
In Hungarian there are several suffixes which serve to mark

iterativity like zorren ("knock") and zorog ("knock
repeatedly"

)

The question of whether an iterative event is a process

seems to be related to my brief discussion of Taylor's

distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous
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processes.

In some sense, heterogeneous
processes are

defined in terms of more
primitive

accomplishments/achievements- whether there
is
corresponding to them or not.

a

verb

(Taylor gives the example of

chuckling, which can not mean
chuckle once ). Motion verbs
like
run, dance involve a complex
pattern of change
and It is not true that every
minimal subinterval of the
processes denoted by any of them is also
an interval of that
process.
it is not easy to determine what
conditions should
be met for x_r\m to be true of a
minimal interval, and the
fact that such an issue comes up at
all casts a shadow on
any attempt to distinguish processes
from iterative events.
It seems that there are few, if any,
homogeneous process
verbs- ^all rise, move together with
inchoative process
verbs may be thought of as constituting this
group.
But
,

,

even the processes denoted by these verbs can be
viewed as

consisting of more primitive events.

These are puzzling

issues related to metaphysical-conceptual considerations
and
the answer to the question of whether there is a real

distinction between events and processes in the world, and
consequently between iterative events and processes, draws
heavily on such considerations.
As far as we are concerned, verbs which denote

iterative events satisfy the linguistic criteria mentioned
before which were set up to single out process verbs.

.
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Notice that iterative events
have the subinterval propertytf John knocked on the
door for half an hour, he
knocked on
the door at any large enough
subinterval of the interval
of

duration of half an hour.

EHJrther Issues Concerning the Amb i guity of inchoate „„

Process Verbs

suggested that inchoative process
verbs and not vague
ones incorporate a comparative
component.
in sentences
I

(112d),

adj

,

(113d) and

get adj

,

(114d) the vague inchoatives "become

turn adj", "change to adj" paraphrase
the

inchoative process verbs and all these
sentences sound odd:
(112)

(113)

a.

The Atlantic ocean widened at 12 noon
May 14 1955.

b.

The Atlantic ocean became wide at 12 noon
May 14 1955.

c.

The Atlantic ocean widened for three years.

d.

*The Atlantic ocean became wide for three
years

a.

The soup cooled at three o'clock.

b.

The soup became cool at three o'clock.

c.

The soup cooled for three hours.

d.

*The soup became cool for three hours.

Similarly when become is replaced by turn

,

change to , get

:
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(114)

a.

The sky darkened at six
o'clock.

b.

The sky

'^turned

changed to
got

r

dark at three o'clock.

c.

The sky darkened for three
hours

d.

*The sky

r

Sentences (112d),

")
turned
changed to dark for three hours,

(113d) and (114d) sound odd since
all of

them involve a vague inchoative.

wide^ repeatedly, where

Something can not become

c is fixed.

This supports our

suggestion that widen, cool and darken in
(112c),

(113c) and

(114c) are derived from comparative
inchoatives by something
like the iterative operator and not

from vague inchoatives.

Notice that sentences (114d) and (113d) may
involve

a

good reading in which the Atlantic ocean remains
wide for
three years and the soup stays cool for three
hours, i.e the
time adverbial specifies the duration of the result
state.
This is not the process reading we are interested in.
(114d) changed to, turned to

reading.

,

in

but not got give us this good

A similar reading where the time adverb specifies

the duration of the result state occurs in sentences which

involve causatives.

Dowty (1979) mentions Binnick, who

according to Morgan (1979) and MaCawley (1971; 1973) was the
first to notice the following sentence, which is ambiguous

between an iterative and a result state reading;
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“°°<5

?or

in the Generative semantics
lexical decomposition analysis
Of causatives, where
is analyzed as composed of
"cause
become x in jail" the iterative
reading (in which at various

occasions throughout the four years the
Sheriff jailed Robin
Hood) arises from a structure in
which the adverb modifies
the highest S, while the result
state reading arises from a
structure where it modifies a lower S.
In the first
case the

duration of the activity described by the
VP cause become x

L?

is specified, while in the second
case it is that of

the state be in jail.
(117)

The following structures (116) and

represent correspondingly the result state and the

iterative reading of (112d),

(113d) and (114d):

NP

VP
I

cool
the soup

.
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(117)

S

Adv
for three years

VP
the soup

cool

Since the meaning of the inchoative
process verb cool is
different from that of a vague inchoative
which is

represented in structure (117), it is not
surprising that
(114d) IS bad.

On the other hand, when the verb is an
event

type verb like that in sentences (112a),

(113a) and (114a)

it can be paraphrased (under one reading)
by a vague

inchoative verb as in (112b),

(113b) and (114b).

We could expect sentences with "become
cooler" and

durative time adverbials to be perfect, since the
meaning of
inchoative process verb incorporates that of a comparative
inchoative.

(118)

(119)

Consider;
a.

The Atlantic ocean widened for three years.

b.

The Atlantic ocean became wider for three
years

a.

The soup cooled for three hours.

b.

The soup became cooler for three hours.

Surprisingly, when read in the iterative sense, the

:
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following sentences sound a bit
odd
(120)

?The Atlantic ocean became
more wide
tor three years.

(121)

?The soup became more cool
for three hours.
?He began to earn more money
for three years

(122)

When replacing "become more adj"
by "become more and more
adj" these sentences are good:
(123)

The Atlantic ocean became more
and more wide
for three years.

(124)

The soup became more and more cool
for
three hours.

(125)

He began to earn more and more money
for
three years.

The iterative reading of inchoative process
verbs is

explained by the existential quantifier over contexts
which
change throughout the interval.
The paraphrase "become more
and more wide" implies that such an iterative reading
is

incorporated in widen. Still, it remains a puzzle why
(120)-(122) sound worse than (118)-(119) and (123)-(125)

since

^ x[ (3c Become cool'^(x)] means become cooler and the
)

interaction of the comparative inchoative with the durative

adverb should have implied the process~iterative reading.
Partee has mentioned (personal communication) that it
is possible that

suppletion facts.

(120) -(122) are odd due to morphological

Since the verbs wide and cool

,

when used

.
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for comparison, have the
specific adj+er forms wider and
cool«, the latter should be used
with become rather than
the form moretadj.
the case where the adj+er form does
not exist in English, as for example
*beautif ier the

m

.

more+adj form can be used with become
(126)

;

Mary became more beautiful for three years.

Sentences (127), (128) exhibit a similar
difficulty:

(127)

(128)

a.

This flower darkened more than that flower.

b.

*This flower became dark more than that
flower

c.

*This flower became darker more than that
flower

a.

This boy grew more than that boy.

b.

*This boy became tall more than that boy.

c.

*This boy became taller more than that boy.

The oddness of (127b) and (128b) is predicted since once the

context of dark'

^

is fixed, one flower can not become dark'

more than the other.

c

The verb in (127c) is an inchoative

process verb, and the comparison in these sentences is
between the two processes of darkening, not between the two
result states.

We may say that between the age of twelve

and fifteen Dan grew more than between the age of twenty and

twenty-three, although when twenty-three years old Dan was

*

;
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taller than when he was fifteen.

Sentences (127c) and

(128c) do not imply the reading
in which two processes are
compared, and as in (120)-(122),
they

present

a

difficulty

for the analysis of inchoative
process verbs in terms of

inchoative comparatives.
Partee has also mentioned that increasingly
wide which
hardly seems like a predicate of any
sort
The Atlantic
Ocean is increasingly wide
inherently has to be linked to
gradual change.
Sentence (129) seems to have the same
meaning as (130) and (131):
,

(

)

,

(129)

The Atlantic Ocean became increasingly wide
for three years.

(130)

The Atlantic Ocean became wider and wider
for three years.

(131)

The Atlantic Ocean became more and more wide
for three years.

Another issue worth mentioning is the difference between two
kinds of inchoative verbs.

One of my examples illustrating

the possible ambiguity of inchoatives between the vague and

the comparative
(132)
meaning was sentences (58a),

(59a)

P^^^ph^^sed by (58c) and (59c). When we replace widen and
grow by warm and darken sentences (132a) and (133a) are less
good

a.

*The soup was warm and was warming.

b.

*The soup was warm and becoming warm.
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(133)

c.

The soup was warm and becoming
warmer.

a.

‘The sky was dark and was
darkening.

b.

‘The sky was dark and becoming
dark.

C.

The sky was dark and becoming
darker.

The oddity of (132b) and (133b)
is predicted as is the case
in (58b) and (59b), since once
the sky is dark'^ relative to
some fixed context, it can not
become dark'^ again.
Sentences (132a) and (133a) which were
assumed to be

paraphrased by sentences (132c) and (133c)
are bad.
puzzling.

This is

There seems to be a difference between
verbs like

wi^.

2IOW,

^tten

and verbs like warm , darken and redden .

There is no upper bound to the degree of
tallness or width
of an object relative to a comparison
class- any tall object

may become taller, but this is not true of
predicates like
redden darken. To get the difference one may ask
whether a
,

red object may become redder, i.e is there a
degree of

redness such that an object red to that degree can not

become any redder?

Intuitively the answer is yes for red

and dark and no for wide and grow

.

At the same time we count

something as red in a context even when it has not reached
the maximal value of red in that context.

Perhaps the fact

that something can be red without reaching the maximal value

accounts for the good reading of (132c) and (133c).

mentioned previously that we can say that a is

I

a red cloth.
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b IS a red cloth and
a is redder than b.

In this case, the

comparison class is the set
of cloths and one compares
between two members in the
positive extension of red.

Adding the degree adjective
quite makes a difference in
the grammaticality of
(132a) and (133a), since it
implies
that the property has not
yet reached its upper bound.
so
the process may still go on.
(134)

a.

The sky was quite dark and was
(still) darkening.

b.

*The sky was quite dark and
(still) becoming dark.

c.

The sky was quite dark and
(still) becoming darker.

There are other suggestions in the
literature for treating
change.
in a first attempt Hoepelman
(1981) adopted the
framework of fuzzy logic to analyze gradual
change.
He
talks of a sentence describing a state of
affairs as

becoming more and more true.

Roughly speaking, a sentence

the door closes is given the anaysis "It becomes
more

and more true and finally is true that the door
closes".

Hoepelman later replaced the framework of fuzzy logic with
new one, which analyzed change in terms of comparison
(1982). The notion of becoming is defined in terms of MORE

and LESS. If something changes it has a certain property to
a

greater or lesser degree than it had before.

To evaluate

John grew, different stages of John must be compared, and

a
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this is where Hoepelman introduces
individual concepts into
his semantics.
In treating process verbs
our intuition was similar to
that of Hoepelman, however we

further extended the

discussion and provided an analysis of
inchoatives in
general. We have pointed to a general
ambiguity in the case
of inchoatives which has to do with
the way we view change,
and provided plenty of evidence to support
it.

We have also

shown how the notion of change incorporated
in the meaning
of inchoative process verbs distinguishes
them from process

verbs, whose meaning does not involve change,
and how the

gap problem interferes with that difference.

In the next

chapter we will see that time and change are not the
only

aspectual notions which can be looked at as either punctual
or gradual in metaphysics and language.

4.

4.1.

Conceptual Puzzles

On Change and Time

The Become operator was introduced in our two lexical

rules which derive absolute/vague inchoatives and

comparative inchoatives and its semantics has not been

discussed yet.
^irids of

Now that we are familiar with different

inchoatives whose meaning, we said, involve abrupt

and gradual changes of state, we can turn to the more

general issue which seems to underly any talk of change.

.
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There is an old argument for the
contradictoriness of
change taking place in time (see
discussion of it in Van
Benthem (1983) and Kamp (1980).
Whenever there is a change
there is a succession of incompatible
events and where there
IS a succession of incompatible
events there is change.
It
IS argued that when a state
p is followed by an incompatible
state q, which is ^p, then a change occurs.
The question
IS about the time of its occurence.
It could not be before
p has ended and not after q has come about.
Two principles

seem to be in conflict when dealing with the
time of change

^p:

from p to

that of bivalence which states that at any

time t either p obtains or

p obtains and that of

incompatability which asserts that at the time of change
from p to q neither p nor q obtain.

These two principles

exclude the possibility of change occuring at any time since
the first requires that either p or

p should hold at such

a time and the second requires that neither of them should

hold
When time is discrete such a problem does not arise
since if a is the last point where p holds, and b is the

fi^st point where

~

p holds, there is no point between a and

b and the question about the time of change does not arise.

(

135

)

P
£

a

p
j

h

.
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In this case change is instantaneous
and the borderline

between predicates denoting states is
sharp.
dense it seems more problematic.

attack the puzzle.

when time is

However, there is a way to

in (136)

(136)

P

a

~p

there is no point between the last point where
p holds and
the first point where ^>'p holds, for there is no
first point

where

~p

holds.

Things are similar when we take the notion

of truth at an interval rather than at moments as
basic.

If

is bivalent and time is discrete the minimal interval

where change occurs will contain only two moments.

In

chapter III, which deals with the progressive, we will
discuss the advantages of interval semantics over point
semantics
Dowty's (1979) truth condition for [Become

given

below involves the notion of an interval.
(137)

[Become
is true at I iff (1) there is an
interval j containing the initial bound of I
such that
is true at J, (2) there is an
interval K containing the final bound of I
such that ^ is true at K, and (3) there is no
non-empty interval I' such that I <^ I and
conditions (1) and (2) hold for I' as well as
'

I.
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Dowty introduces the third
condition to prevent sentences
like M-e door closed from being
true of any interval
whatever as long as the interval
contains the first moment
at which the door was closed.
One wants to limit the truth
of th e door closes to the
smallest interval over which the
change occured.
Dowty suggests that perhaps the
third
condition should not be part of the
definition of [Become
^
but rather understood as a felicity
condition on the

assertion which follows from Grice's
conversation maxims.^®
Let's consider the case where
is bivalent and

j

(138)

a

at a

-/holds.

Suppose c ^a,

bivalent, either
/ at c or

-/ at

b,
c.

c 6 [a,b].

If

/ at

Since / is
c

then [a,b]

does not satisfy (137), since [a,c] is a smaller interval

which satisfies (137). If

-/ at

c then

[a,b] does not

satisfy (137) since [c,b] is a smaller interval satisfying
(137). But when / is not bivalent (and time is discrete)

there may be other moments contained in [a,b] for which
/ is
undefined. According to (137) the sentence It turned red is
true with respect to an interval [a,b] where at
is false

a

it is red

(let us assume it is orange) and at b it is true.
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(137) does not specify what
must occur at the times between
a

and b.

Also, that a change from orange to
red can be

defined with respect to a minimal interval
[a,b], as is
required by (137), is not so obvious.
It is not clear what
is the minimal interval at which
sentences containing

fuzzy

predicates, like the inchoatives, are true.

Inchoatives may

be used in the present progressive,
for example, it is

^ding

,

Uie soup is cooling, John is dying

.

In all these

cases there is a transition from a state
p to an
incompatible state q, separated by intermediate

states which

also begin and end and thus also involve the
question of the
time of change.
When the color of the sun changes from

orange to red it is difficult to determine at what time
it
ceases to be orange and becomes red since the borderline

between orange and red is fuzzy.

Kamp (1979),

(1980)

discussed at length these issues, which directly lead to
questions about the nature of time.

Kamp mentions two views

on time- one taking time as the totality of temporal

relations between events and processes which constitute the

history of the world, and the other taking statements about
time to be in last analysis complex claims about our

experiences.

What is common to both views is that they take

as primary certain entities (physical events or mental

experiences) of finite duration, i.e events.

According to

Kamp, Wiener has shown how from events of finite duration.

75

and the temporal relations by
which they are recognized, one
can construct a linear order
of instants.
Given the meaning of the
precedence and overlap
relations Kamp quotes seven
postulates. However, there are
some difficulties with the last
one:
(139)

(\/x)(\/y)(x-c:yv xOy v y-^x)

(where x and y are individual variables
over events and
,0
are correspondently the relations of
complete precedence and

temporal overlap).

Kamp gives examples which illustrate the

indeterminancy of the relations of temporal
overlap and
precedence involved in (139). This is because
of the

vagueness of the concept used to individuate events,
so the
structure of time can not be determined by events with

fixed

relations.

(139) can be satisfied only when the vagueness

of event individuation disappears.
So far we have discussed the problem of the minimal

interval of change when fuzzy predicates are involved.
Since some of the inchoatives we discussed are vague and

others are not, we would like to see how change interferes
each kind of inchoative and summarize what we have said
so far.
In the case of absolute inchoatives, where time is

discrete, there is a first moment b such that at any time

before b

and at b

In this case

is bivalent and

.
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change is instantaneous,

when time is dense, such a minimal

interval does not exist.

Let us assume there is a single

moment b where ^ is true and [a,b]
is the minimal Interval
where change occurs. By hypothesis,
for any a before b
holds.

Since time is dense, there is an a'
between a and b
and by hypothesis ~ji( is true at
a' which precedes
b.

Therefore,
occurs.

[a,b]

is not the minimal interval where
change

This shows that Dowty's definition of
(Become

too strong since it works only when time
is discrete.

is

When

time IS dense one would like to get rid
of the minimal

interval condition.
In the case of vague inchoatives,

if the vagueness of

the adjective is resolved by the context, then
there is a

minimal interval where the instantaneous change from

^ to

/ occurs, as was the case with absolute inchoatives.
Whenever the vagueness of the adjective is resolved but
^ is
not bivalent, i.e there is a truth value gap, the minimal
interval depends on the context picked up.

What about comparative inchoatives?

There is no

minimal interval where the soup became warmer is true.

The

soup became warmer is consistent with a situation where the
soup reached the maximal value of warm for soups and also

where it has warmed by one degree only or anything between
the two

,
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The Logi cal Form of Verbs of
Changp
Do all events involve a change
of states?

This is not
implied by definition (137),
where ^ can be of any aspectual
kind.
Some achievements seem to involve
a change from a
state to a process, like the
Hebrew verb parax which means
"began to fly-; -took off (bird,
insect)". Von Wright
,

(1963) mentioned that events may
be transitions from a state
to a process, from a process to
a state, from a process to

another process or from a state of a
process to another
state of the same process, for example,
from quicker to
slower or from louder to weaker.
The four possibilities of
transitions among states and processes are given
below:

Verb

1.

state to state

cool

2.

state to process

began to fly ("parax" in Hebrew)

3.

process to state

4.

process to process

Ibare is no English verb to my knowledge, which denotes a

change from a process to a process.

As

I

mentioned in 1.3.

Dowty holds that achievements may stand for "an inchoation
of an activity", with germinate

example.

("become plus grow") as an

One should not confuse an inchoation of a process

with a process consisting of inchoation, as in the case of
inchoative process verbs.

The complex VPs begin running

,

begin moving also constitute examples of verbs of class (2).

.
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J ohn stopped walkinc and beg..

from one process to another,
a simple

exemplifies a change
i

am unaware of any example of

Hebrew verb which denotes this
kind of complex

change
The verbs

^

may be examples of a change from
a

process to a state although stop seems
to imply doing
something.
it is hard to determine whether
the fact that
follows a process of walking or running
is part of its
meaning or a presupposition. There are
few examples of
verbs of category (2) and (3) and these verbs
are not
derived from adjectives.

Dealing with verbs of class

(2)

and (3), we must not

confuse our linguistic and conceptual intuitions.

The

assumption that there are states of which begin flying
or

^^in

growing are the negation is a purely conceptual one.

Since our decision about the kind of change expressed
by the

verbs in category (2) and

(3)

is often based on conceptual

intuitions rather than linguistic ones (binary adjectives
small and tall can be considered as linguistic

aspectual evidence), indeterminancy may arise in many
cases.

To give an example, is begin running a transition

from a state to a process or from a process to a process?
Stop running can be argued to be a transition from a process
to a state since the verb run is a process.

Questions may be raised about a verb like die. Because

.
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of the existence of the adjective
alive

,

it is tempting to

derive die by

(

140

)

^

x[

Become [not (alive (x)
'

)

]

]

and regard it as a transition of
states.

The following

argument, however, may be given against
it:

^

meaning as stop living and as stop being
alive

has the same

The first

.

expression demonstrates linguistically and
conceptually a
transition from a process to a state, while
the second

one

demonstrates a transition of states.
s top

Since stop living and

being alive have the same meaning, they should
also be

of the same aspectual type- that of statives.

We see that

in the case of some verbs, there is no way to
determine what

kind of transitions underlie their meanings.
In our two lexical rules deriving inchoatives, only
the

output state denoted by an adjective translation
given.

o<

is

may denote a certain state or its negation and

the inchoatives formed from them are "opposite". There are

many such examples in Hebrew: katan "became small" vs.
g^dal "became tall"; hitraxev "became wide" vs.
"became narrow"; hismin "became fat" vs.
thin".

hitkacer

hirza "became

Definition (137) specifies a change from

"

^ to

(and no restriction on ^'s aspectual type is given).

said that ^

I

have

may be of a different aspectual type than

although it is difficult to prove it (in the same way it is

difficult to prove that they are
of the same aspectual
type).
When << is an adjective, the
state it denotes may
either the output of the transition
from a process
to a

State, or an output of a transition
of states.

.

.

.

)
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FOOTNOTES

Kenny (1963:173-183) provides
exegesis of Aristotle's discussion references to and an
of different classes of
verbs

accomplishments are Kenny's performatives
and Ryle s achievements with an
associated task.
Kenny
iscriminated between achievements with an
associated
task
and purely lucky achievements.
indicates that the sentence marked by
? indicates that speakers differ
in^
eir acceptability judgements of the
sentence and ?? means
less grammatical than ?.
..

*

.

It IS ungrammatical.

Here is one definition he provides; Sim(e,e'
e'', (while(e' ,e) iff while
f
(e'
(while(e,e
iff while e ', e ''))
'

'

'

)

def
'

,e'

for

)

and

(

This and other details of his theory are given
in his
1977 manuscript

Achievements satisfy some stative tests and fail to
satisfy others.
III,

For a discussion of interval semantics see chapter
section 1.

An E-type pronoun is a plural pronoun referring back
to a group of individuals.
Gareth Evans introduced this
term and discussed the issue in "Pronouns", Linguistic

Inquiry 11.2:337-362.
9

The problem of the possible length of the gaps in the
interval at which a sentence is true is different from that
of the "relevant moments" mentioned by Dowty. We say of John
that he worked in the factory for the last year and do not
imply by it that he worked at weekends, holidays or during
the nights.
If the universal quantifier stands for the
durative time adverb, then the relevant moments it
quantifies over are the standard work hours in John's
factory.
According to Dowty, if we are to use the universal
quantifier to represent durative adverbs, then the moments
it quantifies over are relevant moments which are vaguely
specified and contextually determined. After the relevant
moments are determined by the context we can still inquire
about the possible length of the gaps in the interval which
consists of the relevant moments: if John stayed in the
hospital for eight months during the last year and spent the
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lOn

4u
i'artee
has
mentioned to me that definition

aerinition (137),

is true

(1)

3j containing b such that

(2)

3k containing

b such that

M-^ 7

^

to

[b,b] iff;

~

is true at j.
<j>

is true at k.

'^hat
is true at b, and from (2) that
®°' ‘=°atradiction.
Thus for definition
la^bj can not be a=b.

rif°trurafr
(137)
vij/J

[Become

AccoS
at

CHAPTER

II

CAUSATIVE VERBS AND ASPECTUALITY

1.

^

1

•

Accomplishments, Causatives

and Aspect

Not all Causatives are Event Type Verbs
In my brief review of verb classification

I

discussed

accomplishment verbs and the linguistic tests which
determine this class.

The activity involved in building a

house or drawing a circle is that of bringing about
some

result state- that of a house having been built or

having been drawn.
inchoatives,

I

In chapter

I

a

circle

in my discussion of

discussed the operator Become which is

present in the logical representation of achievement
sentences.

The logical representation of accomplishment

sentences consists partially of that of achievement
and, as is the case with the latter, also involves

the operator Become. In his aspect calculus Dowty suggests

constructing all accomplishments as having a logical
structure

CAUSE

'f

]

where ^ and

f are sentences.

He

does not place any restrictions on the aspectual type of
and f

(ji

but notes that in most cases ^ is a become-sentence

or contains an activity predicate, and
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f is a

1
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become-sentence

.

The sentence John kllleri

hi

has the

1

following logical structure:
(tJ°hn^do^ something] CAUSE [Become
not [Bill is

The motivation for analyzing
CAUSE as a bi-sentential

operator will be discussed in 1.2.
Dowty suggests analyzing

^

accomplishment verbs as

having a CAUSE operator in their
logical structure.
In one
place he says (Dowty 1979; pg.l06):
"As has often been
noticed, natural language causative
structures
(accomplishment sentences) ordinarily single
out

",

and

elsewhere he refers to a linguistic class of
verbs as

"causative/accomplishments" (Dowty 1979; pg.l09).

Nowhere

does he claim explicitly that accomplishments
and causatives
are co-extensive (although by refering to
a class of verbs
as "causatives/accomplishments" he may imply this).

He only

insists that all accomplishments have in their logical

structure a CAUSE operator.

If we could find examples of

causative verbs which aspectually are not classified as

accomplishments (which are event-type verbs), it would show
that causatives and accomplishments are not co-extensive.

Such verbs exist, and many important issues concerning

causation and aspect in natural language arise when dealing
with them.
chapter.

We would like to discuss these issues in this

Our discussion of causative verbs

(a

great number

;
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of which are accomplishments)
is related to many points
raised in chapter I, where change
and time were discussed.

have already noted that Dowty does
not place any
restrictions on the aspectual type of two
sentences combined
by the CAUSE operator.
He lists the following kinds of
I

accomplishment sentences;
(A)

Non-agentive accomplishment sentences which have

two become-sentence clauses as in the
door's opening causes
the lamp to fall down
.

(B)

Non-intentional agentive accomplishments where the

first clause is an activity sentence and the
second one an

accomplishment as in John broke the window
(C)

.

Agentive accomplishments with secondary agent as in

John forc ed Bill to speak and intentional agentive

accomplishments as in John murdered Bill

.

Somewhere else he mentions Fillmore's example

(

1971

)

of

stative causative sentences like Mary's living nearby causes

John to prefer his neighborhood

.

There is no English verb

which is a stative causative, just as there is no English
verb which exemplifies the first class of accomplishments
given above.

Accomplishments and causatives are not co-extensive
group of causatives behave aspectually like processes.

Consider

.

A

:

;
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John galloped the horse for
three hours.
The mother fed her baby for
half an hour.

(2)
(3)

In line with what was said
before, the logical

^®P^6sentation of sentence

(

4

)

John galloped the horse,

(4)

should be;

(5)

[[John do something] CAUSE [the horse
gallop]]

The only reading of sentence (4) is the
process one.

Sentence

(4)

can not be uttered in a situation where
John

did something abruptly which made the horse
start galloping,
like for example pricking his back once
with
a spear.

describe such a situation
employed as in
(6)

(

6

a

To

periphrastic causative must be

)

John made the horse gallop.

The activity specified by the causative verb is almost

always that of the subject of its second underlying clause.
In most cases this subject undergoes a change of state but

sometimes it is the agent of the activity described by the

causative verb.

The causative verbs gallop

,

walk constitute

such examples where their IV counterparts have agentive

subjects

87

(7)

The horse galloped.

(8)

The dog walked.

The activity of the subject
of the sentence in the first
clause underlying the causative
verb is usually
unspecified. Mary can kill Bill in
many ways; she may
poison him, strangle him, put a bullet
through his chest or
push him through a window on the
70th floor of the Empire
State building.
The consequences of all these vicious
acts
are one- Bill undergoes a change of
state from being alive
to being not alive.
The activity of John in sentence (4) is

unspecified as well; he might have been sitting
on the
horse's back kicking him with the spurs on
his boots or
running beside his horse whipping it occasionally.

All the

possible contextualizations of

(4)

involve an activity on

John's part which is durative in nature.

Sentence

can

(4)

not be uttered in a situation where John fired a
single shot
in the air as a consequence of which his horse
started

galloping; nor in one in which he kicks his horse

continuously, but it jumps only once.

The sentences in the

two clauses underlying the causatives gallop and walk are

process type one.

Roughly speaking, the causal connection

between John's kicking the horse and its galloping as

a

result occurs repeatedly or continuously.

A formal

®^plication of this is given in section

of this chapter.

2.

:

'

'

'

88

The class of verbs discussed
here, which we will call
"causative process verbs” (CPV), is
very small in English,
as is illustrated in the following
list of transitive verbs

gallop
feed
run
bounce
walk
roll

(9)

In Hebrew, the class of CPV is somewhat
larger, but still

small when considering the total number of
Hebrew verbs.
What is of interest to us is the fact that
Hebrew CPV

constitute a morphological class.

The list of Hebrew CPV

is

(10)

hidhir
heric
hiska
he exil
hikpic
gilgel
holix
hirkid
hirkiv
Philbis
?hif sit
'

'

gallop

'made run'
'made drink'
'made eat'
'

bounced

'made
'made
'made
'made
'

'

roll'
walk'
dance'
ride'

dressed
undressed

To show that Hebrew CPV form a morphological natural class,
a brief

introduction to the Hebrew binyanim system must be

provided.
There are seven morphological verb patterns

(conjugations or binyanim) in Hebrew. A verbal root normally

consists of three consonants, and can be realized in one or
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more of the seven binyanim.

The root p,

M

(actually p,<„i,
synchronically realized as p,',i
owing to the merger of
S with •) is used traditionally
as a prototype, where
p
stands for the first radical,
the second one and 1 the

third.

The stem forms of the seven
binyanim are:

(11)

CaCaC
ni+CCaC
CiCeC
CuCaC
hit+CaCeC
hu+CCal

— pa'al
- nif'al
- pi 'el
- pu'al
- hitpa'el
- huf'al

Adjectives and nouns follow other morphological
patterns
(miskalim) whose number is greater than
that of the

binyanim.

Verbs can only be realized in one or more
of the
seven binyanim.
The binyanim tend to carry certain

syntactic and semantic characterizations described
in table
2.

More detailed tables which characterize the binyanim
will

be given in chapter IV 1.2., where
of the Hebrew binyanim and aspect.

I

discuss the interaction

]]]

''

''
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Table

2.

The Hebrew Binyanim (l)

name of
binyan

syntactic
function

pa 'al

base form
t[ transitive

meaning

example

'

nif 'al

passive of
pa 'al

inchoatives

-[transitive
pi 'el

+[

pu 'al

transitive

passive of

'

hif 'il

huf 'al

-

[

transitive

normally
transitive

nexlas
'became we

causativization silem
repetition
'paid
intensifying
sulam

pi 'el

hitpa el

samar
guarded

'was paid'

inchoative
reflexive
reciprocal
causative
inchoative

passive of
hif 'il

hitraxec
'washed
himself

hiskiv
'made
lie down'

huskav
'was laid

down

Almost all traditional Hebrew linguists agree that verbs

occurring in the binyanim bear partially systematic semantic
and syntactic relations to the root.

The evidence provided

in Chapter IV shows these regularities can not be captured
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by syntactic rules, but
at the same time, one wants
to
represent them as part of the
speaker's knowledge of Hebrew.
Bolozky and Saad (1983) have
shown how different
semantic properties are distributed
among verb-patterns
(binyanim) in Arabic and Hebrew.
One of the semantic

properties they discuss is what they
call "activity". An
active verb is a transitive verb
whose object is agentive
(2a Hop ) and a non-active
verb is a TV with a non-agentive

object (vra^). Arabic and Hebrew
demonstrate two
morphological causative verb patterns:
Arabic 'af Sala/Hebrew
hif'il and Arabic fa 'i'i ala/Hebrew pi
'el.
They claim that
hif'il is the unmarked causative form
and that it is not
restricted with respect to causativization.
There exist
non-active verbs which are causativizable
in pi 'el only, and

non-active verbs which are causativizable in
hif'il only.
Some non-active verbs are causativizable
in both hif'il and
pi el.

The distribution of causativizable active
verbs

between pi 'el and hif'il is different.

There are active

verbs causativizable in hif'il only and some
active verbs

which are causativizable in both.

But there are no active

verbs which are causativizable only in pi 'el.

The same

generalization about the distribution of causativizable
active and non-active verbs among the binyanim holds also
for Arabic where 'af'iala corresponds to Hebrew hif'il and

fa^Sala to Hebrew pi 'el.

'

''

'

'

'

'
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To make this clearer, tables

3

and

4

contain the

distinctions made by Bolozky and Saad
and illustrates them
with examples of Hebrew verbs which
appear in their lists.

Table

base form

3.

causa tivizable
in pi 'el only

ratav

'

causativizable
in both

'

'made wet'

balat
'stood out'

'died out'

causa tivizable
in hif il only

hirtiv

'was wet'

yafe 'be
beatif ul
kava

Non-Active Verbs

hivlit
'made stand out'

yipa
beautified
kiba
'put out (fire)
'

rava
quenched
'

'

xay
lived
'

riva
hirva
saturated
hexya
xiya
revived

''

'

.

'
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Table

base form

Active Verbs

4.

causa tivizable
in pi el only

causa tivizable
in hif il only

'

'

'

ba
came

causativizable
in both

hevi
brought
holix
'made walk'
'

'

halax
went
NONE

yaga
labored
karav
'drew close'

hogia 'made
yigea tire out'
hikriv 'made
kerev draw close'

'

the unmarked causative binyan for active verbs

since there are no active verbs causativizable
only in pi 'el
and only few active verbs are causativizable in
both.

The fact that most process verbs have agentive subjects
led some linguists and philosophers to define process
verbs
in terms of agency.

However, the property of subintervality

and agency must not be confused- the first has to do
with

properties of time and the second with notions such as
volition, intention, effectiveness etc.

The set of process

verbs and that of agentive verbs are not co-extensive

Bolozky has pointed out that causatives with agentive
objects (and also agentive subjects) are conjugated in
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hif'il (and a few verbs in
both hifil and pi 'el).
Similarly, Hebrew CPV are
exclusively conjugated in hifil
and in this sense, form a
morphological class in Hebrew. We
see that Hebrew morphology
treats causative verbs which are
processes, and causative verbs
with an agentive object and
an agentive subject, in the
same way by assigning them to
the same binyan.
There are interesting relations
between
the class of process verbs and
the class of active verbs
but, as remarked above, they
are not co-extensive
There
are causative active verbs which
are not CPV, and also
causative process verbs with non agentive
objects (non
active verbs).
hekim 'made stand up' and he'ziv are
examples of the first kind; the subjects
.

of

and

k^

'stood up'

azav 'left' are agentive but the activity
described by
the verbs is not durative.
On the other hand, hikpic
j

'bounced', hilbis 'dressed' and hif sit 'undressed'
are CPV

which are non-active.

In John hikpic et hakadur

'John

bounced the ball', the ball is not an agent, but the

activity it is involved in is durative (an iterative
event).
•

In hayalda hilbisa et habuba

'the girl dressed the

the object of the verb is inanimate, so it is not

agentive, though it is involved in a process.

(There is a

sense of perfection in the meaning of dressing and

undressing so hilbis and hif sit may by thought of as
non specific between a process and an event reading).
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Notice also that

h^ exil

-fed'

does not always behave as a

CPV. The sentence j^'em
he'exila et

-the mother fed

the cat

can describe a situation where
the mother fills the
cat's plate with Purina before
it starts eating.
The
mother's act is punctual, and
even if it takes time it does
not occur at the same period at
which the cat eats Purina.
In Chapter

I

we discussed inchoatives which
behave

aspectually like process verbs.

We claimed these verbs are

derived from vague adjectives and
have a comparative
component in their logical representation.
We distinguished
between inchoative process verbs such
as cool warm redden
which involve change, and primitive process
verbs like walk
and rim. There are many causatives which
have a process
inchoative verb in their second clause, such
,

,

as cool ^„,

warm ,py and redden ^.^.
Verbs which are formed by a causativization of

inchoative process verbs are usually conjugated in pi
'el.
is the causativization conjugation of verbs in

hitpa'el.

One of the meanings of verbs in hitpa'el is that

of inchoation

(see chapter IV section 2.1.). Only a few such

causatives (let us call them 'inchoative process
causatives

)

may come in hif 'il and they are derived from

color term predicates like he'edim 'reddened

quality properties like hismin

'

f attened^^

'

.

or human

Examples of

process inchoative causatives and the verbs they are derived

'
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from are given below;

(

12

)

pi el

hitpa el

'

'

kerer
ximem
kicer

'made
'made
'made
'made

cool'
warm'
short'
become

hitkarer
hitxamem
hitkacer
hitnaven

'became
'became
'became
'became

cool'
warm'
short'
decay'

decayed
piteax 'made be
hitpateax 'became developed'
developed'
xizek
'made strong' hitxazek
'became strong'
We have here another case where
Hebrew morphology

distinguishes between CPV with

a

"primitive" process in

their second clause, which come in

causative sentences with

a

hif il

only, and

process inchoative in their

second clause, which usually come in pi 'el.
To conclude, table

5

illustrates the distribution of

different kinds of Hebrew causative verbs in the
binyanim:

Table

5.

The Distribution of Hebrew Causatives

Basic Form

Derived Forms

pa al

hif 'il

pi el

event causative
verbs

event causative
verbs

event causative
verbs

CPV

causatives whose
second clause is
an inchoative
process verb

'

'

:
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gX-J-^ence

that Accomplishment s Analyzed
by CAUSE arp

Bi -Sentential

Generative semanticists proposed a
level of linguistic
representation which carries the meaning
of a sentence.
At
that level abstract lexical items
may be found that are not
English words.
In the course of a derivation
individual
lexical Items replace parts of the
underlying tree.
Inchoatives and causatives were of major
interest. McCawley
(1968) suggested analyzing kill into
the following

components

ALIVE

y

theories argued for different transformations,

grouping underlying abstract elements into constituents
before lexical insertion took place.
Bnther than discuss these proposals,

I

will review the

linguistic evidence which Dowty presents for his

reconstruction of the bi-sentential analysis; his arguments
were mainly borrowed from Generative Semantics. An
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accomplishment construction known
in traditional gramitiar as
factitive is one of them,
these constructions, an
activity verb combines with an
adjective and an object NP to
give an accomplishment, where
the adjective describes the
(14)
result state of the derived
object.
Consider:

m

John hammered the metal flat.
By the(15)
analysis of accomplishments given
above, sentence
(10) could have the following
representation:

[[John hammered the metal] CAUSE
[Become [the metal flat]]

Other examples of the same kind are:
(16)

Bill hung the picture straight.

(17)

Peter painted the wall blue.

(18)

Mary washed the dishes clean.

(19)

The Boy Scouts beat the snails dead.

Another case mentioned by Dowty which calls for

a

bi-sentential analysis of accomplishments are those verbs

which form a subset of verb particle constructions.

The

particle in example (20)- (21) expresses the location of the
direct object, which is a consequence of the activity

described by the verb.

In English these sentences can be

varied in two ways: the activity can be held constant and
the result state varied, or the result state held constant

:
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while the activity varies,

Dowty gives the following

examples

(

20

)

(21)

throw
throw
throw
throw
throw

NP
NP
NP
NP
NP

away
down
aside
in
up

put NP away
throw NP away
send NP away
drive NP away
call NP away

Examples (20) and (21) suggest that verb
particle

constructions should be treated compositionally
as
consisting of an activity verb and a result
state.

Other evidence to support the bi-sentential
analysis of
accomplishments is provided by examples of anaphora
in some

constructions.
(22)

Jerry Fodor (1970), arguing against the

transformational anaysis of verbs like melt and kill,
mentions some traditional arguments used to show that these
verbs are derived from cause to melt and cause to die

.

He

mentions Lakoff (1965) who suggested that sentences like
derive from deep structures like (23):
(22)
(23)

Floyd melted the glass.
(Floyed cause (the glass melt))

Fodor noticed that (24) is ambiguous between two readings in
just the way that the derivation of (22) from (23) would

.
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predict: that what surprised the
speaker is either that
Ployed melted the glass or that
what surprised the speaker
is that the glass melted.

(24)

Ployed melted the glass

and that
and it
which

surprised me.

Fodor notes that a similar argument
holds for the "do so"
construction associated with (22):
(25)

Ployed melted the glass though it surprised
me
that he would do so.

(26)

Ployed melted the glass though it surprised
me
that It would do so.

The d o so in (25) replaces the matrix VP
'cause to melt' and
in (26) it replaces the VP in the constituent
sentence 'the

glass melt'.

Fodor noticed that such examples can not be

formed with a verb like kill

,

which morphologically is

unrelated to the intransitive verb die

.

Fodor raised

objections to the transformational analysis of melt and
but did not provide an alternative explanation for

examples (22)-(26), which encourage the analysis of many

accomplishments with a bi-sentential abstract CAUSE
operator
Examples of adverb scope provide further evidence for
the lexical decomposition of accomplishments.

Dowty

mentions Binnick who gave the following example:
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(27

)

The sheriff of Nottingham
jailed Robin Hood
for four years.

and noticed that this sentence
has a duratlve reading (27a)
as well as an internal one
(27b):
(27a)

The sheriff of Nottingham
spent
bringing it about that Robin Hoodfour years
was in jail

(27b)

Nottingham brought it about
that for four years Robin-Hood
was in jail.

Dowty notes that (27a) may have
in addition to the durative
reading, an iterative one- according
to which on multiple
occasions throughout the four years,
the sheriff of
Nottingham jailed Robin Hood. The adverb
in the durative
reading specifies the time of the action
denoted by the
verb, and the adverb in the internal
reading specifies the
time through which the result state
obtained.
Given the

Generative Semantics framework, Dowty suggests
the following
two structures to represent correspondingly
the durative and
internal readings:
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(27 'a)

adv
for four years

NP

vP

the sheriff

v

of Nottingham

np

1

CAUSE

S

Become
NP

VP

Robin Hood

in jail

(27 'b)

NP

VP
/

the sheriff

v

NP

of Nottingham

CAUSE
Become
adv
for four years

NP

Robin Hood

VP
in jail
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Dowty mentioned other examples
of adverbial scope given
in the literature:
(28)

John closed the door again.

(29)

John lent his bicycle to Bill
until tomorrow.

Sentence (28) has an external
iterative reading, and an
internal in which John caused the
door to be again in a
closed state (he need not have been
the agent who closed it
before).
The durative reading does not
exist, since again
IS a point-time adverbial which
only implies that John
closed the door at least once before.
In (29), the future
adverb u ntil appears with the past tense
verb
lent

.

The

failure of tense-adverb agreement can be
explained by a
decompositional analysis in which the adverb until
modifies
the result state clause as specified in (29'):
(29')

John caused Bill to have possession of his
bicycle untill tomorrow.

Dowty (30)
points out that the ambiguity involved in sentences
like (27)-(29) is a structural one, since the internal
(31)

reading is present only when the adverb appears at the end
of the sentence.

When the adverb is preposed, the result

state reading is lost and only the external one remains:
For four years the sheriff of Nottingham jailed
Robin Hood.

Again John closed the door.

.:
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(32)

*Until tomorrow John lent
his bicycle to Bill

It is not so Clear to
me that a durative reading
is involved
in (27a) in addition to
an iterative one.
the case of
aaarn in sentence (28), the
activity of the subject can be
Iterated as well as the result
state,
i will replace the

m

terminology durati ve/internal by
external/result state
readings
Dowty attributes to Bennett
the observation of a
possible intentional interpretation
of the result state
reading.
The result state reading of
(27b) may refer to the
length of time the agent intended
the result of his action
to last, and not to the length of
time that Robin Hood
remained in jail. To test this he
constructs the following
situation: imagine that John places a
cake in the oven with
the intention of leaving it there for
forty five minutes.
Mary enters the kitchen shortly after
John left it and
removes the cake ten minutes after it was
put in the oven.
The question is whether (33) is true when
uttered at that

situation

(33)

John put the cake in the oven for forty
five minutes.

Dowty reports that speakers differ in their judgements of
(33)

uttered in the above context.

The fact that some

speakers accept (33) should not be taken as counterevidence

;
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to the compositional analysis
of accomplishments, since
the
scope of the durative adverb
in (33) is still the intended
result of the action and not the
act of putting the cake in
the oven.
He noticed furthermore that
the external/result
state ambiguity can not be found
in sentences with statives
and process verbs

(43)

(40)

John loved his wife until her death.

(41)

The world champion ran the marathon
again.

(42)

The wounded soldier stayed at the
hospital
five months.

In Hebrew a genuine ambiguity exists
in the case of sentence

which is the Hebrew equivalent of sentence
(27). The
same ambiguity of adverb scope demonstrated
in (27) occurs
also in Hebrew with the durative time adverbial
phrase

— mesex

.

Hebrew has an additional durative time adverbial

phrase lemesex which occurs only with the result
state

reading
(43)

haserif sel Nottingham kala et Robin Hood
bemesex arba sanim (ambiguous).
"The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin Hood
for four years".

(44)

haserif sel Nottingham Kala et Robin Hood
lemesex arba sanim (result state
reading only).
"The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin Hood
for four years".

:
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le are Hebrew prepositional
phrases which are cliticized

to object NP's like in

parks'.

^

^ganim

'in parks'

and leganim 'to

is a prepositional phrase
which usually means in

squrim beargazim
in heavy boxes".

kvp.d.'n,

.-The

books are locked

is a directional preposition
like in

h^laxti

leganim ciburiy im "i went to public
parks" or
h ikdasti et hasefer leyeladot
ceirot "i dedicated

the book

to young girls".

m

colloquial Hebrew one may omit mesex

duration' in Igmesex and cliticize

^

to the object.

Consider (44'), which like (44) has only
the result state
reading
(44')

haserif^sel Nottingham kala et Robin Hood
l^arba sanim.
"The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin-Hood
for four years".

In English when the adverb "for four years"
is preposed the

result state reading is lost; the same is true for Hebrew

when preposing bemesex

.

When lemesex is preposed, the

sentence sounds bad; this is predicted since lemesex only
allows the result state reading:
(45)

bemesex arba sanim haserif sel Nottingham kala
(external reading only).

et Robin Hood
(46)

*lemesex arba sanim haserif sel Nottingham kala
et Robin Hood.

As in English, Hebrew also allows the intentional result

;
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state reading.

le mesex may specify either
the duration of

the result state or the agent's
intention as to its
duration.
Sentence (47) does not have the
internal reading
when uttered in a situation where
Mary takes the cake out of
the oven after John had put it
there.
Sentence (47) is
false when uttered in such a
situation.

John sam et hauga batanur bemesex
salos saot.

(47)

John put the cake in the oven for
three hours".
However,

(48)

uttered under the same circumstances is

fine

John sam et hauga batanur lemesex salos saot.

(48)

"John put the cake in the oven for three hours".

This suggests perhaps that Hebrew has a genuine
ambiguity

between the intentional result state reading and the

non-intentional one.
Can
(49) we make the generalization that lemesex occurs with
the intensional result state reading only while bemesex

occurs with the non-intentional one?

To answer it we must

examine sentences with lemesex with subjects which lack
intentions.

Consider (49)-(51):
a.

ahavat John hirgiza et Mary bemesex
salos sanim (only external reading).
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b.

*ahavat John hirgiza et Mary lemesex
sales sanxm.
"John's love irritated Mary for
three years".
*john hirgiz et Mary lemesex salos
sanim.

(50)

"John irritated Mary for three
years"
(51)

a.

haruax^kerera et hamarak bemesex
salos saot (only external reading).

b.

*haruax kerera et hamarak lemesex
salos saot.
The wind cooled the soup for three
hours",

kerer et hamarak lemesex salos saot.
"Dan cooled the soup for three hours".
(49a) and

(51a) are not ambiguous, and allow only
the

external reading (which in this case can be either
iterative
or durative depending on how one chooses to
view change).

The result state reading is blocked whether the
agent is

human (has intentions) or not.

Both the intentional and the

non-intentional readings of the result state are bad.

But

consider the following examples:
(53)

a.

?Dan his'ir et hagufa al gdat-hanahar
bemesex salos saot.

b.

Dan his'ir et hagufa al gdat-hanahar
lemesex salos saot.
"Dan left the body on the bank for three hours"

.

.

.

.

.
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(

54

*hanahar his' ii^ et hagufa al
hagada
lemesex galos ^aot

)

he river left the body on
the bank
for three hours".
(55)

a

hakala kista et panea becaif
bemesex
salo^ 5aot

b.

hakala kista et panea becaif lemesex
salos saot.
The bride covered her face with
a veil for
three hours "

*hasufa kista et habyit besmixat avak
lemesex saloS saot.
The storm covered the house with a
blanket of
dust for three hours".

Sentence (53a) is not so good but the
result state reading
is fine with lemesex, when the agent
is human.
Sentence
(55a) has only the external reading and

(55b) with lemegex

has the result state reading only when
the subject is

agentive
lehargiz 'to irritate' and lekarer 'to cool' do not
have a temporal meaning built into them, as is the
case with

verbs like 'jail',

'crown' and

'nominate'. The subject of

these verbs may be agentive or not- this does not affect
the

result state reading of sentences with such verbs.

This is

the reason that bemesex may occur with non-agentive subjects

and have the result state reading:
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(57)

haoava hixtir oto lemelex bemesex
sales sanim.
The army crowned him for three
years".

"for

~

tFF

cover (+fem)

'

,

--

^SurF."°°'^
hj-s

'

ir

'leave' do not necessarily have

a temporal component incorporated
in their meaning,
a component may be present,

but such

given the intention of the

subject of the verb that his activity will
carry

consequences which would last for a certain
period of time,
as demonstrated in (53b) and (55b): i.e,
that the bride

face

would remain covered and the body would be left
on the bank
for a specified length of time.

When no such intentions are

involved, the specification of a certain length of time
is
odd since it is not part of the meaning of the verb,
as

examples (54) and (56) indicate.

While lemesex occurs with

the intensional result state reading, bemesex occurs with
the result state reading, which is not intentional.

lemesex

specifies the subject intentions as to the duration of the
result state and bemesex specifies the length of time of the
result state which is part of the meaning of the verb.

A

period of time for which someone is crowned or nominated
constitutes part of their meaning.

This is why the result

state reading is presented in sentences (57) and (58),

Ill

although intentions are lacking.
'to leave',

le xasot

'to cover'

with verbs like lehas'ir

it is the intentions of the

agent which impose the result
state reading.
lehas'ir
implies, in a certain sense, a
length of time for which the
thing is to be left (This is
not always true of the English
verb leave"). This is not the
case with verbs like lekarer
'to cool' or le hargiz 'to
irritate'.
in some sense lehas'ir
and l exasot are institutional in
terms of time,
and it is

the agent's intentions which impose
the result state
reading.
(They are less institutional than
verbs like
jail ,
nominate' and 'crown' which are institutional

whether intentions are present or not).

with verbs like

lekarer 'to cool' and lehargiz 'to irritate'
which are

non-institutional in terms of time, the agent's
intentions
can not impose the result state reading.

2.

Time Adverbials and the Time of the Two

Clauses of Causatives

2.1.

Event Causative Verbs
In the previous section evidence from English and

Hebrew was given to support the claim that accomplishments

analyzed by CAUSE are bi— sentential

.

In this section we

want to discuss various issues concerning the relationship

between the interval specified by a time adverbial modifying

.
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an accomplishment sentence,
and the time at which its
two
constituent sentences combined
by CAUSE are true.
Causation
was often regarded by philosophers
as a a relation between
events.
Dowty s semantics for CAUSE,
which we will discuss
in section 3. of this chapter,
is a version of David Lewis'
treatment of causation. Lewis
analyzed the operator CAUSE
in terms of counterf actuals
and this is why
'

,

it is a

relation between propositions (the
proposition that event e
occurred, the proposition that event
c occurred, etc).
CAUSE is treated by Dowty as a sentential
operator, so there
IS no need for him to construct
expressions denoting events
and form from them sentences which
assert that events
occurred (The sentences which are the argument
of CAUSE
already assert it).
It was claimed in section 1.1. that
sentences combined

by CAUSE might be of different aspectual
kinds.

Since the

time adverb modifies the complex accomplishment
sentence,

interesting questions arise about the way in which it
interacts with the time of the two constituent sentences,

especially when they are not of the same aspectual type.

We

will discuss these issues, examining causatives of different

aspectual kinds which occur with different time adverbials.
We will look for a generalization which holds in all these

cases
Is it the case that we can always talk about the

:

113

aspectual kind of the sentences
combined by the CAUSE
operator? By looking at the
meaning of the causative verb.
It IS not always possible to
discover the two sentences
combined by it.
This is in particular difficult
when we try
to determine what the sentence
in the first clause of the
accomplishment (and causative) sentence
is.
Consider
sentence (58):
(58)

John killed Mary.

The sentence in the result state clause
underlying (58)
should be ^ry is dead, but it is not clear
what is the

sentence which must appear in the first
clause.

either John poisoned Mary, John shot Mary

Ma^y or many others.

,

It might be

John strangled

The two events described by the two

clauses underlying sentences with event causative
verbs
(which we will refer to by ECV) do not have to occur
at the

same time.

Consider sentences (59) and (60) with the frame

adverbs

(59)

John killed Mary yesterday.

(60)

John killed Mary between noon and midnight.

Sentence (59) could be uttered in a situation where John
shot Mary at noon and she died in consequence four hours
later.

The only condition is that the time of shooting and

the time of dying are contained in the interval specified by
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Y£ster^.

The frame adverb in (60)
specifies an interval
with a length of twelve hours,
and the time of the two
events of shooting and dying
must be contained in the
interval whose end points are
noon and midnight of the same
y (There is a restriction on the
precedence order of the
two events.
Maybe this has to do with the
nature of

causation- a property of the model
and not of the
language). We can not utter
sentence
(61):

(61)

John killed Mary on Sunday

in the case where John shot Mary
on Sunday and she died as a
result on the following Monday, or where
John shot Mary on

Saturday and she died on the next Sunday.
The event verb
specifies the activity of the subject of the
sentence
in the first clause.
The subject of the sentence
of the

second clause might be dead, wounded, lightly
injured etc.
On the other hand, the ECV kill specifies
only the result
state described by the sentence in the second clause

underlying (59) and (60). The ECV kill leaves a wide
range
of activities possible for the subject of the first
clause

underlying (59) and (60). In the case of the event verb shot
it is not determined whether the subject of the sentence
in

the second clause is dead, wounded or unharmed.

We said the

time of the events described by the two sentences underlying
the sentence with the event causative verb is contained in

1
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the time specified by the
adverb modifying this sentence.
If this is correct, we
expect that when the time adverb
is
punctual, the two events must
occur simultaneously.

Consider (62):
(62)

John killed Bill at three o'clock.

It seems that sentence
(2)

(62)

can only be uttered in a

situation where the shooting and
the dying occured at very
nearly the same time. Dowty does
not discuss this issue in
his book but a restriction which
appears in clauses (1) and
in his definition of CAUSE (rule
15 pg.

353 in the

fragment he provides) suggests he was
thinking of cases like
those discussed by us.
Let us repeat his definition below:
(63)

If

CAUSE

[[(j^

i^c

ME^ then (^ CAUSE

^

^

i

iff

such that
c: i

1

)

such that

[

there is some
(2)

[^]

(4)

there is a sequence of formulas
)^=Xj^

and

i'^i meeting

^

Xj^a-2
k

<n

and

j

(1)

and (2), and

,X_,...X
12
n

X,

such that

'f

'

1

there
=i

there is no

[[(

(1)

(

mE^, and

e

(3)

where

Clause

)

.^^g=l,

^
is some i

f

w,

3fg

=if where

Ci.

in the above definition requires that the

interval at which the first sentence
^ of the causative
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sentence is true (i^ in the
above definition) should be a
subinterval of the interval i at
which the causative
sentence is true.
Clause (2) requires that the
interval at
which the second sentence
f is true (i^ in the above
definition) should be a subinterval
of the interval i at
which the causative sentence is
true.
Clause (3) says that
i

is minimal.

At present we will only concentrate
on clauses (1) and
(2) of the above definition and
investigate whether they
hold in the case of other causatives
which are not ECV.

2.2 Process causative verbs

In our discussion of CPV we have said
that the

sentences in the two underlying clauses are
processes.

One

can not utter sentences with CPV when the
first clause or

second clause specifies a punctual event.

causative gallop (like kill

)

Although the

leaves quite a wide range of

possible activities that its subject may be involved in, all
of them are durative in nature.

Spears (1977) distinguished between sentences with

infinitival sensory complements and sentences with gerundive
complements, for example:
(64)

a.

I

watched Sheila build

b.

I

watched Sheila building

a cabin.
a cabin.

;
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IS a sensory verb and
its infinitival complement
build
in (64a) implies that a

cabin was completed.

m

sentence (64b) we have a
gerundive complement and there is
no implication of Sheila
*s completion of the cabin.

Infinitival and gerundive complements
of verbs of
(dis)li)cing are also perfective
and imperfective
correspondent ly.
Spears gives the following examples:
(65)

a.

b.

I

hated to write that book. That's why
did not finish it.

I
I

hated writing that book. That's why
did not finish it.

I

Sentence (65b) with the gerundive complement
sounds
better than (65a), since it is imperfective
and does not
contradict the subsequent sentence, which
asserts that the
the book was not completed.

Spears notes that the same distinction holds
with

monoperf ective predicates, which denote an event
or state
which can be completed only once as in write a
book eat an
,

a pple

and grow up

.

Infinitival complements which are

monoperfective predicates are perfective when they appear
with the disliking verb hate

.

The gerundive complement of

these verbs is imperfective
(^ means that the sentence is

anomalous
(66)

)

Flora hated to grow up in Brooklyn; that's why
she committed suicide at the age of five.

.

118

(67)

Flora hated growing up in
Brooklyn; that's whv
^
she committed suicide at the
age of
five.

Sentence (66) is anomalous since
the infinitival
complement implies that Flora
actually reached adulthood,
and this contradicts the information
in the subsequent
sentence.
Sentence (67) is fine since the
gerundive doesn't
have a perfective implication.

Sentences (64b),

(65b), and

(67), which have the

gerundive complements, behave like CPV
in the sense that the
activities described by the sensory or
(dis) liking verb are
durative (The durative state of watching
is described by the
first clause of the first sentence of
(64b), and that of
working is described in its result state
clause).
The

adverbial specifies the length of time for which
these

activities lasted.

Consider:

(68)

For ten hours

(69)

For eight months

(70)

For ten years Flora hated growing up in Brooklyn.

I

saw Sheila building a cabin.
I

hated writing the book.

The sensory and (dis) liking verbs in examples (68)-(70)

are not causatives but exhibit a similar behavior to that of
CFV.

In these examples we have two different continuous

activities which last for the time specified by the time
adverbial
When the subject of the causative verb is

a

gerund we
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get the same effect as with
CPV verbs.

Consider:

exercising strengthened John's
(72)

For three hours heating it
darkened it.

(73)

For ten years drinking gin
weakened John's mind.

The time adverb was preposed
in (71)- (73) to block the
reading where it specifies the
length of time of the result
state.
Sentence (71) can only describe a
situation where
John does exercises for a year and
as a result of each

exercise his muscles become stronger
and stronger.
In

(72)

the two processes that of heating
and that of

becoming darker are continuous, while in
(71) exercising and
becoming stronger are not.
In chapter I section 3.1. we
discuss the difference between verbs which
describe a

continuous activity and these which describe an
iterative
one.

The same issue is involved here.
It is the gerundive in the first clause
of the

causatives strengthen

,

darken and weaken which create the

same effect as that in the CPV. The inchoatives strengthen

,

darken and weaken are non specific between the punctual
reading (vague inchoatives) and the process reading, which
involves a comparative component (see my discussion of these
issues in chapter I), and it is the presence of the durative
time adverb which imposes the durative reading on the

ambigiuous inchoatives in the second clause of (71)- (73).

.
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CPV take durative time
adverbials.

As earlier in

dealing with ECV, we would like
to investigate the
relationship between the interval
specified by the time
adverb modifying the CPV-sentence
and the time at whioh its
two constituent sentences are
true.
This relationship
is

more complicated in the case
of CPV, and this follows from
the interpretation of the
durative time adverb and its

interaction with the two clauses.

Something like a

continuous or repeated causation is
involved in the reading
of sentence
74
(

(74)

)

:

John galloped the horse for three hours.

We get the "continuous causation" reading
in the above

sentence from the interpretation of the durative
adverb "for
three hours", and clauses (1) and (2) in the
definition of
CAUSE. To show how the interval specified by
the time adverb

relates to the time at which the two constituent sentences
are true, and how the "continuous causation" reading
of CPV
is created, we must understand the way durative time
adverbs

work
Dowty interprets
(

^^/^^ / t/i
)

(

)

.

f or

as belonging to the category

For combines with an expression denoting a

property of intervals to form
(75)

^ P ^x[P^(n]

&

a

\/t

verb phrase adverbial:

[te

n

AT(t, p[x/

)

]

]

]

.

,

j
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We will try to understand
what the above translation
means.
The indexical constant n (for
"now") denotes at any

index the time coordinate of that
index, i.e at any index
<W, 1 > the denotation of
n is i.
After applying lamda
conversion three times and introducing
a subject
NP, a VP

and a property of times we
arrive at:
(74') -three hours '(n]

& \/t

[

to n

AT t
(

CAUSE

,

f

)

]

evaluating (74') at an index <w,i> we get:
(74'')

[[three hours'(n)
AT(t,

&

\/t[tCn-^

y CAUSE ^

The denotation of ([[three hours ']](
n ))
[

[

three hours

'

]

<w, i>

[[three hours

([[n]
(

i

<w , i>

is that of

<w ^i>)/ and this is equal to
in the same way we get rid of the

)

indexical constant in the second conjunct of (74'').
when
(74'')

is true,

then the duration of

for all subintervals t of

i

[

[

i

^cf CAUSE ^

is three hours and
1

1

<w, t>

After applying the past tense to (74'')

=l

'

(rule S39 in

Dowty's fragment) we end up with
(74''')

31

[

Past t
(

Vt[tct^-^

)

&

three hours'

AT(t, ^ CAUSE

i.e for some past interval

t^^,

three hours and for all subintervals

(t^^)

&

^)]\

the duration of t^ is
t of

t^^^,

:

)

)
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[[f CAUSE

f

How do clauses (1) and
(2) in the CAUSE definition
interact with the interpretation
of the durative time

adverbial?
Consider (76) which describes a
situation where (74) is
true

(76)

[-[-(-)
3

—

hours

t

t

According to the interpretation of for
AT( t,

CAUSE

^

)

follows that for each tc
for some

2.

for some

C

for each

.

From clauses (1) and

1.

,

(2)

in the CAUSE definition it

t^^

t,

AT(i^,

t,

ATd^,

and
y/

and from the interpretation of for;
(77)

(\/t

)

[

(tCtj^

Ji^[ (i2^t)

—>
&

3ij^

[

(ij^C-t

AT(i2,

)

&

AT(i^,j^)]

&

(^ )]]

The interpretation of the durative adverb and the

requirements in clauses

(1)

and (2) of CAUSE are responsible

.
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for the continuous causation
reading of CPV. The requirement
that the time at which the two
sentences in the clauses of

causative sentences be true must
be contained in the
interval specified by the time
adverb modifying the CPV
sentence is justified if we want
to account for the special
behavior of CPV.

2

•

3

Culmination Causative Verbs
Some causative verbs like build a
house and write a

s ymphony

describe extended events, i.e their completion

takes time.

We will call such causative verbs
culmination

causative verbs (CCV). The relationship
between the time
specified by the time adverb modifying
CCV-sentences and the
time at which its constituent sentences are
true involve
issues which did not arise in the case of ECV
and CPV. CCV
take the time adverb in two hours
Consider:
.

(78)

John built a house in two hours.

(79)

The composer wrote the symphony in a year.

s

.

:
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Dowty

translation of

'

(

80

)

/Ip^

Vt2[(t2

^

in the time adverb in n hours
is

^x[p^(n}

cn

s

s

s

AKt^, P{xl)j

AT(tj^,p(x|)]

s

t2=t^l

The interpretation of in differs
in two respects from that
of for. We have an existential
quantifier binding t^ in the
above translation while in the
translation of
we had a
universal quantifier at that position.
it is required that
the time of the verb's truth is
some subset of the interval
mentioned, though not necessarily a proper
subset.
Dowty
suggests that for Gricean reasons we usually
consider t^ in
the above interpretation of
to be equal to n; and in

particular when dealing with multiple-change
accomplishments
J ohn

washed the dishes in an hour

.

If we expect the

time that a certain verb takes to be shorter than
that

specified by the adverb, then the verb is understood
to be
true at a finite proper subinterval of the indicated

interval as in John closed the door in an hour

.

We could

utter this although we know it would take him one minute to
do so
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The second respect in which
the interpretation of in
differs from that of for is in
the requirement of the
uniqueness of t^. The uniqueness
condition distinguishes

accomplishments from statives.

In order to explain why

stative verbs do not take in-adverbs

(

? John

slept in an

hour) and accomplishments do take
them, the translation of
in must specify that the verb is
true at a unique

subinterval (not necessarily a proper
one) of the measured
interval.
if John built a house in a year
(where it took
him a whole year to build it), it is
false that he built a

house in 364 days (if

is a proper subset of n, the same

tj^

uniqueness requirement holds for that subset).

Stative

verbs do not obey this requirement.
Let us consider again the requirement in clauses
(1)

and (2) of the definition of CAUSE, and their
interaction

with the above translation of
situation where

CAUSE

The translation of

duration n hours

^

(81)
]

below describes the

in n hours is true:

implies that for some interval

Bt^^CI

[AT(tj^,
(f

for no other interval than

Clauses (1) and

(2)

CAUSE f

)]

I

of

and this holds

t^^.

in the CAUSE definition require
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that

(1)

for some

(2)

for some

AT(i^, j)

g.t^,
'f

^

The translation of in and clauses
(1) and (2) of CAUSE
specify only two intervals: that
at which the event

described by the first constituent
sentence of the
CCV-sentence occurred and that at which
the event described
by the second sentence occurred.

subset t^ of

I,

where

I

Both are contained in a

is the interval specified by the

time adverbial.
(81)

does not seem appropriate when we take into

account linguistic and metaphysical
considerations which
arise when dealing with CCV.
In our discussion of CPV we have claimed
that the

sentences in their two clauses must be of the same
aspectual
type- that of processes.

A sentence with a CPV as its main

verb can no longer be classified as a process when one of
its constituent sentences is of a different aspectual type.

We showed in detail the way in which the interval specified

by the time adverb modifying the sentence relates to the

time at which its two constituent sentences are true.

When

discussing sentences with event causative verbs like kill,
we assumed that each of the sentences underlying it is an

event type, and stated a condition about the relationship
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between the time at which they
are true and the time
specified by the time adverb.
That the two constituent
sentences of a sentence
containing a causative VP like
John built a house in two

composer wrote a sym p hony last year
are event
type sentences is not so clear.
The activity of writing a
symphony takes a long time, but
the result state where some
piece of music becomes a symphony
occurs at a point.

Whatever the activity denoted ‘n the
first clause of the
above sentences is, its nature is
durative: that of writing
a symphony and of building a house.
Somebody
is in the

process of writing a symphony or building
a house before the
house or the symphony are completed (see
my discussion of
Vlach in chapter III 2.1.). There are certain
rituals and

conventions involved in activities of such kinds
(which
usually lead to the completion of a certain object)

that

make them such activities and not others.

And if the first

sentence underlying a CCV sentence is a process while
the
second is an event type (an achievement sentence), then
we
have a case where the two constituent sentences disagree in

their aspectual type.

If this is the case,

it is not so

clear how the time indicated by the time adverb modifying
the CCV-sentence relates to the time at which its two

constituent sentences are true.
One may claim that the activity unspecified in the
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first constituent sentence is
an extended event rather
than
a process.
if this is so, this event
could not be that of
building a house or writing a
symphony since the house or
the symphony are not yet
completed. Also, it could not be
the event of building one third
of a house or half a house,
because neither of these when
considered separately is the
cause of the result state, where a
house came into
existence. We can think about different
events underlying
the activity described in the first
sentence of the
CCV-sentence, each of which has a different
object (building
a roof, building a window), and
all of which constitute an
extended event which causes the result state
of a house that
came into existence.
Each of these events is complex since
each of them contains a causal element.
If this description
of the activity underlying the first clause
of the CCV is

correct, then either picture (81) is wrong or

CAUSE

]

^ in

is a causative sentence itself whose first

constituent is a causative sentence, and so on.

To describe

the way in which the time adverb relates to the two
clauses

such a situation is very complex.
(82)

I

Consider diagram (82):
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1

IS an interval of length
n at which John build a hone,
is

true.

At a, John started to build
a house and at o he
finished it.
There exist subintervals t of
1 where at t^
John does something and at
t^ some result state obtains.^
The sequence of events which
occur at the interval [a,b]
cause the result state to obtain
at
c.

One may argue that all these
complications which arise
when- we think about the world
do not prevent us from

considering in our semantics the interval
[a,b] as the one
at which an extended event occurred.
in such a situation,
the time relationship between the
interval specified by the
time adverbial and the time of the two
sentences is as

described in (81), and not different from that
which holds
for ECV. But what kind of extended event
occurred at the
interval [a,bj? It is difficult to think of such
a specific
event which is the cause of the result state
where a house
came into existence.
Let us discuss the possibility in which the first

sentence underlying the CCV is a process while the second
one is an event.

Since we are dealing with aspectual

properties of languages and not of the world (for a

discussion of this distinction see section 1.1. on verb
classification in chapter
evidence.

I)

we must look for linguistic

Consider the following sentence.

:

:
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(83)

?John warmed the soup at three
o'clocJc.

which is fine for some speakers.

For these speakers the

punctual time adverbial refers
to the time at which the soup
became warm rather than the time
at which John started to

gjree o'clock can not Indicate the
time both of
John turning on the gas and of
that at which the soup became
warm.
John's act may be a durative onethat of refraining
from turning off the gas.
Such a situation is described in
sentence 84
(

(84)

)

John warmed the soup for half an hour
by letting
It Stand on the fire.

The time specified by the durative time
adverb indicates the

duration of the process of having the soup stand
on the
gas.

The causative verb warm in (84) is a
process rather

than an accomplishment and the verb in the
result state

clause is the process inchoative verb become warmer
(We say
Ijie

soup warmed

f or

three hours

).

The sentences in the two

clauses of (84) are of the same aspectual type- that of a
process; and the time adverb relates to them in the same way
as in the case of CPV

.

Warm in (84) is ambigiuous between a

process and an accomplishment in the same way that wash is
(this ambiguity was mentioned to me by Partee

)

(85)

The maid washed the clothes in two hours.

(86)

The maid washed the clothes for two hours.
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Sentence (86) describes the
process of washing connected
with certain rituals as rubbing
the clothes with a soap,
dipping them in the water, etc
rather than the result state
where the clothes are clean.

Consider the following sentences:
(87)

John was cured by administering
vitamins.

(88)

The door was closed by blowing at it.

(89)

The lock was broken by kicking at the
door continuously.

In sentence

(87)

the activity of the missing deep

structure subject (let us say it is the doctor)
is durative;
It IS that of administering vitamins.

In the result clause

we have an achievement "got healthy".

The same contrast in

the aspectual type of the sentences in the two
clauses also

exists in (88)-(89). In the case of the causative verb
cure

,

only the result state of its object ("get healthy")
is

specified but not the activity of its subject.

administering vitamins

,

The VP's

blowing at it and kicking at the

door are process type verbs.

Consider:

(90)

The doctor administered vitamins for three hours.

(91)

The wolf blew at the door for half an hour.

(92)

The police kicked the door continuously.

This perhaps suggests that culmination causative verbs have
a process type sentence in the first clause and an event

:

132

type sentence in the result
state clause.
The instrumental adverb
"by administering vitamins"
in
(87) shares the verb
with the missing deep structure
subject of the sentence.
it was the doctor who
administered
vitamins, not John. Jerry Fodor
(1970) observed that many
instrumental adverbial phrases share
the deep underlying NP
with the verb they modify.
in his example

c^

(93)

it is the

deep subject John rather than
Mary who used the phone:
(93)

John contacted Mary by using the
phone.

He also mentioned that instrumental
adverbs can not appear
in full passive due to a surface
constraint on iteration of

iMary was found by John by using radar

but are
fine when they appear in agentless
passives like (87)-(89).
Since the adverb for n hours in sentence
(94)

,

is a

constituent of the ^-phrase, it specifies the
length of the
duration of the activity of the doctor and not
that of John.
Consider
(94)

John was cured by administering vitamins
for three week.

(95)

The door was closed by blowing at it
for half an hour.

When the for n hours adverb is extracted from the VP and
pi^sposed

,

sentences (87

)

— (89

)

are no longer good:
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Ci?amins?®
at°it!^"

*’i'

’^*’®

administering

door was closed by blowing

This is so because in (96)-(97)
the for-adverb modifies the
hole sentence, as in the case
of CPV. But for CCV like
cure
and close (as in (87)-(89))
the for-adverb inside the

^-phrase modifies the VP in the
^-phrase.
Although sentences (87)-(89) have
an achievement verb
in their second clause, they
are semi-grammatical with a
punctual time adverbial:
(98)

(99)

?John was cured at three o'clock
by administering vitamins for three

hours

.

?The door was closed at two o'clock
by blowing at it for half an hour
.

Sentences (98)-(99) are only partially
acceptable, so they
do not allow the reading (which (87)-(89)
have) where the

administering of vitamins which lasted for three weeks
preceded the time at which John got healthy.

It is not the

case that (98)-(99) are ruled out because of a restriction

that only one time adverb can occur at a sentence; something

else is involved here.

In a construction where the main

sentence is restricted by a frame adverb and also contains
an additional durative time adverb, the time specified by

the durative adverb can not be longer that that specified by
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the frame adverb.

Sentences (98)-(99) are bad
because the
time of the durative adverb
is longer than that indicated
by
the time adverb restricting
the main sentence:

Sentence (100) which does not
violate the above
(100)
condition is fin©:
John was cured yesterday by
administering
vitamins for three hour.c;.
Notice that when the verb completed
appear in the main
sentence, you can have a durative adverb
in the other:
(101)

*John painted the picture at three o'clock
by using an air brush for three hours "

(102)

John completed the picture by using an air
brush for three hours
.

T o complete does not always imply
finishing something at a

point.

If an

activity takes some time, its last stage can

be considered as its completion.

Sentence (102) can be

uttered in a situation where John was painting
a picture for
three months or even longer.

(The completion of the picture

lasted three days and during one of these days John was

using an air-brush for three hours).

Quite surprisingly, we

can add a punctual time adverb to the main sentence when
the

other one is modified by continuously
(103)

:

The police broke the door at three o'clock
by kicking at it continuously.
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we can utter (103) in a
situation where the kicking of the
door by the police lasted
through a short interval of time,
for example, two to five
minutes.
In the same way we can
say of John that he picked up
his mail at noon when it took
him five minutes to pick it up,
but not when it took him
three hours to do so. This follows
from the fact that -at n
o'clock' lacks a definite time
reference, it depends on how
we choose to construct time.
'At three o'clock' indicates a
time around three o'clock and not
necessarily the time when
the small and big arms of the clock
point to the numbers
three and twelve respectively.
In sentence (103),
c ontinuously

modifies a process sentence and the activity

described by it lasts for an interval of
duration.

a few

moments

This short interval is contained in the interval

specified by the "at three o'clock" adverb, so the
above

restriction is not violated and this accounts for the

acceptability of (103).
Partee and Bennett (1978) gave examples of adverbial

phrases which serve both as durative and frame adverbial
phrases.

Consider:

(104)

John was hungry all day yesterday.

(105)

John walked from two to three o'clock.

(106)

John will be building a house until tomorrow.

But culmination causative verbs can not appear with such

.

.
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examples

The Semantics of CAUSE and
Aspectuality

3.

^

1

•

The Se mantics Analysis of CAUSE
In his paper on causation

(1973) David Lewis analyzed

this notion in terms of counterf
actuals

.

Dowty adopted

Lewis' analysis of causation for
his bi-sentential operator
CAUSE and further revised it. We
will present both Lewis'
analysis of causation and Dowty s
version of this analysis
and then we will point to difficulties
which arise with the
semantics of CAUSE and other issues concerning
its
'

interaction with aspectuality.
Causation is a relation between events, but when
treated in terms of counterf actuals it is a
relation between
propositions.

Lewis does not analyze a relation between

events e and c but a relation between propositions
0(e) and
0(c) which assert correspondingly that event e
occurred and

event c occurred.

Dowty 's CAUSE is a sentential operator

and the sentences which are its arguments assert that events

occurred.

We have to distinguish between the events e and c

and the sentences 0(c) and 0(e)

(causative stative sentences

can not be analyzed as relation between events

)

Lewis defines the relation of causal dependence between

event e and c in terms of the notion of counterf actual
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dependence between the propositions
that events occurred,
depends causally on c (cDe)
iff 0(c) -> o(e) and

e

~0(c)0—> '^O(e).
For Lewis, causal dependence
is a different relation
from causation: while causation
is transitive, causal

dependence need not be (causal
dependence is not transitive
since it fails for Lewis' counterf
actual connective
).
Causation is defined by Lewis in
terms of causal dependence:
actual event c causes an event e
just in case there
is a

series of events c, c^, c^, C

c^, e such that c^

3

depends causally on

c,

c^ depends causally on c^ etc.

Causation (C) is the transitive closure^
of the
converse of causal dependence (D) and is
defined as follows:
(107)

cCe iff

(

3 a^

^

^n^^n -1

^
^

c=aj^

and e=a^

]

Causation does not entail causal dependence (because
causal dependence is not transitive) but causal
dependence

entails causation.
Lewis

treatment of causation contains two components:

its definition in terms of the notion of causal dependence

and the definition of causal dependence in terms of the

counterf actual connective

analysis in his (1073a).

(see Lewis' counterf actual

.

)
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Dowty remarks that there
is another important issue
Which he calls the "causal
selection", which
n.ust be

considered in the definition of
CAUSE. Causation statements
in natural language ordinarily
single out one event as "the
cause of the other, while the
oounterf actual analysis
allows a number of events to
be considered
as causes.

He

mentions Kim (1973) and Abbott
(1974), who have shown that
large number of counterfactuals
are odd when converted to

a

causal statements, quoting some of
Abbot's examples:
(108)

(109)

(110)

a.

If I had not lit John's cigarette,
he wouldn't have smoked it.

b.

My lighting John's cigarette caused him
to smoke it.

a.

If I had not been born
have come to Amherst.

b.

My being born caused me to come to
Amherst

a.

If Mary had not gotten married, she would
have not become a widow.

b.

Mary's getting married caused her
to become a widow.

I

would not

Since English causative statements require

selection as the abnormal sentences

(

a

causal

108b )-( 110b

illustrate, Lewis' analysis of causation in terms of

counterfactuals is problematic when taken as an account for
causative sentences in languages.

Dowty 's CAUSE operator is

supposed to account for causative statements in natural

.
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languages.

Therefore he suggests adding
to its definition
another clause which will
take care of the above mentioned
difficulties.
He suggests that one select
"the cause" of an
event as the one whose deletion
from the actual course of
events would result in the
least departure from the actual
world.
If we quantify over a
multiple of causes
of an

event, we can identify as "the
cause" the one whose

non-occurrence can be found in worlds
at least as similar or
more similar to the actual world
than the non-occurrence of
any of the other causes of the
event.
(Since sometimes more
than one cause could be equally easy
to get rid off, Dowty
would like the world in which the cause
does not occur
to be

as similar to the actual world as
any other worlds where
other causes do not occur)

Perhaps this is why we so often find human
actions
Identified as "the cause" in a causal chain
of events.
We
feel intuitively that the actions of human
agents usually

could be different from what they are but that
this is not
so often true for inanimate objects which
obey physical
laws.

To see this more clearly consider the following

example; John pulled the trigger of the gun, lifted the
barrel, the bullet travelled along a parabola and Bill died
as a consequence.

cause

John's pulling of the trigger is "the

of Bill's death rather than the bullet going in a

parabola.

This is so since worlds in which bullets do not

;

.
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go xn straight lines are
less similar to the actual
one than
those in which John didn't
fire his gun.

Dowry's definition of CAUSE has
three clauses: In
clause (Ilia) he adds some
conditions to Lewis' definition
of causal dependence (which
is defined in terms of
counterf actuals) by requiring
that ^ and
should be true.
If i and y/ are true, then

f

^

why Dowry drops it from clause
(111a) in his definition of
CAUSE, in clause (111b) the
definition of "causal factor" Is
his adaptation of Lewis' analysis
of causation as a
transitive closure of the converse of
causal dependence.
The third clause (111c) in Dowty
is the causal selection
condition, which was discussed above.
When

^

and

conditions for

are arbitrary sentences the truth
[j^

CAUSE

(//

]

are given by the following

definition
(111)

a.

^ depends causally on

^

iff

and

\j/

are all true.
b.

jzf

is a causal factor for

is a series of sentences

(for n

0)

^

iff

there
.

.

.

,

,

such that each member of the

series depends causally on the previous

member

(j
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o-

[4 CAUSE

V-

factor for
that

p

]

is true iff
,

(

1

)

^ is a causal

and (2) for all other

such

IS also a causal factor
for
(f/

,

some

-world IS as similar or more
similar to
the actual world that any
-world
is.

Partitivity, Add itivity and Process
Verbs
In section 1.2. of chapter

I

we discussed the

properties of additivity and partitivity
which were
connected with process verbs and mass
nouns (for which we
must maintain a weaker version of
partitivity).
Sentences
which contain CPV have two underlying
sentences ^ and ^
each of them describing a process.
Can we show that if
,

and

are process sentences then it follows
by logic that
is a process sentence?
[f CAUSE
KjJ

]

If something is a process sentence iff
it is partitive

and additive then to answer the above question
we must show

that if
[f

jli

and

CAUSE ^

]

[j/

are partitive and additive so is

We will show that this consequence does not

.

hold for a weaker relation than CAUSE which we will
call
KAUSE. When

KAUSE

]

and f are partitive and additive then

j/

is additive but not partitive.

We will also

show that this is consistent with linguistic facts

concerning the interaction of partitivity and causative
P^o^^ss verbs

.

Here we have a nice case where logic and

1

142

language coincide.
The relation KAUSE in

Dowty

kausE f

is the converse of

]

relation of causal dependence in
clause A of the
definition of CAUSE. We do not know
how partitivity and
additivity interact with the notion
of causal chains (clause
(111b) in the definition of
CAUSE) and how relevant the
notion of causal selection to our
proof is.
s

In our proof we will use
Lewis' definition of the

counterf actual conditional, Dowty
's definition of causal
dependence and Dowty 's definition of
[d CAUSE
where the relation between the time
at which the causative
sentence is true and the time at which
^ and f are true is
made explicit.
Lewis' definition of the counterf actual
(Z'

connective

(

112

)

->
If

is:

y/ 6

ME^, then (^0—>

and [[(^0-#

^

there is no set

there is w'

6 S

)

ME^,

€

either

,w,g,i~^

^

(1)

^

S

e$

w for which

such that [[^1]^
^

'(U,w'

or else (2) there is some set
t

w

J(5^w' ,i,g"^^

S,

[

[

(j^

for some w'

-^ »^)

]

]

C?

We want to prove that;

fW'

'

S6$ w

=i

such that

and for all

5 S

/i/g

,i,g

^

1

(

113

)

1

'

1

is partivive and additive

/

is partitive and additive

^

^

f

KAUSE

P

KjJ

]

]

additive

ifs

The formal proof is given in
the appendix.
We still need to show that
partitivity does not hold
general, i.e there is a model where
/ and y/ are additive
and partitive and
KAUSE y/ fails to be partitive.
Let
our model have two worlds
fw,w'] and three intervals
i
]

and

where 13 = 12^1/12

^ is

•

partitive in a model A iff for

any worlds w and time intervals

^ and
(

I

i

1

'

f have the indicated truth values in w and w':
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)

w

w

h
1

f
^

2

/V

y/

a

—

0

—

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

^ and

1

1
1

row of the form

I3

1

1

1

both w and w'.

M

—

1

In this model,

would be

I3

^2

^

j

—

^

^

y/

are both additive and partitive at

y'

A counterexample to additivity would be a
1

1

0

;

a

row of the form

counterexample to partitivity

Oil

or

101

or

001

.

,
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There are no such rows for
There is

a

world w'

f or for ^
where
is true at
.

and

holds with respect to (w,i^)
and (w',i^), i.e,
in the sphere (w,w'}. So,
[[~j|(Q-; ~y/ Jl^_^ =l.
holds
3
at (WM
and
at (wM^) is flise.
3
since
there are no worlds closer to w
than w' where
holds,
then [[ ^
=Q
This counterexample shows that
the non-partitivity of KAUSE is
consistent with the
additivity and partitivity of
^ and ^
AT(I^,w) we have
so ^ kauSE f
i>,
,
f and
Atd^.w) we have
and
fl,
-)('], so
V'
KAUSE '/'I. So KAUSE is not
partitive in this model.
-f

)

:

.

The following two examples illustrate why
partitivity

fails to hold.

Causative VP's with bare plural objects are

processes and this is why sentence (115) may appear
with

a

durative time adverb;
(115)

For two weeJcs the workers built cabins.

If the workers build different cabins at different

subintervals of the interval specified by the time adverb,
e.g if they build a different one each day, then the workers
cabins is partitive at the two week interval, since it
IS true at its appropriate large subintervals.

But in a

model where all the workers finished building all the cabins
at the same time, i.e at the end of the two weeks, then the
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workers built cabins is not
partitive at the interval of two
since it is not true at any
of its subintervals.
So
in a model where the workers
finished building all the
cabins at the same time, i.e by
the end of the two weeks,

"orkers built cabin, is not partitive
at the
interval of two weeks duration,
since it is not true at any
of its subintervals.
Thus, causatives which

take bare
plurals are process verbs (as the
for-adverb linguistic test
indicates) and partitivity doesn't hold
for process
sentences which contain causative verbs.
There are quite
plausible situation for which The workers
built cabins
is

partitive at the interval with respect to
which it is true,
and there are equally plausible situations
for which this is
not so.
There is another example which illustrates the
same
point.
Consider sentence (116):
(116)

John rolled the drum down the street.

Imagine John pushed the drum for ten minutes from
to ten minutes past

1

1

o'clock

o'clock and also that the drum rolled

down the street during that period.

(116)

is a CPV-sentence

for which partitivity holds: if John rolled the drum down

the street is true at the interval [1°°, 1^°], then it is

true for its subintervals.

But in a model where John pushed

the drum for two minutes (his pushing is a process) and then
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stopped and the drum kept
rolling round the street for
another 8 minutes, (116) is not
partitive.
such a model
(116) is true at the interval
[l^^ i^O] but not at [l^^,

m

1^°],

[l°^ l^O]^ etc.
We have given two examples of
process sentences which

involve causative verbs and for which
partitivity does not
hold.
These examples agree with the results
we arrived at
by using logic.
My discussion of additivity, partitivity
and process sentences shows that the
interaction of these
notions is more complicated than has
been assumed
in the

literature.

We did not provide a complete theory
about

their relationship- this is a topic for
further research and
we hope that the issues and examples
mentioned here will
open up a new perspective for dealing with
process verbs.
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FOOTNOTES

verbs which is
amblgiouf Seiween thf eK?erLT"/^\^
external/intentional readings -The
(^vhnhH+-.-^r,
exhib
ition was in New York for three
days
.

sequence

f
a^^

a^ such that;

l<i<n,

(1)

For all

(2)

a =x and a =y.
1
n

R(a^,a^^^)

" there is a finite

chapter

III

ISSUES IN THE SEMANTIC ANALYSIS
OF THE PROGRESSIVE

Z-he

Traditional Ap p roach to the Progressive

^ntague's Definition and the Continuum Failnr^
The purpose of this chapter is
to compare two main

analyses suggested for the progressive,
which

:^aditional approach vs.
one.

I

will refer

the non-topoloqical

To illustrate the different problems
involved in the

analysis of the progressive

I

will review the history of the

argumentation given by philosophers and linguists
in favour
of one analysis or another and outline
the objections which

might be raised in each case.
I

find such an historical survey important due to
the

volume of literature on this topic, which
be related and compared.

I

I

think ought to

will point to the differences

among the treatments of the progressive within two main
streams.

These treatments were often suggested as responses

and improvements over previous ones.

After discussing in

detail the various theoretical issues involved and pointing
to problems which were left unresolved in the treatments of

the progressive in the two main streams,
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I

will offer my own

s

.
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analysis

Montague (1970) suggested a
treatment for the
progressive stated as follows in
Bennett and Partee

'

(1978)

(1

John IS walking is true at time
p iff there
interval of moments of time, say l,
suc^^h^^
i and for all time t
^ it
in ?
Tnhn walks
^n
I John
is true at t.

In the above definition the
truth of the tensed sentence
Prog[j^]

at a moment of time is dependent
on the truth of the

constituent sentence

— hn

^ at other moments.

The progressive

is walking is true at a moment
of time t just in case

J ohn

walk is true at all moments of some open
interval which
contains t.

Definition

(1)

is too strong.

The two objections to be

raised differ slightly, although the same
criticism, which

I

will refer to as the 'continuum failure' is
involved in

presenting them.

The first objection can be illustrated by

an example of process verbs like walk and read

.

One can

spend an hour at walking or reading without being literally

involved in that activity at every moment within that hour,
as required in the above definition.^

The second objection is a more crucial one and involves

accomplishment/achievement verbs.

The above definition of

the progressive works only for process verbs and is not

general enough to include other aspectual types of verbs.
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With aocomplishment/achievement
verbs the truth of the
tensed sentence seems not
to require the truth of
its
constituent sentence (s) at all
moments within that
-

house at

r

does not mean that
the simple tense sentence
John build a house „as true
at all
moments in an interval surrounding
t.
On the contrary, it
was not true at any moment
of the open interval.
Vlach (1981) provides a nice
example which illustrates
a comparable problem with
an achievement verb: If Mary
starts a race at 3.10 and wins
at 3.16, then there is a
third instant
between 3.10 and 3.16 such that she
pulls
ahead at
and stays ahead until 3.16. Mary
is winning is
true at every instant between
and 3.16, but Mary win is
only true at 3.16. Thus, it is
false that Prog[J^] is true
only at instants contained in an
interval at moments of

f

f

f

which f is true.

it seems that a better definition for
the

progressive is required.

2*

Bennett and Partee and Interval Semantics
To account for the continuum failure
discussed above,

Bennett and Partee (1978) take the notion of truth
at an
interval as basic.

According to their suggestion sentences

in the simple tense can be true at an interval
which is not
a moment.

Their intention is that a sentence in the simple

tense be true at an interval

I

if

l

has an initial and a

.

.
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final point such that the
event described by it starts
at
the initial point and
stops at the final point.
Here is the
definition they give for the
progressive:

building a house is true at

Lr
tor

I

I

iff

i

is

^
endpoint
and John K
builds a house is true at I

,

•

We see that Bennett and Partee
avoid the continuum failure
(which arises by defining the
truth of the progressive at a

moment

t in

terms of the truth of the simple
tense at
moments of time) by defining the
truth of the simple tense
with respect to an interval rather
than a moment.
in this
sense they avoid referring to moments
when defining
the

truth of a simple tense sentence, and
consequently avoid
referring to moments when defining the
truth of the

progressive.

in their definition of the progressive
given

above, the verb which appears is an
accomplishment, build
by what they have said, the simple tense
sentence which

;

contains it should be evaluated with respect to
an
interval.

We will see later that Dowty's semantics for

verbs of change (accomplishments and achievements)
employs

Bennett and Partee

'

s

basic idea about the truth of the

simple tense sentence with accomplishment and achievement

verbs
As in Montague's analysis the progressive is defined in

terms of the simple tense, and in this sense both approaches

s

.
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are said to be compositional-the
meaning of the whole, which
in our case is the
progressive sentence, is defined in
terms
of the meaning of its
parts, in this case the simple
tense
sentence
This analysis like the former
calls for further
revisions.
The next section deals with
it.

Modal-Tempor a l Treatment of The Procrressivp
Doyt y's suggestion

.

The failure of inference

from the progressive to the simple
tense was recognized a
long time ago and recently was labeled
with the name "the

imperfective paradox" by Dowty (1979). The
imperfective
paradox is common to accomplishments and certain

achievements which take the progressive.

In the following

sentence the process verb in the progressive entails
the
simple tense but the accomplishment and achievement
verbs

may fail to make such an entailment;
(3)

(

4

)

(

5

)

That John was pushing a cart entails that John
pushed a cart.
That John was crossing the road does not
entails John crossed the road.
That John was falling asleep does not
entail that John fell asleep.

Bennett and Partee

'

s

definition of the progressive (as well

as Montague's) fail to distinguish between the different

entailments in (3)-(5). According to Bennett and Partee

'

.
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John is crossing th. str.ot
is true at a moment I
just in
John cross the street is
true at some interval I

containing

which require that John completes
the crossing
of the street.
However, this must not always
be
I,

the case
since a car could have hit
John and prevented him from
reaching the other side of the
pavement.
The analysis of
the progressive given in 1.1.
and 1.2. predicts that the
sentence

(6)

John was crossing the street when
he was hit bv

can never be true since there is
no interval at which John
cross the street is true. However,
there is nothing strange
in the utterance of sentence
(

6

)

Dowty offered an analysis to account for
the

imperfective paradox in the framework of his
aspect
calculus.

He claimed that the Become-operator which
denotes

a change of state is what

accomplishments and achievements

share in their logical structure and concludes from
it that
the solution to the analysis of the progressive
lies in a

correct formulation of truth conditions for Prog[^] and
Become[y]. In his treatment of Become[^] he accounts for

what

I

have referred to as the 'continuum failure' and in

his analysis of the progressive he gives an account for the

imperfective paradox.
In Dowty 's definition of Become

[j/]

a

solution to the

s

.
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•continuum failure* is offered.

He adopts the definition
of

the interval and related
notions from Bennett and
Partee and
uses them in his truth
conditions for Become[^]. The
semantics for Become
[j^] captures the intuition
that a
sentence can be true at an
interval without being true at
all times within the interval.
The general idea is to
define the truth of Become at
an interval with reference to
the truth of ^ at the ends
of the interval:
(7)

[Become
is true at I iff
(i)
interval j containing the initial there is an
bound of
such that
is true at J
(2) there is an
interval K containing the final
bound of I
such that 0 IS true at K,
and (3) there is no
non empty interval I such that
I c i
and
conditions (1) and (2) hold for I* as well
as I

T

'

As

I

noted above, Bennett and Partee

'

'

s

definition was

motivated by accomplishment sentences which
in Dowty
aspect calculus are represented with a
Become-operator
Dowty was influenced by Von Wright's
(1963) logic of change,
'

which regarded events in general as transformations
of
state.

Accomplishments and achievements in Dowty (which are

events in Von Wright) are represented by a
Become-operator

which has
argument.

a

stative predicate (or adjective) as an
Thus, the intransitive verb open is represented

by ^x[Become open'(x)] where open' is an adjective

translation and Become is defined as above.
The truth of a sentence in the progressive with an

;
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accomplishment verb is evaluated
with respect to an index
consisting of an interval and
a world.
By considering only
ndpoints of the interval, the
"continuum failure" which
arose in the case of
accomplishment verbs is accounted
for.

The second component, i.e the
world, has to do with the
imperfective paradox.
To account for the imperfective
paradox Dowty suggests
treating the progressive as a
modal-temporal operator. He

assigns truth conditions to a
progressive sentence relative
to an index of an interval I
and a possible world.
From the
:Z2hn was drawing a circle one can
conclude that the
existence of a circle was a possible
outcome of John's
activity.
This line of thought suggests that
the truth
value of the progressive at indices
consisting
of an

interval

and a world w depends on the truth of
j at
indices <I',w'>, where I' contains I and
w' is exactly like
w at all time preceding and including
I.
I

In his final definition of the progressive
Dowty adds a

primitive function "Inr" which assigns to each
index

consisting of a world and an interval of time, a set
of
worlds which he calls inertia worlds

.

Inertia worlds are

worlds which are exactly like the given world up to the
time
in question and in which the future course of events
after

this time develops in ways most compatible with the past

course of events

]

'
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(

8

)

Prog ^ IS true at <I,w> iff
for some interval
such that I Cl' and I is not
a final
subinterval of l
and for all w* such that
6 Inr(<l,w>)
^ is true at <!' ,w'>
[

I'

W

f

,

We see that the truth
condition for Prog[^] requires not
only the truth of
^ at some possible world like the
actual
one up to a certain time, but
its truth in all of such
worlds that meet certain conditions.
This is to take care
of cases of a coin which is
being flipped but has not yet
landed and of begining to draw a
picture without yet

deciding whether it is to be
unicorn.

a

painting of a horse or a

in the case of the flipped coin
the coin is coming

^

heads or Uie coin is coming up tails both
can not be true
since the relevant set of worlds would
include both worlds

in which it comes up heads and in which
it comes up tails.

Stump (1981) provided examples of present participle

adjuncts which exhibit the imperfective paradox:
(9)

Crossing the street, John was hit by a car.

He observed several differences between present participle

adjuncts and the progressive.

Some predicates may occur as

present participle adjuncts but not with the progressive:
(10)

a.

Being a sailor, John smokes a pipe,

b.

*John is being a sailor.

Also, a VP in the perfect may occur as a present participle

:

;
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adjunct but never as a
progressive:
(11)

Having finished his work,
John went to bed.
b. *John is having
finished his
a.

work.

stump also observed that
present participle adjuncts
deriving from VP's in the
perfect may themselves contain
a
progressive

anlweL!^®"

reading the book, John knew the

In order to decide which
part of the meaning of the
present

participle in free adjuncts
constructions derives from the
meaning of the present participle
phrase and which from the
meaning of the free adjunct, he
checked free adjuncts with
other (13)
constructions like past participle
phrase, adjective
phrase, prepositional phrase etc.
In all these cases the
imperfective reading of the free adjunct
is not possible- as
for example, in the case of a
past participle:
(14)

(15)

Beaten, the Phillies left the field,
(perfective reading)

Furthermore, he has shown that the present
participle in
other constructions may be understood imperf
ectively

Mary found the dying man

.

John sat reciting the Iliad

.

s

s

.

158

All this shows, claims
Stump, that the progressive
semantic
aspect does not have an
independent status in English.
He
offers a semantics for the
present participle phrase by
defining
an intensional logical
expression of type
<<s,t>,t>:

(17)

Where / denotes a proposition
p, lnq{d) is true
some inte?vSi
such
^
subinterval
for
i'
f
and for
all w'
Inr(<w,i>), p <w i > =i

"

,

(

(

'

,

'

)

Stump, as we see, identifies
the problem of the imperfective

paradox with the semantics of the
present participle which
may appear in different constructions,
and the semantics he
gives to
is basically Dowty
treatment of the
'

progressive.

The progressive is for Stump a predicative

construction consisting of a copula

participle phrase.
raised against Dowty

^

and the present

Therefore the objections which may be
'

modal-temporal treatment of the

progressive hold also for Stump's analysis.
Some o bjections

.

Dowty does not provide us

with a characterization of the relation which
holds between
inertia worlds and the actual one.

function is a primitive notion.

For him the inertia

He rejects Lewis'

similarity relation which was used in his counterf actual
analysis and which requires that the actual world be at
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least as similar to itself
as to any other world.
This of
course would lead him back
to the imperf active paradox.
He

also rejects the notion of
probability by which 'natural
course of events' may be defined.
We can say by looking at
the past that a certain
accomplishment or achievement was
occurring at the time, even though
the probability of its
completion was very small.
At a certain point Dowty mentions
that the beliefs of
the agent (in the case where the
logical subject can be
thought of as an agent) may be involved
in deciding what
worlds count as inertia worlds. However,
he finally rejects
the Idea that the meaning of
progressive sentences should be
a function of the speakers' or
hearers' beliefs.
Some attempts were made to introduce the
intentions of
the agent of a progressive sentence to
bring about an

accomplishment as determining what worlds count as
inertia
worlds.
However, it is easy to show that such an intention
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition for the

truth of all sentences in the progressive.

Consider the

example suggested to me by Partee;
(18)

John is building a perpetual motion machine.

Sentence (18) can not be true, although John has the

intention to build a perpetual motion machine.

This shows

that the agent's intentions are not a sufficient condition
for the truth of progressive sentences.

It also should be

.
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possible for the agent to
fulfill his intentions. Given
the
natural laws, there are no
inertia worlds at which there
exists a perpetual motion
machine.
if the agent's
intentions were a sufficient
condition for the truth of
progressive sentences, then John
is building a
could
be true even before he
became physically involved in the
process associated with building
houses, i.e when he merely
planned in his mind to build a house
sometime in the
future.
We do not want to accept such
a consequence
especially since the case may be extended
further by
allowing intentions to be random, or
even subconscious. All
this suggests that the agent's intention
is not a sufficient
condition for the truth of all sentences
in the

progressive
The agent

s

intentions are also not a necessary

condition for the truth of all sentences in
the
progressive.
(19)

In

The stone was rolling down the hill when
it exploded.

there are inertia worlds where the stone reached the bottom
of the hill although no intention is involved here.

A

®^^ilar example involving a human agent was given by

Hinrichs (1983
(20)

)

;

The old composer was writing a symphony even
though he knew he would not finish it.

161

Sentence (20) can be true
although due to his imminent
death
the composer might have
no intention of finishing
the
symphony.

He can still be in the
process of writing the

first movement, making
(20) true.
There is another problem with
the definition of the
progressive which reveals itself
in when-clauses Consider
the following sentence:
.

John was watching T.V when Bill
entered the room.

(21)

If

w^

is interpreted as suggested in
Bennett and Partee

(there, p.31) as "at the time that"
or "during the time
that" then sentence (21) entails
that the time of John

watching T.V actually extended at least
the time that Bill entered the room.

a few

moments beyond

This is so since the

time at which the truth of the
progressive is evaluated, let
call It t, IS identical with the time
of Bill's entering the
room, and since the progressive is
evaluated with respect to
a bigger interval where John watched
T.V is to be true.

According to Bennett and Partee

'

s

definition of the

progressive, sentence (22):
(22)

John was watching T.V when he fell asleep.

entails that the period of John's watching T.V extended

beyond the time of his falling asleep.

This was noticed by

Dowty and avoided by him in his analysis of the progressive,
where he only required that it was possible for John's

.

;

R
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activity to continue beyond
the time specified by the
when -clause
A genuine difficulty for
Dowty which arises in the case
of when -clause
IS the following.
Consider again the
sentence

street when he was hit by

ft?uck!
If the

w^-clause

event and the main-clause event
occur at

the same time, then the event
of John being hit by a truck
falls within the interval I in Dowty
's definition at which
the progressive operator is to
be interpreted for the
main-clause.
Since inertia worlds are identical to
the
actual world up to the point of evaluation,
then every
inertia world defined at I will contain
the fact that John
is hit by a truck at I
it follows from this that there are
no inertia worlds where
We want to fix the point
^ is true.
of evaluation in a way that would not
include the moment he
.

was hit by a truck.
To conclude, there are two puzzles still left

unresolved in the temporal-modal treatment of the
progressive: the first concerns the nature of the inertia

function (or the accessibility relation) so crucial in the
solution of the imperfective paradox and the second concerns
fixing the time of evaluation of the progressive in

when-clauses
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a2 "-r°P°l°qical Truth ConHi. jons for th.

^

^

*

Vlach

'

s

Suggestion

Vlach (1981) claims that any
correct truth condition
for the progressive operator
applied to accomplishment and
achievement sentences must be
non-topological
By this he
means that the set of instants at
which Prog[/] is true can
not be a function of the set of
instants and intervals at
which
f is true. The definitions of Montague, Bennett and
Partee are topological in this sense.
Dowty's definition is
not purely topological because of
his introduction of
.

possible worlds, but in the cases where

j in Prog[j<]

is true

in the actual world, it is topological
as well.

Vlach introduces a counterexample which
applies to all
the previous definitions of the
progressive.
Consider the

following sentences:
(a)

Max dies.

(b)

Max's life ends.

(c)

Max is dying.

(d)

Max's life is ending.

Furthermore, suppose that a bus is about to hit Max. In that
case we say that (d) is true and (c) is false.

However,

according to the topologically specified truth conditions
for the progressive, since both achievements die and ends

one's life have the same extension, and Prog[/] at

t

or

I

is

.

.
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defined in terms of
/ at some interval containing
sentence (c) and (d) can not
have different truth
conditions

t or I

Vlach suggests that John's
life can be in the process
Of ending without John
being in the process of dying.
The
idea is that the process of
dying is specifically
biological, while the process of
ending one's life is more
general.
Thus, while (a) and (b) are
true at the
same

moments,

(d)

false, e.g.

can be true in circumstances where
(c) is
in the case where the truck
is approaching

John, but has not yet hit him.

What Vlach is pointing out is that
the truth of Prog[
for achievements and accomplishments
is not exclusively
depended on the truth of
i but on the process that must be
going on in order to make the progressive
of a sentence
true
The process that must be going on to
make the

progressive of

a

sentence ^ true is always a process that is

connected with the truth of

jz(.

if

jzf

is a process sentence,

then the process that goes on when the progressive
of ^ is
true is the same one that goes on when
If
is
^ is true.
^

an accomplishment or achievement sentence, then the
process

that goes on when the progressive of
^ is true, is the one
that will lead, if continued, to the truth of

.
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^•2*

Bennett's Suggestion

Bennett (1981) distinguishes
between closed and open
intervals. Occurences of
processes (activities) are
represented by Bennett by open
intervals and occurences of
accomplishments (performances in his
terms) lilce John builds
a_house are represented by a union
of closed intervals.
Sentences can be evaluated with
respect to unions of
intervals, not just intervals. The
closed intervals in (24)
represent period of worlc and the gaps
represent rest. John
starts building a house at t^ and
finishes it at t^. At t
he is building a house but not at
t^.
(24)
^1

I3

^2

[_ 4._]

^1

^2

^3

^4

However, John b uild a house is not true merely
with respect
to I2.^l2^^3*

point sets.
^l'^2'^3'

sentence is not true at any other closed
However, it is true at the open subintervals of

analysis retains an open subinterval

condition on accomplishment sentences.

If an accomplishment

sentence is true at a union of closed intervals, then it is
true at every open, connected subinterval of that union.

Bennett defines the truth of a progressive sentence in
the following way;
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(25)

/is

Prog

true at a union of intervals
A
moment of time, and there
exists
1 of intervals A' such
a union
that « IS
is an open,
o
connected interval, A S.A', and
/ is true at A'
.

In this way, John is building
a house is true at t^
because

there are open intervals A'
I

2

)

(for instance the interior of

at which John build a house is
true.

The fact that John

b uild a house is true at the
open subintervals of
does not affect the truth of
non-progressive sentences,
since in the recursive truth
definition, these are always

evaluated with respect to closed point
sets.
Bennett exploits the distinction between
closed and
open sets to solve the imperf ective
paradox.
The truth of a
sentence in the progressive depends on the
tenseless

sentence being true at an open interval.

The truth of a

simple tense sentence on the tenseless sentence
being true
at a closed interval.
This allows Bennett to represent an

incomplete building of a house in the following way:
(26)
I

1

I

2

I
3

[
)

As before we stipulate that the tenseless sentence John

build a house is true at every open subinterval of
However, in this case there is no closed union of intervals
at which John build a house is true.
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Bennett

definition of the progressive
is
compositional like that of
Montague's, Bennett
s

and Partee's

and Dowry's. In a certain
sense his analysis is similar
to
Vlach's. There is a single
basic notion of truth with
respect to an interval, but
there are two kinds of
intervals- open ones and closed
ones, viach did not
distinguish between two kinds of
intervals but had two
components in the lexical meaning
of the verb- an event and
a process part.
According to viach the process part
of the
meaning of the verb can be true at
an interval although the
event part of the meaning is false
for that interval.
For
Bennett, a basic sentence would be
true with respect to the
open interval and false with respect to
the closed one.
Thus, although Bennett's analysis is
compositional it shares
some features with Vlach's and hence is
exposed to the same

objection.

The basic lexical meaning of a verb encodes
the

same information in the two proposals.

^

^

*

Some Difficulties with Non-Topoloqical Truth

Conditions for the Progressive
As we have said, under Vlach's approach the lexical

meaning of the verb has two components- an event and a
process, and the progressive is defined in terms of the

process component of the lexical meaning.

In the

traditional approach the lexical entry of the verb does not
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have two components and that
is why the progressive of
a
sentence with an accomplishment
is defined in terms of the
truth of the event sentence.

Neither Vlach nor Bennett
specifies or formalizes the
link between the meaning of the
accomplishment/achievement
verb and the meaning of the
activity (process) corresponding
to them- a link which has been
incorporated into their
analysis of the progressive. Consider
the following
sentence suggested by Dowty:
(27)

John was making Bill a millionaire.

There are many ways in which John can
accomplish making Bill
a millionaire.
John might be about to die leaving his

millions to Bill, he might be gambling, he might
be stealing
money or looking for an hidden treasure- all
these
activities have no necessary link to the accomplishment
of
making someone a millionaire. Each of these
activities
viewed independently of the context in which (27) is
uttered
and of the meaning of the accomplishment VP make one a

does not guarantee John's possession at some

point in time of millions of dollars.
The meaning of the above accomplishment (in addition to
the context) tells us what the possible associated

activities are which may lead to its fulfillment.

There is

no single activity connected with the meaning of the

(
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accomplishment,

viach's definition of the
progressive can
not explain how speakers
have learned the meaning
of

(27).

find another difficulty with
the non-topological
approach. Consider the following
sentence:
1

(28)

John is polishing every boot.

Sentence (28) is ambiguous.

When the universal quantifier

has a wide scope over the
progressive, sentence (28) says
that John is polishing every boot
at the same instant.
To
get the possibly sequential reading
the quantifier every
boot must be in the scope of the
progressive operator.
We can establish the truth value of
John loves every

—

know the extension of love

,

which is a

relation.

Consider now the sequential reading of Prog John
it is not apparent that the process
p olish every boot ).
part of the meaning of polish every boot can be
derived from
the basic lexical meaning of polish (even if
we include the

process part of the basic lexical meaning).

it seems that

Vlach's theory handles cases of the progressive of atomic
formulas, but not of complex ones.

One way to circumvent

this problem is to say that the process part of the verb is

intensional in the object position.

If we apply the process

part of the meaning of polish to the generalized quantifier

which is the meaning of every boot

,

then we get the process

part of the meaning of polish every boot

,

as desired.

But

.

.
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then we will have to say that
the process version of any
accomplishment and achievement verb
is intensional.

m

PTQ

all verbs are treated as
intensional in the grammar and

extensional transitive verbs are
governed by meaning
postulates,
it seems perfectly possible to
limit the
extensionality meaning postulates to
the event part of the
meaning of a verb. Thus my objection
to Vlach's proposal
may not be insurmaountable
Another example which may be raised is
that mentioned
by Parsons (1983) as a possible objection
to his analysis.
If Mary is building a house then her
building event has an
object which is a house and so there is a
house that she is
building.
Let us suppose Mary dies when the house is
only
one fifth finished.

Some might claim there is no house

since an unfinished house is not a house.

The

question is: how much of a house needs to be built before
the agent's activity is described as one of building
a

house?

In other words

^

when do we say that a certain

activity which goes on is an activity of a certain kind if
it is not the output of the process which determines this?

(This is of course problematic only for the progressive of

accomplishments and some achievements

)

o

Aqvist's example mentioned by Parsons (1983) raises a
similar point, consider:
(29)

Mary is drawing a circle.

.

.
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If Mary ia interrupted,
then no circle gets completed.

Many
wrll insist that an incomplete
circle is no circle at all
but an arc with constant
curvature.
There is a present

object of Marys activity, but
it is not clear which object
exactly it is. There is no single
way to describe the
activity she is involved in: is
it the drawing of a circle
or the drawing of an arc? Such
cases lead us to agree that
the progressive is dependent on
the meaning of the atomic
sentence

3

3

•

1

•

A New Proposal

.

The V agueness of the Progressive

Angelika Kratzer (1977) offered an analysis of

mu^

within the framework of possible world semantics.

and

A

similar idea to that which she employed in her
analysis of
modal verbs may be employed in the treatment of
the

progressive.

My suggestion is in line with that of Dowty's

i.e, treating the progressive as a modal-temporal
operator,

but abandons the notion that there is a single primitive

inertia function, which

I

have shown in 1.3.2. to be

unsatisfactory
Kratzer claimed that different notions of must and can
are involved in sentences in which these words are uttered.
She gives the following example to demonstrate it;

.

:
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(30)

All Maori children must
learn the name of their
ancestors

(31)

">“st have

from Tahiti.
(32)

arrived

If you must sneeze, at
least use your
^
handkerchief.

(33)

said .Rakaipaka must be the chief.

The

^

mu^

in sentence (30) is a deontic
one which refers to a
duty, the mu^ in sentence
(31) is an epistemic one, that in

sentence (32) a dispositional one
and the must involved in
(33) IS what IS often called a
preferential must which
refers to wishes and preferences.

Kratzer paraphrases

(30)-(33) to illustrate what is meant by
must in the

utterances of these sentences
(30')

In view of what their tribal duties are,
the Maoris children must learn the names of
their ancestors.

(31')

In view of what is known, the ancestors of
the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.

(32')

If In view of what your dispositions areyou must sneeze, at least use your handkerchief.

(33

When Kahukura— nui died, the people of Kahunguru
said In view of what is good for us Rakaipaka
must be our chief.

)

:

The suggestion is to treat must as a relative modal phrase

must in view of which has two arguments; a phrase like "what
is known" and a sentence.

The first argument which is
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provided by phrases liKe "what
is known" or "what is
good
for us IS very often missing
in our use of

English, as can

be seen from the examples
(30)- (33). it is the context
of

utterance which provides a deontic
argument when uttering
(30), an epistemic argument
when uttering (31), etc. It
follows from this that it is not
must which has different
meanings but the missing argument
whose presence was felt in
all the occurences of the verb
must.
After making these observations
Kratzer describes how
and can should be treated within
a framework
of

possible world semantics.

The meaning of the phrase "what

IS known" is that function from
the set of possible worlds

into the set of all propositions which
assigns to each
possible world the set of propositions which
are known in
that world.
in general, the first argument of the
modal
will be a function f from worlds to sets of
propositions.
The meaning of must in view of (lets call it
Must

)

is a

function which assigns a proposition to a pair consisting
of
a function like f and a

pair consisting of

f

proposition p.

Must assigns to the

and p that proposition which is true in

exactly these possible worlds w where
p follows logically
from the set of propositions which
To make it more clear,

lambda-operators.

I

f

assigns to w.

state her suggestion by using

Where w is a set of worlds,

f

a function

from a set of possible worlds to the set of sets of

:
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propositions, then must In view of
follows
(34)

(

Must

is defined as

)

Must(f,p)= ;^„[p follows from
f(w)l
(which is a characteristic
function of a set of worlds,
i.e.
a proposition).
Let us illustrate the definition
for
sentence (31). where f is as
before (a function from a set

possible worlds to the set of sets
of propositions which
assigns to each possible world
the set of propositions which

—

*^hat

world.)

and p is the proposition

an cestors of t he Maoris arrived
from Tahiti

I-.

[

The

(The latter

abbreviates the denotation of The
ancestors of the Manr)s
arrived from Tahiti Known' is a
relation between
propositions and worlds and Known' (q,w)
means that q is
known in w)
.

(35)

Must [iv ^q[ Known (q,v)
'

]

,

[

Ancestors of the

Maoris have arrived from Tahiti

=

)
'

^^

[[

Ancestors of the Maoris have arrived

from Tahiti

and by
(36)

]

follows from

'

V ^q [Known (q,v)
'

(

]

]

(w))]

^-conversion:

^w

[[

Ancestors of the Maoris have arrived from

Tahiti

]

'

follows from

^

q[Known (q/w)
'

]|

The same idea can be developed in our analysis of the

.
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progressive .

Let's repeat Dowty's definition:
t

f

<I,w> iff for some interval
and I is not a final
and for all w' such that

The inertia function in Dowty's
definition is a constant
one, a primitive function.
Dowty did not characterize the
nature of that function (or in
Lewis' terms the

"accessibility relation") which selects
the inertia worlds.
In 1.3.2. I introduced different
notions which seem
to be

involved in determining inertia worlds
which are like the
actual one up to a certain time, and
differ afterwards.
l
mentioned the possibilities where the selected
inertia
worlds are determined by the agent's intention,
the

similarity relation, physical laws etc, and have
claimed
that no single one of these is satisfactory
or
can be

regarded as a necessary or sufficient condition for
the
truth of progressive sentences.

The difficulty arose

because we wanted to pick up one of these notions in order
to describe the nature of the inertia function taken as
a

constant, and none of them was satisfactory when taken in

isolation.

However, it seems that all these notions (and

maybe others) are involved in the truth conditions for the

progressive and the following examples demonstrate it;
(38)

Given his intentions, John was going to Boston
when he was hit by the truck.

176

(39) Given the laws of
motion,

John's life was
ending when God rescued him.

(40) Given the legal
practices in the countrv

In

(38)

Tnhn

It IS John's intentions
which determine the inertia

worlds where the progressive is
evaluated.
in these worlds
John went to Boston although
in the actual world he was
hit
by a truck.
in the case of sentence
(39), assume it is
uttered in the case where a truck
is about to hit John when
God's hand appears out of the darkness
and snatches him
away.

m

this case the inertia worlds which
are picked up
are determined solely by physical laws
(we assume God stays
outside physics) and in these worlds
John dies although in
the actual world God rescues him.
For example (40), let

John be Rockefeller's son.

A certain organization is

interested in sullying John's name by accusing
him with the
murder of a communist. His enemies supply the
court with

convincing false evidence by which the law should
have found
him guilty.
The inertia worlds selected here are these in

which the courts operate in the way they usually do
and John
is framed for murder.

in the real world his rich father.

Rockefeller, bribes the judge and saves him.^
The fact that we can utter sentences like (38)-(40) and

many others with Given x

,

and the progressive and these

sentences can have an imperfective reading, suggests that in
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the meaning of the
progressive there is a free
variable over
sets Of worlds which is
determined by the context.
Dowty
the function from indices
(worlds and times) to
propositions

m

is a constant; we want
it to be a free variable
over worlds

Which receives a value by a
context.

Sometimes the context

selects the inertia worlds which
are the agent's intentions,
sometimes the inertia worlds are
determined by physical laws
etc.
Kratzer argued that the first
argument of

Mu^

i.e,

the function f, is often misssing
in must - sentences and is
determined by the context, and the same
is true in the use
of progressive sentences where
the phrase Given x is often
missing and is covered by context.
The notion of necessity
is involved in both Kratzer 's
and my suggestion.
This
suggests that the appeal to a contextually
specified notion
of inertia world may not be unprincipled:
the contextual

delimitation of the domain of the quantification
over worlds
induced by a natural language expression of
necessity may be
a general phenomenon."^
Ed Gettier has suggested (personal communication)

another argument which can be used against Dowty 's idea
of a
single primitive inertia function in his definition
of
the

progressive, and which supports my own theory of the

vagueness of the progressive.

walk to one

's

The VPs cross the street and

own death are both accomplishments.

assume John was hit by a car at 12 o'clock.

Let us

The sentences
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(41)

John was crossing the
street.

(42)

John was walking to his
death.

are both true at 11:59.
This can not be the case if
„e have
a single inertia
function since in all inertia
worlds at
which John died he did not
cross the street and in all
inertia worlds at which he
crossed the street he did not
die.
Since at 11:59 both sentences
(41) and (42) are true,
a modal treatment of the
progressive which employs the
notion of a single inertia function
malces the wrong
prediction in this case. However,
under my own treatment of
the progressive both (41) and
(42) can be true at the same
time since the corresponding simple
tense sentences are
evaluated with respect to different
classes of inertia
worlds. The inertia worlds relevant
for the truth of 41
are those in which John's intentions
are fulfilled and those
relevant for the truth of (42) are those
where physical laws
hold.
(

)

Gettier has also suggested that in my analysis
of the

progressive a problem may arise when trying to account
for
the truth of sentences like (19) repeated
below;
(19)

The stone was rolling down the hill when
it exploded.

Since the stone does not have intentions it is not clear

what are the inertia worlds which account for the truth of
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(19). The laws of nature
are those which enable the
stone to
reach the bottom of the
hill and those which enable
it to
explode.
So, we can not pick the
laws of nature as those

Which determine the inertia
worlds at which the stone
reached the bottom of the hill.
One way to avoid this
difficulty is by restricting the
set of natural laws to
subsets like the laws of motion,
law of genetics,

hydrostatics, chemistry, etc.

it is the inertia worlds at

which the laws of motion hold but
not chemistry, which are
responsible for the truth of (19). But
consider
the

following example
(43)

The wheel was rolling across the
road when it
was knocked over by the falling rock.

The rolling of the wheel and the falling
of the rock are
both governed by the laws of motion, so
we can not pick a

notion of inertia that contains one but not
the other.
Michael Jubien has suggested (personal communication)
an example in which the progressive is used
to report that

somebody is engaged in a certain activity and has nothing
to
do with modality.

Someone can describe a section of a

baseball game he has been watching as follows:
(44)

Smith was pitching a no hitter, when John
tripled to left.

It is not Smith's intentions or physical laws which are

:
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relevant for the truth of (44)
but a sequence of structured
activities which constitute pitching
a no hitter in a
baseball game. One may object
to this example by claiming
that pitch a no hitter is a
process verb rather than an
accomplishment, so (44) can not be
taken as a case that the
modal treatment of the progressive
can not handle.
But if
itch
a
no hitter is a process verb like
E
run, then we could
have used (46) as well as (45) to
report;
(45)

I

saw Smith run yesterday.

(46)

I

saw Smith pitch a no hitter yesterday.

but (46) is not true in a case where Smith
did not finish

pitching a no hitter.

So this example raises a difficulty

for my treatment of the progressive as well
as for Dowty's.

3*2.

When-Clauses and the Imperfective Paradox
One of the objections raised in section 1.3.2. against

Dowty's definition of the progressive was the claim that if
the interval at which the main— clause sentence is evaluated
is the same as that at which the sentence in the when-clause

iS/ then the event of John being hit by a truck described in

sentence
(23)

(

23

)

John was crossing the street when he was hit
by a truck.

falls within the interval

I

at which the progressive main

.
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sentence is evaluated, and
therefore in every inertia world
hich IS exactly like the
actual world up to and including
I) John was hit by
a truck,
it follows from this that
there
are no inertia worlds where
John crossed the street is true
and therefore, contrary to
our intuition, sentence (23) is
false

Hinrichs (1981) suggested a
treatment of tenses,
adverbs and temporal anaphora in
sentences with
before
and af^-clauses which was
pursued in the framework of
Kamp's discourse representation
structures. Hinrichs
focused on temporal structures of
past tense narrative
discourse and like Kamp (1981b) and Bach
(1980; 1981) took
events, processes and states (which
Bach gave the generic
term "eventualities") and the relations
of precedence and
overlap between them as primitive, rather
than moments or
intervals of times.
in the heart of his treatment of

temporal anaphora lies Reichenbach

'

s

notion of reference

time, which Hinrichs extended into a formal
semantics

framework.

Partee has pointed out (1984) that the theory of

discourse representation which has provided

a

unified

treatment of pronouns and the approach which takes

eventualities rather than times as basic together with the
notion of reference time can explain to a greater extent the
analogies between nominal and temporal anaphora noticed by
her in an earlier paper (1973). In that paper Partee
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observed that tenses (which
involve several categories of
expressions like tenses. adverbials
and adverbial clauses).
like pronouns, are anaphoric
and can have either a
inguistic or a non-linguistic
antecedent. The tense
morpheme was treated by her in
that paper as a pronoun-lihe
variable over time. Partee
later observed
(1984) that this

can be carried out more elegantly
by using reference times
which do not correspond to any
constituent in the sentence
but are part of a necessary
context for interpreting tensed
sentences.
In the same paper she presents
the general
approach taken by Hinrichs in his treatment
of temporal
structures for a fragment of English and
further extends
it.
We will summarize below the main
features of Hinrichs'
and of Partee 's treatments in order
to pursue the issue of
temporal reference in when -clauses like
(23).

In Kamp's theory (1981a), discourse
representation

structures are descriptions of partial models
and are true
with respect to a complete model if they are
embeddable in
it

(embeddability plays in his theory the same role that

satisfaction does in predicate logic).

in Kamp's account of

nominal reference each occurence of a proper name or an
indefinite noun phraze introduces a new element into the

discourse representation, while pronouns refer to elements

already introduced.

Discourse representations can be used

in a similar way to describe temporal reference as suggested
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by Kamp (1981b) and
Hinriohs (1981).

m

the following little

narrative taJcen from Hinriohs
and given in Partee (1984
(47)

),

Jameson entered the room, shut
the door carefully
1

and switched off the light
It was pitch dark around
him,

because the Venetian blinds were
closed

the clauses labled e^^-e
3

describe events (e^ is the event of

Jameson entering the room) while s^-s^
describe states. It
was observed that an event sentence
moves the action
forwards in time while a state sentence
describes how things
are at the time of the last mentioned
event.

Partee

represents the discourse representation (47)
in the box
given below by using "<" for the relation
of complete
precedence, "0" for overlapping, "9." for the
relation of

temporal inclusion, and r^ for the speech time.

There is a

past reference time which is specified at the begining
of
the discourse and is moved forwards with the
introduction of

each new event-sentence.

Each new past tense event occurs

within the then-current reference time and causes the
reference time to be shifted to a new reference time which
follows the just introduced event (In Partee

'

s

discourse

representation structures given below r^ is the past
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reference time,

the present reference time
and r^, r^, r

3
are the “updated" reference
times introduced between
and
r^).
States and processes include
the current reference
time but need not overlap
the event that led to the
introduction of that reference
time.

Partee represents (47) in a
discourse representation
box following Kamp (ms. 1981b)

(47

'

In the discourse representation (47') e^ is the
event-toJcen

of the event type given in the box following it.

As a

consequence of the ordering specifications s^ and s^ must
both overlap some time "just after" e^ (this is Partee

's

term, and will be explicated later) and may but need not
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overlap

itself.

To conclude, a single
sentence is interpreted with
respect to a reference time,
if it is a state or a
process
sentence the state or process
must hold or go on at the
current reference time; when
it is an event sentence,
the

event occurs within the
then-occuring reference time while
a
new reference time following
it is introduced.
Hinrichs assigns different
roles to the main and
subordinate clauses with respect
to the dynamic of reference
time.
Suppose we interpret a simple
past tense narrative
where the past reference time
is r^ and the next sentence
begins with a wh^-clause. The
when-olause introduces a new
reference time r^ which follows r^
and the main-clause
is

interpreted with respect to r^.

To demonstrate how

reference time is triggered in when-clauses
under Hinrichs'
treatment Partee suggested the following
little discourse:
(

48

)

Mary turned the corner. When John saw
her.
she crossed the street,
e..

and extracts from it the following temporal
conditions of
discourse representation structures (where circles
represent

inclusion i.e e^or^, S2Cr2, e3cr2)

;
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(48')

r

©^

j.

*

< /^<

'3

<»»

Hinriohs does not impose any
relative ordering on the events
in the when and main-clauses
and gives examples in which the
event in the main-clause does
not follow that in the

w^-clause.

In example

(49) both events can happen
at the

same time and in (50) the event
in the when-clause follows
that in the main-clause (both
examples are Hinrichs',
adjusted by Partee to keep the surface
order of the clauses
constant
)

(49)

When John wrecked the Pinto, he broke
his arm.

(50)

When the Smith threw a party, they invited
all
their friends.

Partee distinguishes between the temporal
relation "just
after" represented by "^" and the relation
of precedence

represented by

The reference time introduced by an

event sentence is located "just after" the event
(According
to Partee a newly introduced reference time is
definite if
it is "just after" some uniquely specified event,
and

indefinite when it is after, before, or within some given
event or "just after" an event not specified uniquely).
only requires that the reference time be put within
or surrounding the when -clause in stative or eventive
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sentences.

The "just after" relation
introduced by Partee
represented in the temporal
condition (48'') of the

discourse representation structure
of

(48

"

(

48 );

)

now

The main difference between her
treatment of when-clauses
and Hinrichs' is in how the when
-clause characterizes the
new reference time introduced by
it.
Partee says that the
primary function of a v^-clause in
simple linear narrative
IS to provide a new reference
time for the main-clause, and
the event described in the
when-clause does not have to
occur within the then-current reference
time.
This is

consistent with the temporal condition
conveyed in (48'')
where
introduces the new reference time
r^,

occur within it, nor within

r^^.

but does not

She provides the following

example to account for the role when -clauses
play in linear
discourse in the introduction of a new reference
time;

(51)

People began to leave.
0-1

1

The room was empty.
S

The janitor came in.
^2
(^2)

People began to leave.
oT

1

the janitor came in.

When the room was empty,
e

2

.
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Discourse

(

51

)

is anomalous because
the state described by

of the room being empty
is not expected to hold
just
after people began to leave
and since s^^ can not move
the
t

action forwards, The janitor
ca.. in can not be interpreted
with respect to a time after
people began to leave, and just
after the room was empty.
Such a problem does not arise
in
the case of discourse (52)
since the when-clause (which is
an inchoative and not a stative
sentence) introduces a later
reference time (and the event it
describes is not within any
previous reference time). So the
janitor is understood to
come in after people began to leave
and just after the room
was empty.
Partee has also provided examples with
before and after
which show that as with when -clauses the
subordinate clause
IS always processed before the
main-clause and interpreted
with respect to the main clause introduced
by it.
So far examples have been given of the
three possible

temporal conditions which govern discourse
representation
structures of narratives with when -clauses

.

These three

possibilities are listed in cases (a)-(c):
(a)

The when -event and the main-clause event
can occur at the same time, as is the case in
example (49).

(b)

The event in the main-clause is just after the
event in the when -clause as in example (48)
(The "just after" relation may also distinguish
between the ordering of events in when and
after-clauses
)

:
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The event in the when-clause
is just after the

(c)

Case (b) is the only one handled
by Partee and case
disallowed by her scheme. Sentences

(c)

is

(53)- (54) are examples

of case (a) where the events in
the two clauses occurred at
the same time

(53)

When John became chairman of the board,
Mary
became president.

(54)

When the pressure of the gas rose, the
temperature increased.

The same temporal relations hold when
the main-clause comes

before the when-clause in the linear order of
the discourse:
(55)

John broke his arm, when he wrecked his Pinto.

(56)

Mary became president, when John became
chairman of the board.

(57)

The temperature increaesed, when the
pressure of the gas rose.

At the begining of this section we have said that if the

temporal relation between the two clauses are as stated in
case (a), then Dowty's analysis of the progressive, an

extended version of which was adopted by us, is
Problematic.

In evaluating the truth of sentence (23) every

inertia world includes the fact that John was hit by a
truck, so it is not true in any of them that he crossed the
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street and thus, contrary
to our Intuition, sentence
(23)
should be false.
Simple past tense discourse
in which the ordering of
events is as described in
case (b), i.e the event in
the
main-clause comes just after
that of the when-clause, is
the
most common one among the three
possible temporal relations
among events described in
(a)-(c). As we have already
mentioned, Partee handled only
case (b). However this
relation can not hold between a
when -clause in the
progressive and a main-clause in
sentences like (23) which
demonstrate the imperfective paradox.
This is so since it
implies that first John was hit by
the truck and only just
after that event occurred was he
crossing the street. A
progressive sentence is stative. We said
before that a
state described by a stative sentence
must overlap some time
just after the event in the when -clause
and may but need not
overlap that event. In sentences involving
the imperfective
paradox we must require that the state described
by the

progressive main-clause should never overlap the
event in
the v^ en -clause. As we said before, in the
case of sentence
(23)

it can not follow that event.

Partee does not discuss cases where in the linear order
of the discourse the main-clause precedes the
when -clause

and how this affects the dynamic of reference time and the

relative ordering of the events described in them.

In

s

:

191

sentences (23) the wh^-clause
follows the main clause in
the linear order,
In examples (55)-(57) the
postposing of
the when -clause doe s not
affect the relative ordering of
the
events.
The same i s true of examples
(59) and (61).
(58)

(59)

(60)
(61)

When the room emptied, the
janitor came in.
The janitor came in, when the
room emptied.
When the janitor came in, the
room emptied.
The room emptied, when the janitor
came in.

In (58)- (59) the janitor came
in just after the room was

empty and in (60)-(61) just after
the janitor came in the
room emptied (the later event must
occur in a very short
time).
(62)Sentences (58) and (59) are paraphrases and so are
(60) and (61). in the same way the when
-clause
can be

preposed in sentence (23) to yield (62), which
is its
paraphrase
When John was hit by a truck, he was
crossing the street.
If the linear order of processing when -clauses
does not

affect the ordering of the events in the two clauses as is
the case in (55)-(57) and (58)-(59), and if Partee

'

description of the ordering of events in when -clauses (case
(b))

and the way reference time is triggered is correct, one

wonders how sentence (23) can be true given the modal

definition of the progressive.
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Examples of temporal relations
as in case (c) where the
when-clause event follows the
main-clause are quite rare.
However, this is exactly the
event ordering which we want
to
hold in example (23). John
was crossin g the street i,
true
at an interval I iff
all worlds exactly like the
actual
one up to and including
1 and in which the
future course of
ents is that in which John's
intentions are fulfilled,
J ohn crossed the street is
true.
Since he was hit by a
truck some time after he was
crossing the street, inertia
worlds need not include the fact
that a truck prevented him
from completing his crossing.

m

The temporal relation described
in (b) is the most
common in the progression of simple
past when-clauses but is
the least plausible one to hold
between a main-progressive
clause and a ^en-clause in sentences
which demonstrate the

imperfective paradox.

On the other hand the least common

ordering of events in simple past when -clauses

.

which was

described in (c), is the one which must hold in
sentences
involving the imperfective paradox. We can not
explain this

mystery but only point out that the theory provided
for the
organization of time in when -clauses in past simple tense
makes the wrong prediction for progressive sentences like
(23), which exhibit the imperfective paradox.

193

FOOTNOTES

Montague's remark suggests
that this analysis might
due to Dana Scott.
be
i

Where
the case of process and
inchoative process verbs!
world '!rwh!ch"!oh!"s'!n!ent!on!

^

arf fuUi?f

possiDie
^o^sibir^or
for To,:r
John to be in Boston, i.e there
nr.
make it'imposs^w! !o! hL to
f°'^'=^^rhich
be
!he!™ich
sentence (18),
me!t!^ned bef!r!?"johrL"b!!ld"''""

intentions such as in examples

(

39

)

and

^
(

40 ).

^More work is required to determine
what sorts of
functions can be specified by the
context in the case of the
functions
different operators like Must, Can, etc are good for
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Lexical vs.

Verbs and Lexical Rules

Syntactic Rules

In various places in the
literature

(Jackendoff 1975,

Aronoff 1976, Dowty 1978, 1979,
and Bresnan 1978) it is
argued that the regularities among
sets of morphologically
related words should be described by
a set of rules distinct
from syntactic ones called "lexical
rules".
Lexical
rules

are responsible for derivational
morphology, zero

derivation, compound formation, etc.

In the process of

derivational morphology, a word is prefixed
or suffixed with
a new phonological component which
does not constitute an
independent word, as in red - redden The process
.

of zero

derivation changes a word's grammatical class
and meaning,
but not Its form, as in the formation of
the verb warm from
the adjective warm. In compound formation,
two words are
concatenated to form a third word, as in pocket-money

.

Various facts concerning word formation have led
linguists to distinguish lexical rules from syntactic.

Certain linguistic phenomena which in traditional grammar
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y

.
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were explained by word
formation appear to be less
systematic than those which
traditionally were treated
within the domain of syntax.
Not all potential derived
words of a certain morphological
pattern of a language are
actual words in that language.
Consider for example
den vs.
bro^-*bro^
and beauty - beautif vs.
ugl^-* uglify where * indicates
a potential but not an
actual word of a language. A
word marked by * must be
distinguished from an impossible derived
word which does not
correspond to any existing morphological
pattern, for
instance, r^-redm^. Unlike syntactic
transformations, for
example wh-movement, the lexical rule
which adds the
derivational affix
to an adjective is only partially
productive.
Lexical rules are also not always

—-—

,

^

compositional- the meaning of

a

derived word can not always

be predicted from the meaning of its
parts.

This was

pointed out earlier in Chomsky's paper on
nominalizations
(Chomsky, 1970). Dowty mentions the example
of the suffix

a^:

where V is a transitive verb, v-able usually means

'capable of being V-ed

'

.

Examples are washable

lovable. But changeable means

,

bearable and

'capable of changing' rather

than 'capable of being changed' and readable means
'capable
of being read without undue effort' rather that

being read'

'capable of

This shows that besides being partially

productive, lexical rules are also not always regular in
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their semantics.

Dowty claims that partial
productivity and semantic
unpredictability are the properties
which distinguish
lexical from syntactic rules.
He suggests that
morphological and syntactic operations
should be regarded as
distinct classes, although they
have the same form in the
grammar.
the context of this proposal
he mentions
Partee's suggestion (1979) of
reducing the number of
syntactic operations and replacing
them with a set of
primitive operations such as concatenation,
substitution for
a variable, etc.
The composite syntactic operation
of each
particular syntactic rule must be built
up recursively from
the set of the primitive operations.
Both morphological and
syntactic rules employ primitive operations.
Unlike

m

syntactic operations, morphological ones
always give a fixed
linear order of elements.
Syntactic operations may
interrupt and rearrange constituents formed by
other

syntactic operations but not by morphological ones.
Partial productivity and semantic unpredictability
are
the criteria which distinguish lexical from
syntactic rules,

but each of these two features may characterize a

morphological or a syntactic operation.

Dowty gives the

formation of a verb adjective construction

(

hammer flat

an example of a lexical rule which employs a syntactic

operation.

The verb-adjective construction is a

)

as
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discontinuous constituent and as
such is subject to a
syntactic operation, but since
many verb-adjective
combinations are ruled out in
English, this construction
must be derived by a lexical
rule.
The converse case is of
a syntactic rule which
uses a morphological operation.
Inflectional morphology, which is
highly productive and
semantically regular, provides such
examples, as for
instance English past tense
formation in which the suffix ed
is added to the verb.
From the viewpoint of semantic
decomposition,

accomplishments, achievements and statives
are related;
accomplishments contain a meaning component
present in the
logical representation of achievements
and the latter have a
meaning component present in the logical
representation of
statives.
This raises the question whether the
semantic
relationships between these classes of verbs are
reflected
in a different level of the language.

Word-formation is the

domain which deals with the relationships between
various
verbs and, as was mentioned before, morphological
operations
can be used by either syntactic or lexical rules.

if there

exist morphological operations which relate aspectual
classes of verbs, we will inquire to what degree they are

productive and semantically regular.

And if lexical rather

than syntactic rules are responsible for the derivation of
diffsisrit aspectual classes of verbs, then their inclusion

198

in a Montague Gra.^ar-like
framework violates the notion
of
a rule defined by
such a framework whose rules
are
compositional and productive.

Dowty derives different
classes of aspectual verbs by
lexical rules which take the
same form as syntactic ones.
His introduction of lexical
rules to derive English
aspectual verbs suggests that
their morphological
relationships are unsystematic and
semantically irregular.
Adjectives are basic expressions
from which inchoatives are
derived by adding the suffix en.
Two lexical rules are
introduced to derive causatives (in
addition to two rules
which derive f actitives
The first lexical causative rule
IS a zero derivation of a
causative-TV from an IV
)

.

of the

same pattern, as in cool^^-cool^^
and

red^^^-red^^^.

The

second rule derives a causative from
an adjective by
suffixing it with
as in the pairs random - randomize and
real - realize
.

Morphology plays

a

English aspectual verbs.

marginal role in the formation of
Most English causatives are basic

lexical items and the derived causatives constitute
only a
small subset of the class of English causatives.
(The rule

which derives English causatives from adjectives by
them with ize is much more productive than the one

which forms causatives by zero derivation.)

Inchoatives

derived from adjectives by adding the suffix en are few in
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comparison to the number of
English achievements. English
process verbs, «hich were
analyzed in Dowry's aspectual
calculus as semantically complex,
do not bear any
morphological relations to other
words or other aspectual
verbs.
These facts suggest that English
morphology reflects
aspectual properties of verbs
only to a limited extent.
The Hebrew system of morphological
verb patterns called
"binyanim” interacts with aspectual
properties of verbs in
an indirect way which may support
Dowty's construction of
his aspectual calculus, discussed
in chapters I and II. The
analysis of the interaction of Hebrew
verb-pattern and

aspect will be postponed to section

2,

after discussing the

issue of the status of lexical rules
in a Montague
Grammar -like framework.
Dowty presents a theory of lexical rules
which have the
particular properties assigned to them by
linguists and
which may exist within the framework of UG.
A lexical

component W of a language L is formally defined
as a
language independent of L (here a "language" is
used in the
sense of the grammar and not the generated sentences),

although it has certain parts in common with

L.

W has its

own set of lexical rules and a set of basic expressions,
the
same as that of L. Since not all possible derived words
in W

are actual words in L, Dowty defines various kinds of

lexical extensions of

L,

relative to some lexical component

:
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w of L, which adds to
it a new basic expression
which is one
of the possible derived
words specified by w. The new
basic
expression added to L, which 1 will
call E, was formerly a

derived expression in the lexical
component W. if e were a
derived expression in L, it might
have failed to satisfy the
requirements of compositionality and
full productivity which
all rules in OG must satisfy.
The introduction of
a

lexical

component and a lexical extension
avoid this consequence.
I repeat Dowty's suggestion
below to make it more
clear

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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Table

6.

Lexical Rules in a Montague
Graimnar

The Language L
bl

:

The Interpretation of l

a set of names of

syntactic categories
L2

:

L3

:

the set of basic
expressions of each
syntactic category.
the set of syntactic
rules

L1-L3 recursively determine

L4 which is the set of

well-formed expressions in
each category of L.
A Lexical Compone nt
W of L

L5: the interpretation
of each basic
expression of L.
L6: an interpretation

rule corresponding
to each syntactic
rule in L3

L5-L6 recursively
determine L7 which is
an interpretation for
each of the well-formed
expressions in L4
The Interpretation of w

Wl: a set of names of

syntactic categories
of W (Wl )=(L1

W2

:

)

a set of basic
expressions for each
category (W2)=(L2).

W3: a set of lexical

rules (W3

)

^

(L3

)

W1-W3 recursively determine
W4 which is the set of

possible derived words of
L for each syntactic category.

W5

:

an interpretation
of each of the basic

expressions
W6; an interpretation

rule corresponding to
each lexical rule
in W3

W5-W6 recursively
determine W7 which is
the derivationally
predicted interpretation
of possible derived words
in W4
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transparent

eKten.inn o. r i, ,
lexical extension of L in
which (1) the new basic
expression
added is one of the possible
derived words of L according
to
W and (2) the interpretation
assigned to this new expression
in L' IS the interpretation
given it by w.

^ s^^a^tically
20i
(A)

non- transparent lexical ext^nc-ion

is a lexical extension of
L meeting conditions

(1

)

in

but not condition (2).

Ln°n-derivational lex ical extension of

r.

is ^

lexical extension of L meeting
neither condition (1) nor
condition (2) in (A).

^ lexical

semantic shift in an interpreted language
L
IS an interpreted language L'
exactly like L except that the
interpretation of some basic expression in
L
is different
from the interpretation of that
expression
'

in L.

A lexical semantic shift explains
cases where the

speakers interpret correctly the meaning of
a new derived
word through their knowledge of the lexical
rule and later
on they learn its idiosyncratic meaning.
The effect of this
process, which is a two-step one, is the same as that
of a

semantically non-transparent lexical extension.
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Lexical Rules and th e Hebrew

Riny^.^iim

We have said above that
Hebrew morphology interacts
indirectly with aspectual
properties of verbs in a more
productive way than English
morphology does, and promised
to
discuss this issue further.
We think that this interaction
may be taken as evidence
supporting Dowty's construction
of
his aspectual calculus
discussed in chpater I and Ii,
where
it was shown how classes
of verbs are derived from
others by
means of semantic operators and
logical connectives.
1 will
argue in section 2. that the
semantic operators responsible
for the derivation of different
aspectual classes of verbs
interact with the distribution of
Hebrew verbs among the

morphological patterns called "binyanlm”.
Since the
regulations which govern the distribution
of verbs among the
binyanim have not been discussed yet in
detail, we will

present that issue in this section.
We have already discussed the distinction
between

lexical and syntactic rules, and between
morphological and
syntactic operations. The survey given below of
the

regulations characterizing the binyanim system suggests
that
the latter are governed by lexical and not
syntactic
rules

and that the operations employed by the lexical
rules are

morphological ones.

Dowty's suggestion discussed above with

regard to the incorporation of lexical rules in a Montague

Grammar-like framework may be adopted as well for the Hebrew

:

204

binyanim system.
There are seven morphological
verb patterns of
conjugation (binyanim) in Hebrew.
A verbal root can be
realized in one or more of the
seven morphological verb
patterns. The root p,
(historically p,<;,l) is used
traditionally as a prototype, where
p stands for the first
the second and 1 the third.
The stem forms of the seven
binyanim are

M

CaCaC

-

pa'al

Ni+CCaC

-

nif'al

CiCaC

-

pi'el

CuCaC

-

pu'al

hit+CaCeC

-

hitpa'el

Hu+CCaC

-

huf'al

Adjectives and nouns follow other morphological
patterns (miskalim). There are more miskalim than
binyanim.
Verbs can only be realized in one or more of the
seven
binyanim.

Almost all traditional Hebrew linguists agree thatr to
some extent, the binyanim system predicts semantic and

syntactic relations of the root.
the binyanim are quite productive.

The syntactic functions of
The active/passive

relationships are very productive in the case of pi'el/pu'al
and hif'il/ huf'al but less so in the case of pa'al/
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nif'al.

As far as transitivity is
concerned,

nifal

and

hitpa'el are typically
non-transitive: that is, they do
not
take et NP
is the definite direct
object marker).
Pi-el
and hifil are typically
intransitive and pu'al is neutral
in this respect.
The table below lists the
independent

syntactic functions attributed
to the binyanim in a typical
school of grammar^
(All verbs are represented in
the third
person. masc.
sing.
past tense.)
Table

7.

The Hebrew Binyanim (II)

name of
binyan

Traditional
syntactic function

pa'al

unmarJced base form

nif'al

passive of pa'al

nislax
'was sent'
passive
of salax

pi 'el

normally transitive

sider

'arranged'

pu'al

passive of pi 'el

sudar

'was arranged

hitpa'el

middle voice, normally
hitlabes 'got dressed
intransitive counterpart
of pi'el or pa'al.

hifil

normally transitive

hixtiv

'dictated'

huf al

passive of hif'il

huxtav

'was dictated'

'

Examples

The only significant change in the above traditional list is
the replacement of pa'al by pi'el as the productive unmarked

'

)

''

)
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form.

There are many pi-el verbs
which do not have pa'al
counterparts and are not derived
from pa-al or any other
binyan.
Perhaps the fact that pa-al
is neutral with respect
to transitivity is responsible
for this, in addition to
pa al s failure to accomodate
quadriliterals and

quintiliterals.
Linguists usually agree that, to
some extent, special
meanings of the binyanim are
productive in Hebrew, The
following table illustrates the
meanings common to a group
of verbs realized in each binyan.
The most common meaning
of each binyan is listed first.
Table
Name of
binyan
nif 'al

8.

The Hebrew Benyanim (III)

Meaning

change of state

Example

nidlak
vs. dalak

pi 'el

intensified form

siber

of pa'al

'turn on'
light int
(

'

.

smashed
intensified form
of Savar
break
'

hitpa el
'

hif 'il

reflexive
inchoative
reciprocal

hitraxec
hitraxev
hitvakeax

'washed' (oneself'
'widened int

causative
inchoative

higdil
hichiv

'enlarged' (tr)
'became yellow'

'

'

(

argued
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Bolozky (1978) constructed
tests which show that the
selection of the binyan a root
is realized in is influenced
by phonological considerations.
A root can not be realized
in a binyan if the resulting
verb has an unpronounceable
consonant cluster.
this case the root is realized
in the
banyan with the closest meaning
in which the verb can be
pronounced.
For example, a long noun like
torpedo realized
in hif'il yields J^itprid which
has an unpronounceable
cluster, so it is shifted to pi 'el
to yield tirped
Realizations preserving the consonant
cluster of original
nouns are preferred to these which
"break" them.
The verb
derived in productivity tests from the noun
snob was
conjugated in hif'il hisnib instead of pi 'el
sineb since the
former preserves the consonant cluster /sn/.
Also, when a
slot is already occupied by a verb, the
semantically closest
binyan is chosen.

m

.

Evidence is given below to show that the regularities
of the binyanim can not be captured by syntactic
rules, but

at the same time one wants to represent them as
part of the

speakers' knowledge of Hebrew.
The main observations that have been made of verb

pattern behaviour in Hebrew can be summarized in the
following six points:
1*

P^^^tial productivity - Only a small percentage of

Hebrew roots occur in all seven binyanim.

Schwarzwald
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(1975) found that only 2.3%
of the roots occur in all
seven
binyanim.
SpeaJcers learn idiosyncratically
which roots are
possible in which binyan.
2.

Homonymy - since a number of
roots are homonymous,

the realization of a phonological
root in one conjugation is
unrelated semantically to the
realization of the same
phonological root in another conjugation.
'ibek means
•dusted' and hib'abek means 'wrestled';
'izen means
balanced' and he ezin means 'listened'.
'

Irregularity - Even among the non-homonymous
roots, one can find semantic
irregularities.

Many roots do

not receive the expected meaning of
the binyan and their
meaning is learned independently. Geres
means 'sent away'
and hitgares means 'divorced'. The latter
verb takes the
unmarked feature of reciprocality from hitpa'el
('sent each
other away') but is more specific in meaning.

Several meanings- Most binyanim are connected with
several meanings.

A verb in hitpa'el may have an

inchoative, reciprocal or reflexive meaning.

The speaker

must learn which of these is related to a certain root.
5.

Speakers' mistakes - Speakers shift verbs from their

original binyanim to other more 'appropriate' ones.

Such

mistakes are ©specially common in language acquisition.
6.

Recent innovation and potential words - Bolozky

(1982) has shown that assignment of recent and potential
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innovations to canonical
morphological forms In the verb
system is essentially
semantic.
The facts presented in
(l)-(6) suggest that the
binyanim defy precise
systematization, but that there
exist
syntactic and semantic regularities
among sets of

morphologically related words.
treated by lexical rules.

These regularities should be

Lexical rules reconcile failure

of productivity (case
1) and failure of semantic

compositionality (case

3)

where the meaning of the word is

not determined by the meaning
of its parts.
On the other
hand, speakers' mistakes (case
5) and recent innovations in
addition to the cases where the meaning
of the derived verb
IS predicted (case 6) suggest
that to some extent the
binyanim are governed by semantic
properties.
The operation
employed by the Hebrew lexical rules are
morphological and
not syntactic.

2.

2

^

*

Aspectual Verbs and the Hebrew Binyanim

Deriving Inchoatives in Hebrew
Bolozky investigated Modern Hebrew verb formation

^t^^tegies and showed that assignment of recent and

potential innovations to the binyanim is essentially
semantic.

in an earlier paper (1978), he suggested that the

distribution of verbs among the binyanim is based on the

'

'
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division between transitive
and intransitive verbs
and in a
(1982 ), he replaced this
by a more complex system
which includes notions like
'agency,
'causation' and

activity to be discussed
later.

Bolozky claimed that

non-agentive verbs are normally
realized in hitpa'el.
canonical pattern like hittCaCeC
the root

m

a

s,p,r 'cut hair'

is inserted to yield
histaper

'cut one's hair' and s,m,r
to

yield histamer. To support
the claim that non-agentive
verbs
are realized in hitpa'el he
provided a list of recent Hebrew
innovations of verbs
_ __
veros whi’r-h
wnicn are non-agentive.
The majority
of his examples repeated
below are inchoatives:
,

(1)

hit'azreax
hit axzev
'

hitparxeax
hitmaked
hitxatex
hitmames
hitrakez
hityaded
histavec
hitpancer

.

'became
'became
'became
'became
became
'became

a citizen'
disappointed'
a hoodlum'
focused'
handsome
a reality'
concentrated
'became friend'
'had a heart attack'
'failed because of mishap'
'

'

Bolozky also tested the productivity of
formation of new
verbs from existing nouns and adjectives
whether borrowed,
native, old or new.

The nouns selected in the two tests he

constructed were triconsonantal (to avoid phonological

restrictions on the choice of binyan) and non-native
(to
avoid clash with existing forms).
In the first test the
subjects were asked to invoke active formation of

denominative verbs.

The nouns were read aloud with their
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paraphrased target meaning and
the subjects were asked
to
fill in their suggested
realizations for corresponding
verbs
in short sentences
prepared in advance. For example,
the
noun
-sheriff was read aloud and then
its target
meaning -he became a sheriff.
The same method was used in
test II except that below
each of the given sentences
there
were a few alternative verbal
realizations of
the noun.

The

noun and its target meanings
were read aloud and the
subjects were asked to choose the
one that best
characterized the given meaning and
to fill it into the
given short sentence.
l will list below only
the
denominative verbs constructed from the
nouns whose target
meaning was that of inchoation. Bolozky
reports that the
preference to realize inchoatives in
hitpa'el in

productivity tests was 100%
(2)

histaref
hitvasel
histalen
histnobeb
hitmarkses
hitsmalcec

'became
'became
'became
'became
'became
'became

:

a sheriffa vassal'

an armchair revolutionary'
snobbish'
a Marxist'
schmalzy'

Hitpa'el is the only non-passive binyan which is
marked

exclusively as syntactic intransitive.

Since inchoatives

are always syntactic intransitive, it is very likely
that

they will be realized in hitpa'el.
are derived from adjectives.

Inchoatives in hitp'ael

For example:

'

'
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(3)

Adjectives
kar
xam
raxav
'

adorn

sikor
kacar

cold
'warm
'wide
'

'red'
'is drunk'
'

short

Inchoatives

hitkarer
hitxamem
hitraxev
hit adem
histker
hitkacer
'

'became
'became
'became
'became
'became
'became

cold'
warm'
wide'
red'
drunk'
short'

Hebrew adjectives follow certain
morphological patterns (of
which there are a much greater
number
than for the verbs).

However, since in Dowry's English
aspect calculus, which we
adopt for Hebrew, stative predicates
(which adjectives form
most of them) constitute the basic
expressions of the
language (i.e, they are not semantically
derived), they need
no further consideration.
In chapter I we discussed three
kinds of inchoatives-

absolute, vague and comparative inchoatives.

Aspectually

there are two kinds of inchoatives in
English and Hebrewevent inchoatives and process ones. Absolute
and vague

inchoatives are event type verbs, and process
inchoatives,
which were claimed to derive from comparative
inchoatives,
are processes.

The verbs listed as vague inchoatives also

have the become-ad j-er reading.

inchoatives are event type verbs.

Both vague and comparative

Examples of absolute,

vague and process inchoatives are provided below (see the

discussion of these distinctions in chapter II, section 2.).
All three kinds of inchoatives are realized in hitpa'el.

Consider the following examples;

'

')

'

'

)

)

')

'

'
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4

)

^mple Inchoatives

(Absn1in-o^

hitazre ax became a citizen
hitpager
die
hitroken
'became empty'
'

'

'

(

^

^

Vague Inchoative*

hitkacer
hit adem
hitxamem
hitkarer
hi^taker
hitmoses

shortened int
'reddened' (int)
'warmed int
'cooled' (int)
became drunk
'melted' (int)
'

'

'

(

^

)

'

(

(

'

Process Inchoatives

hitnaven
hitpateax
histaper
hitragel
histaxlel
histalhev

decayed
'developed
improved
'got used'
^became technically better and
better
became more and more excited
'

'

The base form pa'al is neutral
with respect to transitivity:
iasav -set down' is an IV and
'ate' is a TV. Since the
verbs in pa'al are basic and not
derived, they may exhibit
the different shades of meanings
which govern the binyanim
system. Verbs of all aspectual classes
may be found in
pa'al and among them inchoatives.
Some examples of

inchoatives in pa'al are given below:
gavah
gadal
raza
kaf a
kaha
names
xala

'became tali'
'

grew

'became thin'
'froze int
'darkened int
'melted int
'became sick'
'

(

'

'

(

(

)'

'
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A small class of color
inchoatives are assigned to
hif'ii;
(8)

hichiv
horik
he edim
'

he ef ir
'

hisxir
hesxim
hivhir
hixxil
hilbin

'became
'became
'became
became
'became
'became
'became
'became
'became

yellow'
green'
red'

grey
black'
brown'
bright'
blue'
white'

'

Also to be found in hifil
are a few human and physical
quality terms, for example:
(9)

hifsir
hexmic
hismin
hivri

'melted int
'became sour'
'became fat'
'got healthy'
'

(

All the above verbs in hifil
are ambigious between the
inchoative and causative reading as
in the case of the
English verbs cool,
etc.
There may be a lexical
rule which derives color term
inchoatives in hif'ii. This
rule does not derive all possible
color inchoatives since
'became purple', *hixtim 'become orange',

—

for

example, are not Hebrew words.

There are no color term

inchoatives in any of the other binyanim
except for hit 'adem
became red' in hitpa'el which has an
equivalent hif'ii
counterpart; he 'edim. The question of whether
color term

inchoatives are rule-governed or learned idiosyncratically
will be left open.
To conclude, the lexical rule which forms
Hebrew

'
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inchoatives is highly productive.
inserts it in hitpa-el.

it takes an adjective
and

Since lexical rules are
not

systematic it is expected that
a few inchoatives may
be
found in other derived
binyanim as is the case with

color

inchoatives which come in hif'il.
The verb pattern hittCaCeC
has two other meanings
beside that of inchoation:
reflexivity and reciprocality.

Hebrew reflexives are formed
in two ways- by adding the
reflexive pronoun 'myself,
'yourself, etc to a verb in one
of the transitive active
binyanim, or by realizing the root
in hitpa el.
Consider (et is the direct object
marker and
acmo means "self"):
(10)

jraxac et acmo
(hitraxec
Tcava' et acmo

(hictabea
Tserek et acmo
(histarek

'washed himself

'painted himself
'combed himself

J

T'iper et acmoi
Ihit'aper

'put on makeup'

>

The following verbs are examples of
reciprocals in hitpa 'el:
(11)

hitgarsu
hityadedu
hitpaysu
hitna^ku
histaxsexu

'(they)
'(they)
'(they)
'(they)
'(they)

got divorced'
befriended'
made peace with each other'
kissed each other'
quarreled'

We see that the verb pattern hit+CaCeC shares several
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meanings- that of reflexivity,
reciprocality and
inchoation.
The verb hitxamem seems
ambiguous between the
reflexive and the inchoative
meaning (perhaps only a
vagueness rather than an ambiguity
is involved

here, and in

this case no difficulty
arises).

The verb in ha -is hHtvam.,.

—

hatanur "the man warmed himself
next to the heater"
has the reflexive reading only
since ha 'is ximem et
le yad hatanur "the man warmed
himself next to the heater" is
acceptable, but not *ha'is na'asa
vot er xam leyad hatanur
"the man became warmer next to
the heater".
Hamarak
hitxamem al hagaz "the soup warmed
on the
gas" has the

inchoative reading since hamarak na'asa
voter xam al haaax
"the soup became warmer on the gas"
is acceptable, but not
amarak ximem et acmo al hagaz "the soup
warmed itself on
the gas".
Since the translation rules which derive

^

reflexives and inchoatives are different, we
end up with two
different expressions in the intensional logic.
The

morphological operation which derives different kinds
of
verbs may be the same as is the case with the formation

of

Hebrew reflexives and reciprocals as long as their

translations are different.
As we illustrated above, process inchoatives as well as

simple and vague inchoatives are derived in hitpa'el.

The

morphological operation takes an adjective and turns it into
a hitpa'el verb.

The lexical inchoative rule is:

=

.
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<12)

L„j^:

If

then

^

where

(

4

)

g

conjugated in hitpa'el.

TWO translation rules
are needed to derive the
vague and
comparative inchoatives discussed
in chapter I. The rule
which derives vague inchoatives
says that if ,4 is an
adjective with translation o<
then inchoative
is a
verb with translation
^ x[become(cool ^ (x)
The rule which
derives comparative inchoatives
states that if

(<

)

)

] .

'

^

adjective with translation
with translation

'

then inchoative «'

3c[become (cool

^ x

is an

'

is a verb

)

(x))].

The comparative translation
rule and the vague one give
the same results for absolute
(non-vague) adjectives like

fourlegged

.

When oC is an absolute adjective
then the

contextual parameter in the translation
of vague inchoatives
does not affect interpretation.
Since fourlegged
is

non vague,

(^c) (Vc

')

[fourlegged '^=fourlegged

when an
absolute adjective appears in the
translation of comparative
inchoatives we get: ]x 3c[Become fourlegged
'^(x)

(

above generalization we can replace c by

c'

)

J

.

By the

so

7x3c[Become(fourlegged'^,)J. since the existential
quantifier does not bind anything we can eliminate
it and
end up with a translation of an absolute
inchoative
^ x[become four legged
(

'

,{x))].

.
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•

Hebrew Causative Verbs

Hebrew derived causatives are
formed in hif'il (60%)
and pi'el (40%). A verb in the
base form pa'al is
causativized by being inserted in
one of the two binyanim
according to certain regularities
which will be discussed
below.
Katav 'wrote' is causativized in
hif'il to yield
hixtrv 'dictated', and lamad 'studied'
is causativized in
pi'el to yield
'taught'. Many of the pa'al verbs
from
which the causatives are derived are
no longer used in
Modern Hebrew and not all verbs in
pa'al are

IJ^

causativizable.

As to semantic predictability, all
derived

transitive verbs in hif'il are causatives
except for the
small group of color term inchoatives
mentioned before.
There are basic accomplishments in the basic
binyan pa'al,
such as harag 'kill' bana 'built', xanak
'strangled', etc.
Some notions interact with causative verbs
affecting

their distribution between the two causative
binyanim.

Causatives may be divided into three classes:
(a)

Causatives whose objects are agentive like hekim
'made stand up', he eziv 'made leave' and hi trim
'

'made contribute'.
(b)

Causatives which aspectually are processes (CPV) like
holix 'made walk'
'made roll

(c)

,

hikpic 'bounced' and gi Igel

'

Causatives whose object is a patient which undergoes a

.

'
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change of state.

Causative process verbs (CPV)
which belong to the second
class were discussed at
length in chapter II, section
2.3.
In that chapter we also
discussed Bolosky-s distinction
U983) between causative verbs with
agentive objects (which
he calls "active verbs")
and causatives with objects
which
are patient and undergo a
change of state ("non-active
verbs").
Tables 3 and 4 showing the
distribution of active
and non-active causatives between
hifil and pi 'el were
presented in chapter II, section 1.1.
Bolozky claimed that
there is no restriction on the
distribution of causatives
with patient objects but that there
are no causatives with
agentive objects which are conjugated
exclusively
in pi 'el.

Many causatives with agentive objects
are conjugated in
hif'il and some are formed in both binyanim.
Hif il has causative verbs with agentive
objects as

well as causatives with patient objects
that undergo a
change of state, like hilbin 'made become
white', hikpi
'froze' (tr) and hikdir

'

darkened

'(

tr

)

.

Pi 'el has causatives

with patient objects like kicer 'shortened', niven
'made
become decayed' and siper

'

improved

'(

tr

)

Bolozky (1982) has drawn another distinction between

which are causatives and verbs which are agentive.

Causative verbs are realized in hif'il, and to some extent
in pi 'el, and there exist transitive verbs which are

'

)

'''

''

''
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agentive but not causative
and these are realized in
pi. el.
The subject of an agentive
verb Initiates some activity
with
regard to an entity and this
is weaker than causing
an

object to act or undergo a
change of state. Bolozky
does
not supply us with a definition
of causation or initiation
which might point to the sense
in which causative and
agentive verbs differ. However
he offers lists of causative
and agentive verbs and these
suggest there is a genuine
difference between the verbs in each
category.
Some of his

examples are listed below:
(13)

Causative Verbs
in hif'il
(recent innovations)

hitrim

'cause to

Agentive Verbs
in pi'el
(recent innovations)

mikem

'put in place'

miked
sivek
tiyek
giSer
viset

focused
'marketed

contribute

he'eziv
hidhir
sigea
gidel
pinker

'made leave'
galloped tr
'made crazy'
'grew' (tr)
'cause a

ixzev

mishap'
'disappointed'

'

'

(

biyel
kif ter
kitleg

'

'filed'
'

'

'

'

'

bridged
regulated
stamped
buttoned
cataloged

The difference between the verbs in the two
lists may be

informally stated as follows: the result state or effect
of
most activities described by the causatives may exist

independently of the subject or causer of that activity.

A

flower may grow by itself (notice you can not say 'the earth

:
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grew the flower- since it
is thought of as growing
by
itself; something like
Dowty's causal factor is
needed
here.
See my discussion of this
point in chapter II,
section 3.1.) Similarly, a
person can be disappointed
without someone forcing him
to that state; I may leave
the
room without being forced
to do so; or 1 may get crazy
without anyone driving me into
that state of mind. The
result state of the activity
described by an agentive verb
IS intrinsically related to
the activity of the subject of
that verb- the result state can
not exist independently of
the subject's activity which
brings it about. The result
state is always specified in
causatives, but not the
activity of their subject. On the
other hand an envelope
can not be stamped by itself, a
camera can not be focused
without somebody focusing it and documents
are not filed by
themselves. Although the distinction I
have drawn is stated
rather informally, I believe it captures a
genuine

difference which exists between causative and
agentive
verbs.

Bolozky has shown the difference between them is
reflected in Hebrew morphology, since agentive verbs
are

conjugated in pi -el while causatives tend to be conjugated
in hif'il.

The distinction made so far may be summarized as

follows

,
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hif il
'

pi 'el

causatives with agentive
objects*

causatives with objects which
undergo a change of state

agentive verbs

causatives with objects
which undergo a change
of state

causative process verbs
some causative verbs with
agentive objects come in both
hif 'il and pi 'el
(

)

.

^cojnplishments.

Causative s and Hebrew Morphology

In chapter ll, section 1.2.
we discussed Dowty's

suggestion that accomplishment verbs
be presented by a
bi-sentential CAUSE operator whose second
clause is usually
a become-sentence.
We have already seen that Hebrew
exhibits a highly productive rule for
deriving inchoatives
and we shall investigate whether the
same is true for

accomplishments.

Since the latter are analyzed by a CAUSE

operator, the relationship they bear to
causative verbs must
be examined carefully.
Hebrew morphology may help us here.
Since it was assumed in traditional Hebrew
grammar that

hif'il verbs are causatives (apart from a small
group of
color term inchoatives

)

we can ask whether verbs which

carry the hif il morphological pattern are
accomplishments
•

English does not have a unigue morphological

pattern to mark most of its causatives, so it is impossible

.
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to determine this issue
in that language.
Pi 'el is the secondary
causative binyan in Hebrew,
but

since traditional Hebrew
grammarians agree that not all of
its verbs are causatives,
its morphological pattern
alone
can not identify causative
verbs for us and we must
establish an additional criterion
for sorting "natural
causatives" in that binyan. The
criterion established
should also be capable of
identifying underived causatives
in the basic binyan pa'al such
that we could ask with regard
to them whether they are also
accomplishments.
Two issues need to be clarified:

(1)

Are Hebrew

binyanim sensitive to the aspectual
property of being an
accomplishment, and (2) What evidence can
Hebrew provide to
support the hypothesis that accomplishments
should be
analyzed in terms of CAUSE?.
To answer this we must deal with two
questions:
(a)

Whether all Hebrew causatives are accomplishments,

(b)

Whether all Hebrew transitive accomplishments are

and

causatives
The first question has already been answered neqatively
in chapter II, where causative process verbs (CPV) were

discussed.

Hebrew CPV are conjugated in the causative

binyan hif 'il and aspectually are process verbs and not

accomplishments.

A parallel example exists with process
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inchoative verbs which are
formed in hitpa'el along with
simple and vague inchoatives.
Although aspeotually those
verbs are processes and not
achievements, they are formed in
hrtpa'el which is the main
inchoative binyan.
It is the

semantic operator Become, denoting
change, which is present
in the logical representation
of process inchoative verbs,
that determines their formation
in hitpa'el, and in the same
way. It IS the semantic
operator CAUSE and not the aspectual
property of being an accomplishment
which determines
the

formation of CPV in
XII nir
hif'il
11.

mvn-icr
This
does not refute the claim

concerning the relationships between
causation and
accomplishments and between change and
achievements, but
only shows that Hebrew morphology is
sensitive
to the

semantic features of change and causation
and not to the
aspectual properties connected with being an
accomplishment
or an achievement.
Let us turn to the second question.

Since traditional

grammarians agree that hifil verbs are causatives,
we must
look for transitive accomplishment verbs in
pi 'el and pa'al

which are not causatives.

in several places we have claimed

that the state described in the result state clause
of

causative verbs can exist independently of one of the

assumed unspecified activities in their first clause.

A

natural causative of a language" will be defined as a verb

whose

resultant" is expressed in that language by an
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adjective or verb morphologically
as simple as or simpler
than the causative verb.
If a pa'al or pi'el
transitive
verb has a result state
expressed as an adjective or
verb
which is as simple as or
simpler than the pi 'el or pa-al
verb, then that verb is a
Hebrew causative, ximem 'warmed'
IS a pi 'el causative since
its result state is expressed
in
Hebrew as a morphologically
simpler adjective xam 'warm' and

kicer 'shortened' is also a pi 'el
causative since the
adjective kacar 'short' is morphologically
simpler than the
verb.
Accomplishments, on the other hand, will
be defined
as non-subinterval verbs.
If it took x n hours to V, where
V is an accomplishment, then it
is not true that x V-ed in
any smaller interval than that of n
hours duration. We will
look for Hebrew verbs which fail to
satisfy the subinterval
condition and which do not have a result
state expressed as
an adjective morphologically as simple
as or simpler than
the verb.
The problem with the criterion above is that
almost all

Hebrew transitive verbs have corresponding adjectives

expressing their result states.

There are many

morphological patterns of Hebrew adjectives.

Certain

adjectives, which may be considered the result states of
causatives, have the pattern of the passive binyan

corresponding to the active binyan in which the causatives
are conjugated.

Biyel 'stamped' in pi 'el has its result
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state expressed in pu'al,

(simple present tense) which
is

the passive binyan of
pi' el to yield mevuyal -is
stamped',
and similarly the result
state of tiyek 'filed' is
expressed
by metuyak 'is filed'.
(The corresponding statives
in
English are expressed by the
present participle).
it
appears that an adjective formed
in a passive binyan of the
corresponding causative is morphologically
more complicated
than the causative in the active
binyan.
If this is true,
then verbs with morphologically
more complicated adjectives
are not natural causatives. All
the verbs in pi 'el listed
in 2.2. which were called
"agentive verbs" have result
states expressed as adjectives in their
corresponding

passive binyan, and since those adjectives
are

morphologically more complicated than the verbs,
the latter
are not causatives according to our criterion.
The verbs

:y^yek

'filed' and

Myel

'stamped' are accomplishments, and

so are the agentive verbs in pi 'el tiyek
'filed', miked

focused', etc.

if what we have said above is correct, then

we have examples of accomplishments which are
not

causatives.

According to our new criterion for defining

causatives, not all hif 'il verbs are causatives since the

result states of some of them are expressed in adjectives
formed in their corresponding passive binyan, for example,

hixtim 'stained'- muxtam 'is stained'; hivris
muvras 'is brushed'.^

'

brushed

'-
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Are there Hebrew accomplishments
which lack
corresponding adjectives to express
their possible result
states? The only example I
am aware of is the VP laxac
’shook hands ’.3 lax ac yadalm
is an accomplishment
whose duration is very short.
Also, the verb is formed in
the basic binyan pa'al. A
slow motion movie in which a
shaking of hands is filmed
consists of different sequential
hand gestures with the last
gesture the shaking

22^

of

interlocked palms.

Not until the last stage has
been

reached, can it be said that the
shaking of hands has
occurred.
this respect laxac yadalm is an

m

accomplishment, since it fails to satisfy
the subinterval
condition. There is no Hebrew adjective
morphologically
related to the accomplishment laxac
vadaim - lexuc vadaim 'is
hands shaken' sounds peculiar in Hebrew.
The function of the
custom of shaking hands in western society
is that of
greeting, making acquaintance, congratulating,
etc.

You can

not say of someone whose hand you have shaken
that he is

mevorax 'is greeted'.

There are no Hebrew adjectives

expressing the result state of leaxel 'to congratulate'
or
lehitvadea 'to make acquaintance'.

Hebrew does not have a

result state adjective morphologically related to laxac

yadaim and there are no adjectives (morphologically
unrelated) which can be used to express the result state of
that accomplishment.

So here we have a case of an

v
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accomplishment verb with no
corresponding adjective
expressing its result state.
This IS a case where language
and metaphysics
coincide. Why is not there a
Hebrew adjective expressing
the state of having had one's
hand shaken? There are Hebrew

adjectives expressing the state of
being blessed (e.g., by
the pope) (mevorax) or being
baptized mutbal
the
religious sense, the result state of
being baptized or being
blessed by the pope changes the state
of the world, while
the result state of having had
one's hand shaken does not
change the state of the world in any
significant way. This
(

)

.

m

of course, can not be separated from
our conceptual schemes,

beliefs and metaphysics which very often
are reflected in
language.
it seems to us more appropriate to
include in our

ontology the states of being baptized or blessed
than the
state of having had one's hand shaken.
Perhaps this is why
Hebrew does not have an adjective to express such
a state.

The fact that mevorax 'is blessed' and mutbal
'is baptized'

come in the passive binyanim huf'al and pu'al of the

causatives hitbil 'baptized' and berex 'blessed'

(i.e are

more complicated morphologically) coincides with our

intuition that those verbs are "less natural causatives"
than he edim 'reddened', hirxi
'

fattened

.

'widened' or hismin

The result states of the latter are expressed by

hsbrew adjectives simpler than the corresponding verbs
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'red',

ra^

'wide',

Given our

conceptual schemes, physical
states and human quality
states
"exist" in our world.
This has probably to do
with the fact
that such states are
expressed in Hebrew by adjectives
which
are morphologically simpler
than the related verbs.
Partee has brought to ray
attention another interesting
fact.
The VP's ^eak windows and
shake hands can both be
modified with a by-phrase. Consider:
(14)

John broke the window by hitting
it with a book.
clasping it and moving

We have argued in chapter II,
section 2.3. that what is
inside the
phrase modifying a causative verb
specifies
the activity of the subject of
the causative, i.e the causee
of the result state.
However, in sentence (15) the clasping
and moving of Bill's arm are not the
causee of Bill's having
his hand shaken; they only constitute
part of the

accomplishment of shaking his hand.

in contrast,

in

(

14

)

the hitting of the window with a book is
what caused it to
break.

m

addition to the lack of an adjective expressing

the result state of the verb laxac yadaim 'shook
hands',

what IS inside the scope of the ^-phrase that modifies
the
VP is not a causee.

laxac yadaim 'shook hands' is an

accomplishment which is not a causative.
What conclusion can be drawn from this discussion?

The
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fact that we have found only
one example of an Hebrew
transitive accomplishment which
does not have an adjective
expressing its result state makes
Dowty's analysis of
accomplishments as bi-sentential combined
by CAUSE very
appealing.
Hebrew accomplishments almost always
have
adjectives expressing their result
states and those
adjectives are embedded under a Become
operator in the
second clause of the CAUSE operator.
However, sometimes
those adjectives are morphologically
more complicated than
the accomplishments whose result
states they express (the

adjectives appear to be derived from the verb
and not vice
versa) and in this respect they do not
satisfy the

definition of natural causatives we provided.

If we stick

to that definition then there are Hebrew
accomplishments

which are not causatives and this can be taken as
a

counterevidence to Dowty's hypothesis.
we may allow

On the other hand,

resultant" of causatives to be expressed in

adjectives morphologically more complex than the verbs they
are related to.

The states expressed by those adjectives,

although derived from the verbs, are now part of the
ni^tsphysics of the language" and the adjectives express

"genuine" result states.
The Hebrew binyanim system derives causatives and not

accomplishments.

But according to the about remarks about

Hebrew accomplishments and their result states, their
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analysis by a bl-sentential
CAUSE operator whose second
clause expresses a result
state which came into existence
is
an attractive prposal.
This also explains why most
accomplishments are formed in hifil
and pi 'el.
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FOOTNOTES
The two lists provided are
taken from Bolozky's 1978

paper

criterion of defining causatives,
so
morphology is sensitive to causatives our claim that
aL not
accomplishments is still valid.
3

Perhaps laxac yadaim is an idiomatic
exoressinn

Qinr-c.

.

,

.

.
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In several places in the proof,

i

use assumptions about

interval semantics, specifically
about the interaction of
truth functions and intervals,
which may be controversial.

would like to point out what these
assumptions are.
Essentially, l assume that truth functions
and intervals do
not interact, i.e., that
I

ii^

&

]]j=[[j<]j^ s

Y

II

f]]^

(The truth functions on the left are those
of the object

language; those on the right those of the metalanguage).

in

the proof, the sole relation between
[[^]]^ and

where

I

and

I'

are different intervals, is provided by the

axioms of additivity and partitivity.
We begin by stating the axioms of partitivity and additivity.

Partitivity Axiom

^

^(5,w,

;

[tl,t2] ,g,"^^

Additivity Axiom
^

^

^

^(5,w,

[tl,t2] ,g~^

^®,w, [tl,t3] ,g"^*

^
^

,w,

[

t2 ,t3

,g“^
]

^

.

]
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P roposition

KAUSE

Let / and
f be additive and partitive.

.

Then

is additive.

Proof

KAUSE
[

[

^

1//]

is additive if the following

KAUSE

I/'
]

]

[tl,t2 ,g

i nference

is valid:

=1

]

[

show

:

I

^
^

KAUSE

^

KAUSE

KU

T

'(JrW,
]

,

[t2,t3 ,g

~

]

]_
^<?,w, [tl,t3] ,g
;

=1

^

Below the formulas occuring in this inference
have been
expanded, using the defintion of KAUSE.
([fcx^ll
'V,[tl,t2]
abbreviates

®-“/''w,[t2,t3j‘'t'^Hw,[t2,t3j""~)*“^'')^ll„,tt2,t31
show

—

;

By additivity and premises A and B we have

[[(/]]
/

and
[

[-^

[[

O"?

]

]^^

.
|.

^

[

tl , t3

We still have to show:

^ ^^w,[tl,t3]’
'jf'

w,

We will prove a slightly stronger

j

result, deriving this from the final conjucts in A and B:
A-.

show:

"V'll„,[tl,t3]

When the meaning of Lewis' counterf actual connective Q~>

premise A' is made explicit. A' amounts to

in

.

;
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w

,

[tl,t2 =1
]

\/

<?t

(3se5J

.

1.

P
The counterf actual connective

2.

a-i>

in premise B

'

and the

conclusion can be expanded in the same way.
Since each
premise is a disjunction, we have to show 4
3.
cases

4.

premise A' disjunct
premise B' disjunct

conclusion
premise A' disjunct
premise B' disjunct

conclusion
premise A' disjunct
premise B' disjunct

conclusion
premise A' disjunct
premise B' disjunct

conclusion
In the first case,

conclusion

I

will derive disjunct

In the remaining cases,

I

^

of the

will derive disjunct
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P

of the conclusion.

Case

1.

For case (1) we show:

VW

a.

Vw'

b.

show;

[

[^]^

V'
]

.

W

[[i]]
^
I
'

[0]

,

]

,

=1

,

=1

[tl,t2]

,

[t2,t3]

,

r

!

[tl,t3]

,

The conclusion follows from premises
(a) and (b) by the

additivity axiom.
Case

2.

For case (2) we have to show:

Ose

a.

$^)(

g„.£

s

show:(3se5^)(3w€S)

t

[~/l 1„,

Let S, w', verify premise (a).

j=l i
_

Then

premise (a)) and

^^"^^^w',[tl,t2]"^

^

(from premise (b)).

We are to show

Suppose not. Then [[^]]^,
[

[

]

]^

,

^

j

^

^2

•

^w'

.

,

^^2 t3
,

i=l.

[tl,t3]
-i

By partitivity

This contradicts the formula derived

]

from premise (a), as desired.
We still need to show

(

\/

w" e S

)

[

^

t3]^^'

.

.
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Let w"6
^

From disjunct

s.

From disjunct

^w", [t2,t3]"^‘

ft

^

^

of premise

^

(b),

of premise

(a),

semantics for-:?

^w", [tl,t2]^^*

and

we have

1

We are to show that

li/

/

'

1

1

^

w"

,

[

=1

tl , t3

.

-i

-i
equivalently
^

'

4

that [[~{^]]^„ r.,
w ,[tl,t3]1=1 -? [-^ O'
^^V",[tl,t3] =1
We show this by conditional proof.
[

1
2

[tl,t3]"^

.

w ", [tl,t3]"^

/

3.
,

[tl,t3]"^

,

[

6

,

by
and

[tl,t3]"^

Case

&

elimination

from

4

0

instantiation of
premise (b) and 5.
contradiction,

p

6

and

1

3.

This is symmetric to case

Case

V

by additivity and

.

p

indirect proof

by partitivity

tl t2

[tl,t2

7.

,

assumption

4.
5.

]

assumption

.
,

]

2.

4

For this case we assume that conjunct

^

holds

for both intervals, that is, there are spheres

such that

and S

2

]
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a. (^w 6
]

^

1

„,._

"‘^"'^®2)tt~/Hw',[t2,t31=l‘<^“"*S2)[[~/
Since
S
1.2

is a nested family of spheres,
either S^c S

CS^

(for both). Without loss of
generality, we can

assume

3
^

S

Si
c.

(

or

2

082

the other case is symmetric.

;

Since

we have, from the second conjunct
of (b),

2

\/w" € S,

1

)

(~0^ ->

)

'

w",[t2,t3]

=1^

We need first to show the first
conjunct of the conclusion,
e.

^

^

^ ^

1

^

^

the procedure of case
1

-

(

'

2

.

3 w' 6

To show this we follow

f

)

[

2.

[-^]

From (a),

1

SW:( 3w€

=1
'

'

3.

4.
5.
6

.

7.

=1

,

.

‘'~»^^'wMtl,t2]=l

5^=[[~^Hw,[tl,t31=l
"^''W,[tl,t3]=l
tiffn,..,
'w'

p

&

p

,

[tl,t2

=1

existential
deriviation

assumption, from

1

indirect proof

assumption
by partitivity from

5

contradiction

6

3

and

f

)

]
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We need still to show
1

2

.

(

Vw"

6 S,

1

)

[

[-rf

r

\/w" 6

-

1//1
'

^

)

1

w"

,

(~

[

-v

tl , t3

.

3.
4

sJi<Jw:

(

-1
~^
]

w"

,

[tl,t3

=1

•

universal
derivation
,

conditional proof

assumption

'w, [tl,t3]"^

.

indirect proof

5.

assumption

^w", [tl,t3]"^
6

y/

.

'

“'^''w”,[t2,t3

indirect proof

1=l

7.

assumption
8.

9.

"1

10.
11.
12.
13.

[tl,t2]^^ 1
["1*1

^

*1^1

1„", [t2,t3j“'l' ^

Iw", [tl,t2]"*-

[[)

^w", [t2,t3]"^

[[)

^w", [tl,t3]"^

1
—

^

15.

P

^W", [tl,t3]~°
«

p

truth definition
for negation
by additivity from
11 and 12

truth definition
for negation

contradiction,
and 14

3

16.

instantiation
from second conjunct of

(a

^

>
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17

.

[

f

[

18.

^w"

,

&

[tl,t2

[[f

^

^w", [t2,t3]^^

[[^

^

^w", [tl,t2]"^

[[ y/

^

.

[[/] ^w",
[tl,t2]"^^

.

—

^

[t2,t3]
22

^
semantics of
elimination, 16,18
semantics for
V elimination, 6,20
,

.

tt2,t3J

23.

24.

n^j
p

&

elimination, 17

^w", [t2,t3]"^

and

21

by partitivity
from (5)

&

19
20

^

w'

^p

[t2,t3]

-1

^

universal
instansiation
from (c)

semantics for •—?
-^elimination, 19,22.

,

semantics for ^ and
contradiction 21,23

hfli^

\4..

i A

